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Introduction
It is a central tenet of American corporate law that the board of directors
of a corporation is entitled to manage and direct the business and affairs of
the company. Shareholders have distinctly more limited powers within the
corporation: they can sell their shares, vote them where allowed, or sue the
company and its management to enforce its officers and directors' fiduciary
duties.1 While suing and selling are important topics worthy of scholarly
attention, this article focuses on shareholder voting rights.
As a routine matter, shareholders vote on a significant number of issues.
For example, statutory, state corporate law requires that they vote annually
to elect all, or at least a significant portion, of the members of the board of
1. Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance:
Protecting ShareholderRights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 216-18
(1999).
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directors. A second major area for shareholder voting pertains to
management and directors proposals, such as votes to approve a merger or
sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the corporation, or a proposed
amendment to the corporate charter. In more limited circumstances,
shareholders have the right to place proposals on the corporate ballot using
Rule 14a-8 of the 1934 Exchange Act, as well as the right to initiate bylaw
amendments that are consistent with state law limitations.
In this article, we conduct an extensive review of empirical studies
concerned with the most important areas for shareholder voting: elections
of directors and management proposals. 2 We seek to inform the reader
about which topics have been well-studied and which areas still require
further investigation. Part I examines the various theories that have been
proposed to explain the existence of shareholder voting at corporations. Part
II looks at the evidence surrounding proxy contests for corporate control
and whether it serves to discipline management or just provide a target for
opportunistic investors. Part III looks at uncontested director elections and
whether they have a meaningful role in keeping management accountable to
shareholders. Part IV examines management proposals to understand which
proposals play a meaningful role in corporate governance. We conclude
with a brief summary and recommendations for future lines of potential
research.
I. Theory of CorporateVoting
What are the theoretical justifications for giving the shareholders voting
rights?3 Easterbrook and Fischel advance one of the first formal analyses of
this question.4 In their highly influential book, The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law, they characterize shareholders as "gap fillers" in the
incomplete contract that is the corporation. The shareholders hold the
residual interest in the corporation, and therefore have "the appropriate
incentive[] . . . to make discretionary decisions. . . . The shareholders

2. There is a related, recent survey that covers research on shareholder proposals and
some other selected areas of shareholder voting. See Matthew R. Denes et al., Thirty Years
of ShareholderActivism: A Survey of EmpiricalResearch, 44 J. CORP. FIN. 405 (2017).
3. For a discussion on the theory of corporate voting, see Randall S. Thomas & Paul H.
Edelman, The Theory and Practice of Corporate Voting at U.S. Public Companies, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER PowER 459 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas
eds., 2015).
4. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAw

63-65 (1991).

5. See id. at 21-22.
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receive most of the marginal gains and incur most of the marginal costs.
They therefore have the right incentives to exercise discretion." 6 In other
words, shareholders have the right to exercise discretion through their
voting rights because they have the claim on the residual value of the firm.
For practical reasons, they can choose to delegate those voting rights to the
board of the corporation, but "managers exercise authority at the sufferance
of investors." Easterbrook and Fischel's theory is subject to a number of
critiques, which one of the authors has explored elsewhere but will not be
repeated here.8
A second theoretical argument justifying shareholder voting can be
derived from Berle and Means' observation that in the modern corporation,
there is generally a separation of ownership and control.9 Jensen and
Meckling build on this point to argue that there is a principal-agent
relationship between the shareholders of the corporation and the board of
directors.o In any principal-agent relationship, the agent will be tempted to
try to extract private benefits, while the principal will take actions to
minimize these costs." In the corporate setting, shareholders can engage in
monitoring as well as adjusting the price they charge for capital. 12
Monitoring activities include shareholder voting, which shareholders will
use if it is cost effective to do so. 13 This model has also been subjected to
various criticisms.14
More recently, Edelman and Thomas have proposed an alternative
justification for shareholder voting.1 5 They note that shareholders are the
only corporate stakeholders whose only certainty of obtaining returns on
6. Id. at 68.
7. Id. at 67.
8. Thomas & Edelman, supra note 3, at 460; see also Paul H. Edelman et al.,
Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1371-72
(2014) [hereinafter Edelman et al., ShareholderVoting].
9. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 119-25 (1932).
10. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-09 (1976).

11. Id. at309-10.
12. Id. at 312-13.
13. See id.
14. Thomas & Edelman, supra note 3, at 460-64. For one thing, there is little evidence
that the law requires boards to act on the shareholder's behalf. See Margaret M. Blair,
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 214-23 (1995); see also Edelman et al., ShareholderVoting, supranote 8, at 1372-

74.
15.

Thomas & Edelman, supra note 3, at 462.
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their investment is tied directly to stock price changes.16 In other words,
shareholders can only be sure of getting any return on their stock by selling
it "at market price to realize a capital gain (or loss)."17 The other forms of

.

returns they may receive-dividends or other payments from the
company-are not guaranteed but are subject to the board of directors'
discretion. 8 By contrast, the other corporate stakeholders generally know
what their returns will be, such as interest payments to creditors, subject to
the enterprise's financial viability.19
If the corporation's stock price is positively correlated with the residual
value of the firm and stock markets are given sufficient information about a
public firm's value so that its residual value accurately reflects their share
price, then shareholders are the single corporate stakeholders whose return
depends on both the firm's residual value and the stock market's accurate
functioning.20 Hence, shareholders can use the vote "to ensure that the
residual value of the firm is maximized" (which therefore maximizes stock
price)-21
For example, shareholders "use the monitoring function of the vote" to
remove boards that fail in maximizing share price by removing them in
proxy contests. 22 When management proposes a value-decreasing merger,
shareholders may use the vote to reject it or to force the acquirer to make a
better offer. 23 Less dramatically, hedge funds may use the vote as part of a
campaign to gain representation on the corporation's board of directors and
place pressure on the board to realize the full value of the stock.24 More
generally, the vote provides shareholders with a method of monitoring the
25
board to ensure it protects their interests.25
Assuming that one can establish the legitimacy of shareholder voting
rights using one of these theories, historically shareholders have been
reluctant to exercise the vote vigorously.26 The explanation for this
16. Id.
17. Id.

18. See id. at 462-63.
19. Id. at 463.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. For an extensive discussion of the legal rules and regulations affecting proxy
&

contests for corporate control, see RANDALL S. THOMAS & CATHERINE T. DIXoN, ARANOW
EINHORN ON PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (3d ed. 1998).

23.
24.
25.
26.

See Thomas & Edelman, supra note 3, at 463.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 474-75.
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behavior generally focuses on the costs of voting.27 Shareholders
individually bear all the costs of voting, such as gathering information,
preparing solicitation materials, distributing those materials, and soliciting
support; yet, their successes benefit all of the shareholders. 28 In other
words, there is a collective action problem: how can individual shareholders
be incentivized to actually engage in monitoring activities? 29 Of course,
there are a variety of ways to reduce these costs, such as using third-party
voting advisors or permitted electronic proxies. 30 But even reduced costs
will only be incurred if the benefits of voting to the share price are likely to
exceed them.31
In recent years, activist shareholders have been more willing to incur the
costs of voting and seek to gain representation on, and even control of,
corporate boards.32 Their aggressive use of the vote has brought proxy
contests and voting on management proposals, such as mergers and
acquisitions, to the forefront.3 3 New regulatory developments have spurred
the growth of third-party voting advisors and mandatory voting by pension
funds and other institutional investors.34 These developments underscore
the importance of understanding corporate voting today and highlight the
need for a review of the academic literature concerning shareholder voting.
I. Proxy Contestsfor Corporate Control
In 1950, the first activist shareholders succeeded in gaining board
representation at a public company through a proxy contest. 35 It happened

at the Sparks-Withington Company, a New York Stock Exchange listed
company that manufactured radio and television parts.36 A shareholder and
accountant, John Smith, submitted a full slate of directors seeking to correct
the company's poor profits, nonexistent dividend, and inefficient
27. Id. at 468, 472.
28. Id. at 468.
29. Id.
30. Id.; Jeffrey N. Gordon, Proxy Contests in an Era of Increasing ShareholderPower:
Forget Issuer Proxy Access and Focus on E-Proxy, 61 VAND. L. REv. 475, 475-76 (2008).
31. See Thomas & Edelman, supra note 3, at 469.
32. See Alon Bray et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm
Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1730 (2008).
33. Edelman et al., ShareholderVoting, supra note 8, at 1408-13.
34. Thomas & Edelman, supra note 3, at 474-75.
35. Frank D. Emerson & Franklin C. Latcham, Further Insight into More Effective
Stockholder Participation:The Sparks-Withington Proxy Contest, 60 YALE L.J. 429, 430,
432-33 (1953) [hereinafter Emerson & Latcham, FurtherInsight].
36. Id. at 431-32.
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management. 3 7 The contest quickly turned into an all-out mudslinging
battle.38 In a proxy statement, Smith asked shareholders if they could live
on a dime of dividends.3 9 The company's directors responded by holding
cocktail parties for shareholders and offered shareholders radio and
television sets at reduced prices.4 0 Each side shot accusations at the other.41
Smith accused the directors of engaging in self-dealing with other
companies owned by family members.42 The directors accused Smith of
acting only out of self-interest, and they claimed his aim was to replace the
company's auditing firm with his own, Smith & Skutt. 43 Management used
company funds to employ a proxy solicitation firm, Georgeson & Co. 44

Smith used his second-hand Beechcraft Bonanza airplane to travel across
the Midwest and rally other shareholders.45 When the dust settled, Smith's
Protest Committee won control of the board of directors by a margin of 2%
of shares. 46 It was the first successful challenge to a NYSE-listed
company's incumbent management by a grass-roots shareholder
committee.47
Proxy contests' importance declined when the tender offer, a faster
mechanism for bringing about a change-of-control transaction, became
more popular in the 1970s. 48 During this time, hostile bidders were able to
overcome a variety of management defensive tactics to gain control of
publicly traded U.S. firms. 49 The tender offer's popularity peaked in the late
1980s 5 0 and began a rapid decline in the wake of the Delaware Supreme

Court's decision in the Time/Warner litigation.5 Time/Warner and
subsequent Delaware case law upheld target companies' "Just Say No"
37. Id. at 432.
38. Id. at 433.
39. Id. at 441. Specifically, Smith asked, "Can you live on a dime a year? In dividends,
we mean." Id.

40. Id. at 438-39.
41. Id. at 441.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 432, 443.
44. Id. at 445.
45. Frank D. Emerson & Franklin C. Latcham, Proxy Contests: A Study in Shareholder
Sovereignty, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 393, 397 (1953) [hereinafter Emerson & Latcham,
ShareholderSovereignty].
46. See Emerson & Latcham, FurtherInsight, supra note 35, at 451 n.93.
47. Id. at 429-30.
48. THOMAS & DIxoN, supranote 22, § 1.01[B].
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1141 (Del. 1989).
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defenses.52 This pushed bidders to bring joint tender offers and proxy
contests where they would offer to buy the company if the target firm's
shareholders would vote to turn out the incumbent board and allow the
bidder to redeem the target firm's poison pill. 53

Since the early 2000s, an important new player has emerged in corporate
voting: the activist hedge fund5. These investors typically purchase stakes
of 5% to 10% of the target company's stock and then push to bring about
changes in the firm. Their strategies often lead them to seek seats on the
target firm's board of directors, either through a short slate proxy contest or
by a negotiated agreement with the incumbent board.ss They are the most
frequent sponsors of proxy contests: during the period 2003-2012, they
sponsored 70% of all such contests, most of which were non-control
contests where activists seek to influence or replace existing management,
rather than to run the company. While hedge fund activists have been
carefully studied in the empirical literature, few papers have focused on
their involvement in corporate voting contests.
Part A below summarizes the existing body of empirical research on
proxy contests for corporate control. This work largely analyzes contests
that occurred before hedge fund activism became significant. The first
thirteen subsections draw on these earlier studies, while the next subsection
focuses on the newer research that examines hedge fund activism. The final
subsection summarizes the overall results and gives an overview of their
important points. Part B examines the determinants of the outcome in proxy
contests for corporate control.

52. Eduardo Gallardo, Poison Pills Revisited, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
& FIN. REG. (Feb. 18, 2010), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/02/18/poison-pillsrevisited/#4 ("[C]ommentators have suggested that the current state of Delaware law allows
a target board to "just say no" to an inadequately priced tender offer by enacting a
shareholder rights plan, effectively stopping shareholders from tendering their shares at the
board's discretion.").
53. See THOMAS & DIXON, supra note 22, § 1.01[B].
54. Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Gap Filling, Hedge Funds, and Financial
Innovation, in NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS: OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY
CHALLENGES 101, 101 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2007).
55. Vyacheslav Fos, The Disciplinary Effects of Proxy Contests, 63 MGMT. Sci. 655,
656 (2017).
56. Id.
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A. The Impact of Contested Elections of Directorson Shareholder Value
Researchers have tried to distinguish between two competing theories on
how the proxy contest fits within corporate governance. 7 The first theory
views proxy contests as a mechanism of corporate governance that
increases shareholder value by replacing or disciplining management.5 The
second theory views proxy contests as a destructive competition between
business tycoons that wastes shareholder wealth. 59 Distinguishing between
these theories requires investigating the identity and power of the dissidents
challenging the management incumbents, the conditions that lead to proxy
contests, and their impact on shareholders' wealth. 0
1. DissidentStock Ownership
Looking at proxy contests in the early 1950s, Emerson and Latcham
discover that dissidents own on average between 7% and 8% of the target
company. 61 These results suggest that dissidents are motivated by the
62
success of the company, rather than the private benefits of control. Instead
of being surprise raiders, dissidents tend to be shareholders with a
significant ownership stake in the company who only resort to proxy
contests after other measures have failed.63
Additionally, DeAngelo and DeAngelo uncover that dissidents publicly
announced their disagreement with the company policies prior to
announcing the proxy contest in 71% of cases, while many of the other
64
cases had private signs of dissident activity before the contest. This

57. See, e.g., Peter Dodd & Jerold B. Warner, On Corporate Governance: A Study of
Proxy Contests, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 405-06 (1983).

58. Id. at 405.
59. Id. at 406 (citing Adolf A. Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62
COLUM. L. REv. 433, 439 (1962)).
60. See id. at 406-07.
61. See Emerson & Latcham, Shareholder Sovereignty, supra note 45, at 412; Frank D.
Emerson & Franklin C. Latcham, Proxy Contests: Competition for Management Through
Proxy Solicitation, 8 Sw. L.J. 403, 411 (1954).
62. See David Ikenberry & Josef Lakonishok, Corporate Governance Through the
Proxy Contest: Evidence and Implications, 66 J. Bus. 405, 413 (1993).
63. Harry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo, Proxy Contests and the Governance of
Publicly Held Corporations,23 J. FIN. ECON. 29, 32 (1989).
64. See id. at 32, 33 tbl.1. The announcement of the proxy contest was the first public
"sign of dissident activity" in only seventeen of the sixty cases that they studied. Id. at 32. Of
the remaining seventeen, seven involved a formal insider of the firm, and seven had
evidence of prior contact between the management and the dissidents before the proxy
contest announcement. Id.
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suggests that dissidents are not surprise raiders but rather shareholders with
a vested interest in the firm who use the proxy contest as a last resort. 5 In
DeAngelo and DeAngelo's analysis, the dissident leader had prior
experience in the industry in half of the contests, with one-third having
prior experience at the target firm.
Along the same lines, Ikenberry and Lakonishok demonstrate that
dissidents tend to have a substantial ownership stake in the firm, suggesting
67
that they are looking after their own investment. They determine that the
median dissidents own 10.62% of the company, twice the ownership stake
in the company as the median incumbent directors.6 Similarly, Harris finds
that the dissidents own on average 8.7% of the company, a slightly lower
percentage of ownership than the mean incumbent group.69
2. CorporatePerformanceEffect on Targeting
Firms targeted for proxy contests consistently performed worse than
similarly situated firms based on accounting measures. 70 DeAngelo shows
there are negative median returns on equity in the three years leading up to
when dissidents announce their dissatisfaction with firm governance.
In a
similar vein, Mukherjee and Varela find proxy contest firms have
significantly lower returns on equity than other firms in their industry in the
two years leading up to the election.72

65. See id.
66. See id. at 36, 37 tbl.3. Of the sixty contests, dissidents in twenty-nine had prior
experience in the industry, including ten at the target firm. Id.
67. Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 62, at 413.
68. See id. at 413, 414 tbl.2A. They find that the median dissident group owns 10.62%
of the company, while the median incumbent group owns 4.61%. Id. Similarly, they find
mean dissident ownership of 13.58% and mean management ownership of 8.94%. Id.
69. Lee Harris, The Politics of Shareholder Voting, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1761, 1796, 1797
tbl.2 (2011). Harris's sample includes 190 contested elections at publicly traded firms from
2006 to 2009. Id. at 1791-92. He finds that the mean dissident owns 8.7% of the target
company, while the mean incumbent directors own 9.5% of the company. Id. at 1797 tbl.2.
70. See Linda Elizabeth DeAngelo, Managerial Competition, Information Costs, and
Corporate Governance: The Use of Accounting PerformanceMeasures in Proxy Contests,
10 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 12-14 (1988).
71. Id. She finds market-adjusted returns on equity for the three years leading up to the
dissident activity of -4.3%, -4.4%, and -5.8%, respectively, each significant at the 1% level
using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Id. at 13-14, 13 tbl.3.
72. Turun K. Mukherjee & Oscar Varela, Corporate Operating Performance Around
the Proxy Contest, 20 J. Bus. FIN. & ACCT. 417, 419-20 (1993). They examine return on
equity using the Du Pont system and the statistical tests used "include the t-test, the
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Duvall and Austin's analysis shows that targeted firms have significantly
lower returns on equity relative to the industry in the seven years leading up
73
to a proxy contest. In Austin's study he discovers that 35% of proxy
contests are associated with deficiencies in operating performance, another
25% resulted from disagreements over corporate policy, while the
remaining contests resulted from social factors such as personality
conflicts. 74 In a like fashion, Ikenberry and Lakonishok find that proxy
contest firms did significantly worse than comparable firms in their industry
in net sales, operating income before depreciation, cash flow, and dividends
in the five prior years.7 5 In sum, dissidents tend to target underperforming
firms, supporting the view that proxy contests are useful corporate
governance tools. 7 6

3. PriorTarget Stock Returns
The studies that focus on the target's prior stock returns paint a more
confusing picture.
Generally speaking, studies tend to observe weak
evidence of target firm negative cumulative abnormal returns ("CAR") in
the years leading up to the election.78 For instance, Ikenberry and
Lakonishok are unable to reject the null hypothesis that the target firm's
CAR equals zero for the five years leading up to the proxy contest. 79 Dodd
and Warner similarly find weak evidence of negative returns.o

Wilcoxon Matched-Pair Signed-Rank test and the Mann-Whitney test." Id. They found the
difference significant at the 5% level. Id. at 420.
73. See Richard M. Duvall & Douglas V. Austin, Predicting the Results of Proxy

Contests, 20 J. FIN. 464, 464-65 (1965). They find rates of returns on equity capital average
a -5.7% difference during the seven years leading up to the proxy contest. Id. This was
statistically different from their respective industries. Id. at 465.
74. See DOUGLAS V. AUSTIN, PROXY CONTESTS AND CORPORATE REFORM 20 tbl.3, 33
tbl.4, 39 tbl.5 (1965).
75. Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 62, at 417. They found that net sales (-26.2%)
and operating income before depreciation (-39.3%) were significantly different at the 1%
level, while cash flow (-37.2%) and dividends (-32.6%) were significantly different at the
5% level. Id. at 419 tbl.4B. During the three years leading up to the proxy contest, they also
found that net income before extraordinary items (-80.8%) was significantly different at the
5% level. Id.
76. See, e.g., id. at 417.
77. See, e.g., id. at 414.

78. See id. at 414-15.
79. See id. at 414. In their sample, they find a CAR of 4.7% for months -60 to -24
and -8.6% for months -23 to -6. Id.
80. Dodd & Warner, supra note 57, at 414.
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Yet, an interesting pattern emerges when stock return variations are
examined over time. Ikenberry and Lakonishok see significant negative
returns from two years to six months before the contest announcement, but
then significant positive returns during the two months leading up to the
announcement.8 2 Similarly, Dodd and Warner show weak negative returns
from two years to six months before the contest but significant positive
stock returns during the last six months.83 The reported positive returns just
prior to the proxy contest may have resulted from the stock market getting
wind of the approaching contest, since the extensive preparations required
for a proxy contest can be difficult to keep secret.8 4 Consistent with this
interpretation, DeAngelo also uncovers significant positive stock returns in
the six months leading up to the contest.8 5
Using a portfolio method to measure stock returns, Mukherjee similarly
shows that the contest firms outperform the S&P 500 in the six to nine
months leading up to the contest, depending on which test he uses. 8 6 These
returns, however, level off in the last two to four weeks before the contest. 87
In other words, the stock market may have fully priced the coming proxy
contest weeks before it is even announced.88
Discordantly, Austin finds three trends in the period leading up to a
contest, showing that about a third of firms' stock increases in value, a third
81. See id. at 418-19.
82. Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 62, at 414-15 tbls.2 & 3. The negative returns
in the two-years-to-six-months period are not statistically significant until they adjust for
size and beta. Id. The positive returns in the two months before the announcement are
statistically significant at the 5% level. Id. However, for Ikenberry and Lakonishok, the
abnormal returns become negative after they adjust for size and beta. Id. at 415.
83. Dodd & Warner, supra note 57, at 414-15 tbl.2. Looking at univariate statistics in
the months 60 to 24 before the contest, they find a cumulative residual of 0.054 with a
z-statistic of 1.42. Id. at 414. In months 23 to 6 before the contest, Dodd and Warner find a
mean cumulative residual of -0.087 with a z-statistic of -1.01. Id. Finally, "the mean
cumulative residual for months -5 through 0 is 0.054, with a z-statistic of 2.72." Id. at 415.
84. Id. at 423-25.
85. DeAngelo, supra note 70, at 16. DeAngelo finds a mean cumulative prediction error
of 6.6% for the five months before the contests (z = 2.60) and 9.7% for the two months
before the contest (z = 4.52). Id.
86. See Tarun K. Mukherjee, Stock Price Behavior Surrounding Proxy Fights for
Control: A Non-ParametricApproach, 21 REV. Bus. & ECON. REs. 85, 93 (1985). The sign
test finds higher returns from six months to four weeks prior to the contest announcement,
significant at the 5% level. Id. at 93, 94 tbl.2. The Wilcoxon test finds higher returns from
nine months to one week before the contest announcement, significant at the 5% level. Id. at

93, 96 tbl.4.
87.

See id. at 93.

88. See id.
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decreases in value, and a third does not significantly change.8 9 He suggests
that the increases may be due to dissidents buying additional stock to gain
more voting power before the contest. 90
Finally, Mulherin and Poulsen find significantly positive stock returns
from twenty days before the announcement until five days afterwards.91
Summarizing, the bulk of these results suggest that proxy contests generally
target firms with underperforming stock, but that this effect becomes
obscured by the perceived benefits of the coming proxy contest. 92
4. Value of the Vote Hypothesis
Dodd and Warner propose an alternative theory, called the "value of the
vote hypothesis," attributing the increasing stock price to the value of each
share's vote leading up to the record date. 93 This hypothesis suggests that
the price of the stock should decrease after the record date because only the
record holder has the right to vote in the proxy contest. 94 As expected,
Dodd and Warner find significant negative returns between the contest
announcement and outcome, which usually encompasses the post-record
date period. 95 To test this theory, they separate the sample between contests
where the announcement occurs before and after the record date. 96 They
find some evidence that stock prices drop more in contests with the record
date after the announcement than in contests with the record date before the
announcement.9 7 This difference, however, does not fully explain the drop
in price between the announcement and outcome. 98
89. See AUSTIN, supra note 74, at 49-50, 50 tbl.6.
90. Id. at 49-50.
91. J. Harold Mulherin & Annette B. Poulsen, Proxy Contests and Corporate Change:
Implications for Shareholder Wealth, 47 J. FIN. EcON. 279, 292-93, 292 tbl.4 (1998).

Between twenty days before the contest announcement until five days afterwards, they find
cumulative abnormal return of 8.04%, with a z-statistic of 10.7. Id. at 292 tbl.4.
92. See, e.g., Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supranote 62, at 414-15.
93. See Dodd & Warner, supra note 57, at 425-31.
94. See id. at 428-29.
95. Id. at 424-25. For the entire sample between these announcement and outcome, they
find a mean cumulative residual of -0.043 (z = -2.63), with only 32% of the sample having
positive cumulative residuals. Id. at 425. "[W]here dissidents win a majority," the "mean
cumulative residual" is -0.053 (z = -1.71). Id. "[W]here dissidents fail to win a majority," the

"mean cumulative residual" is -0.056 (z = -2.14). Id. It appears that they did not design the
study with the value of the vote hypothesis in mind and decided to improvise after they saw
the unexpected results. See id.
96. See id. at 429.
97. Id. at 429-31. For the forty-two contests with data available and record dates after
announcement dates, they find a mean residual for the day after the record date of -0.014
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Mukherjee also shows that the company's stock loses value during the
contest period relative to the S&P 500.99 However, when he separates the
sample between dissidents winning and losing, only dissident losses exhibit
significantly worse returns between the announcement and outcome of the
contest. oo
Ghosh et al. further assess the value of the vote hypothesis.101 They
discover more pronounced positive abnormal returns leading up to a proxy
contest for board control than with an issue proxy contest. 102 They fail to
find statistically significant differences in the lead up to board control
contests with the record date before and after the contest announcement and
with and without cumulative voting.103 They do, however, uncover
significant negative returns following the record date of a proxy contest and
larger negative abnormal returns for contests with cumulative voting than
those without it. 104 They argue that this provides some support for the value
of the vote hypothesis.105 Overall, the value of the vote hypothesis appears
to have significant support but cannot fully explain the pattern of stock
prices during the proxy contest. 106
5. Effect of Poor CorporatePerformance
Unsurprisingly, dissidents have a better chance of winning a proxy
contest at poorly performing companies. 107 Duvall and Austin show that
firms where dissidents succeeded in gaining control had significantly lower
average rates of return on equity than firms where dissidents failed.os
(z = -3.02). Id. at 429-30. However, for contests with record dates before the announcement
dates, they find an insignificant mean residual of -0.0003 (z = -0.49). Id. at 430-3 1.
98. Id. at 431.
99. See Mukherjee, supra note 86, at 97.
100. See id.
101. Chinmoy Ghosh et al., Proxy Contests: A Re-examination of the Value of the Vote
Hypothesis, 18 MANAGERIAL FIN. 3, 4 (1992).
102. Id. at 8.
103. Id. at 8-9. They expect that cumulative voting would have a more pronounced value
of the vote effect because the dissidents need less votes to gain board representation. Id. at 5-

6.
104. Id. at 10. The difference for cumulative and non-cumulative voting was significant
at the 1% level. Id. at 15 tbl.5 (Panel A).
105. Id. at 11.
106. See, e.g. Dodd & Warner, supra note 57, at 429-31.
107. See, e.g., Duvall & Austin, supra note 73, at 465-67.
108. Id. at 466. In their sample, forty-five contests were for control. Id. Of these, fifteen
contests resulted in dissident victory, where the firms average rates of return relative to
industry of -12%. Id. at 466, 466 tbl.2. At the thirty firms where dissidents lost, the firm had
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Interestingly, representation contests where dissidents gained board seats
had slightly higher rates of return on equity compared to firms where they
failed to get any seats. 1 09 Using a multiple regression model, Duvall and
Austin learn that dissidents are more likely to gain control at firms with
lower returns on equity relative to industry and lower profit margins
relative to industry.1 10
Similarly, Hancock and Mougou6 show that return on equity, dividend
payout, earnings per share, and price earnings ratio negatively correlate
with dissidents' odds of victory."' Mukherjee and Varela find that
successful contests had significantly lower returns on equity than an
industry control group in the three years leading up to the contest, while
unsuccessful contests had significantly lower returns on equity only in the
year before the contest. 112

Harris shows that there is a significant difference in the average stock
returns during the five years preceding this contest where dissidents win
and lose.113 Yet, he fails to find a significant correlation with one-year or
five-year stock returns and dissidents' chances of victory. 114 It seems based
on these studies that shareholders are more willing to vote for new
management when the company is performing poorly.115

average rates of return relative to industry of -4.8%. Id. Using a sum of squares test, they
find these differences to be statistically significant at the .06 level. Id. at 467.
109. Id. at 467. For representation contests, they find rates of return to be slightly higher
where the dissident was elected (-0.5%) compared to where he wasn't (-3.6%), but the
difference wasn't statistically significant. Id.
110. Id. at 470-71.
111. G.D. Hancock & M. Mougou6, The Impact of FinancialFactors on Proxy Contest
Outcomes, 18 J. Bus. FIN. & ACCT. 541, 546-47 (1991) (computing statistical significance at
the 5% level). They were unable to find a statistically significant correlation between
dissidents' odds of victory and return on assets, average excess return, beta, degree of
financial leverage, and the degree of operating leverage. Id.
112. Mukherjee & Varela, supra note 72, at 421, 422 tbl.1, 423 tbl.2 (computing
statistical significance at the 10% level).
113. Harris, supra note 69, at 1797-99, 1799 tbl.3. He found average five years stock
returns leading up to the contest of -10.4% where dissidents won and 4.77% where
dissidents lost, significantly different at the 5% level with a t-test and at the 1% level with a
Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test. Id. at 1799 tbl.3.
114. See id. at 1799-800.
115. See, e.g., Duvall & Austin, supra note 73, at 465-66.
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6. Liquidity Effects
Liquidity facilitates the occurrence of a proxy contest.116 Fos finds that
proxy contests occur more often at companies with liquid stock.117
Liquidity makes the proxy contest easier because dissidents can buy large
blocks of stock without increasing the stock price." Norli et al. find that
stock liquidity facilitates shareholder activism.119 They determine that
liquidity positively correlates with instances of shareholder activism,
including both proxy contests and shareholder proposals. 120 Using an
interaction term between liquidity and past performance, Norli et al.
discover that the probability of shareholder activism is more sensitive to
past performance when the company has higher liquidity. 121 They further
find that the liquidity negatively relates to the abnormal returns in the three
days around the announcement of shareholder activism. 122 Since the market
will price in the probability of shareholder activism, this shows that the
market believes that shareholder activism is more likely at companies with
more liquid stock. 123 They believe that liquidity facilitates shareholder
activism by making it easier for dissidents to buy shares.124
7. Stock Price Effects During a Proxy Contest
Dodd and Warner show that the target company's stock price generally
increases during the proxy contest, suggesting a potential increase in future
value. 125 They uncover positive stock returns from approximately sixty days
116. Fos, supra note 55, at 655.
117. Id. at 656, 664-65 (using the Amihud illiquidity measure). For an in-depth analysis
regarding the Amihud model of market illiquidity, see Yakov Amihud, Illiquidity and Stock
Returns: Cross-Section and Time-Series Effects, 5 J. FIN. MARKETs 31 (2002).
118. Fos, supra note 55, at 656.
119. 0yvind Norli et al., Liquidity and ShareholderActivism, 28 REv. FIN. STUD. 486,
503 (2015) (using the Amihud trade impact measure). The authors define shareholder
activism to include both proxy contests and shareholder proposals. Id. at 491-92. Their final
sample identified 385 instances of shareholder activism between 1994 and 2007. Id. at 487.
120. See id. at 502-03. They use a probit regression with the probability of shareholder
activism as the dependent variable and liquidity as an independent variable, yielding a
positive relationship significant at the 1% level. See id.
121. Id. at 503. The interaction variable yields a negative coefficient that is statistically
significant at the 1% level. See id.
122. See id. at 498-99, 498 fig.2. They find a coefficient of -0.105, which is statistically
significant at the 1% level. Id.
123. See id. at 502-03.
124. Id. at 511, 515.
125. See, e.g., Dodd & Warner, supra note 57, at 416. These results are different from the
results relating to the value of the vote hypothesis because they include both the pre-contest
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before the contest announcement up until the outcome.126 Surprisingly, their
results do not vary greatly depending on who ends up winning the proxy
contest.127 However, when examining the stock returns immediately
surrounding the outcome of the contest, they find positive returns for
dissident victories and negative returns for dissident defeats.128
Somewhat along the same lines, Borstadt and Zwirlein find positive
abnormal returns in the period surrounding the proxy contest. 129 DeAngelo
and DeAngelo also discover overall increases in stock value through the
course of the proxy contest.130 These returns, however, disappear when the
forty days leading up to the contest are removed, which supports the notion
that the stock market prices the value of the contest before it even begins.13 1
Alexander et al. find gains in stock value through the course of the
contest.132 Looking at the resolution of the contest, they report significant
period and the stock market reaction to the results of the contest. See supra notes 93-105 and
accompanying text.
126. Dodd & Warner, supra note 57, at 416. Defined as the fifty-nine days before the
announcement and going to when the election outcome results are announced, they find that
the mean cumulative residual is 0.082, with a z-statistic of 2.78, and a median cumulative
residual of 0.079. Id.
127. Id. For the period of fifty-nine days before the announcement up until the election
outcomes are announced, they find a mean cumulative residual of 0.082 (z = 1.89) for
contests where dissidents win no seats, 0.081 (z = 2.05) for contests where dissidents win at
least one seat, and 0.128 (z = 1.43) for contests where dissidents win a majority. Id.
128. Id. at 418. For the two-day period prior to and including the announcement, they
find a mean cumulative residual of 0.011 (z = 2.38) for contests where dissidents win at least
one seat and -0.014 (z = -1.67) for contests when dissidents win no seats. See id. They note
that "[t]he relatively small size" of these returns indicates that the good and bad news from
the contests has already been anticipated by the market. Id.
129. Lisa F. Borstadt & Thomas J. Zwirlein, The Efficient Monitoring Role of Proxy
Contests: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Post-Contest Control Changes and Firm Performance,
21 FIN. MGMT. 22, 28 (1992). They find an average abnormal return of 11.4% (z = 5.83)
during the proxy contest, defined as sixty days before the announcement until the contest
resolution. Id.
130. DeAngelo & DeAngelo, supra note 63, at 40. From forty days before the initiation
through the election, they find average abnormal stockholder wealth increases of 6.02%
(z = 4.32). Id.
131. See id. When the forty days before the initiation are taken out of the sample, they
find negative but insignificant returns, with -12.47% (z = - 0.77) from initiation of dissident
activity to the outcome and -6.32% (z = -1.14) from contest announcement to outcome. Id.
"These returns become significantly negative under the market-adjusted returns
approach . . . " Id.
132. See Cindy R. Alexander et al., Interim News and the Role of Proxy Voting Advice,
23 REV. FIN. STUD. 4419, 4431, 4436 (2010) (using a sample of 255 proxy contests
occurring between 1992 and 2005). For the period of twenty-five days before the proxy
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positive returns for a dissident victory and insignificant negative returns for
a management victory. 133 On balance, these studies support the claim that
investors appear to view proxy contests positively regardless of who wins,
although the announcement of dissident victories gains a more enthusiastic
-134

reaction.

The stock gains associated with proxy contests may result from their link
to takeovers of the company, which typically occur at a price per share that
is significantly above the current market price. 15 When DeAngelo and
DeAngelo break down the full period between contest outcomes, they find
significant positive stock returns only for contests where dissidents gain
some seats but not a majority.136 Their data appear to indicate that the
increased target firm value results from the sale or liquidation of the
company, which mostly occurs where dissidents gain some but not a
majority of seats. 137 Looking at the two days surrounding the contest
outcome, they find that dissidents withdrawing from the contest results in
significantly negative stock returns, further supporting their earlier
mentioned conclusion.1 3 8

Mulherin and Poulsen also show that most of the stock price returns
created by proxy contests actually result from takeovers. 139 Looking at
proxy contests accompanied by a takeover bid, they find that firms that
contest filing date until the resolution of the contest, they find a CAR of 17.26%, significant
at the 1% level. Id. at 4435 tbl.2, 4436. Even for contest won by management there is a
positive CAR of 19.24%, significant at the 1% level. Id. at 4435 tbl.2.
133. Id. at 4436. In the days surrounding the completion of the contest, they find a CAR
of 2.02% (t-statistic = 2.89) for dissident victory and a CAR of -1.07% (t-statistic = -1.56)
for the management victory. Id.
134. See, e.g., Dodd & Warner, supra note 57, at 416.
135. See, e.g., DeAngelo & DeAngelo, supra note 63, at 44-45.
136. See id. at 41-43. Between forty days before the start of dissident activity up until the
contest outcome, they find that contests resulting in some but not a majority seats had
shareholder returns averaging 30.12% (z = 4.77). Id. at 41 tbl.4.
137. See id. at 43-44. They count only those firms that have a sale or liquidation as
resulting from the contest where the financial press reports a link. See id. They find fifteen
contests result in sale or liquidation of the firm, of which seven had dissidents winning some
but not a majority of seats. Id. at 44. Those fifteen contests saw wealth gains of 15.16%
(z = 4.21) for the full period of dissident activity. Id. The remaining sample had shareholder
gains of 2.90% (z = 2.54). Id. at 44-45.
138. See id. at 42. Overall where the dissidents gain no seats, they find shareholder losses
of -5.45% (z = -7.56) in the two days surrounding the contest outcome. Id. For the seven
contests that ended with shareholder elections, they find insignificant outcomes of -1.73% (z
= -1.51). Id. For the sixteen contests that ended with dissidents withdrawing, they find
stockholder returns of -7.19% (z = -8.13). Id.
139. See Mulherin & Poulsen, supranote 91, at 308-09.
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experience successful takeovers have significantly higher stock returns than
firms with unsuccessful takeover bids. 140 Similarly, looking at contests
without a takeover bid where dissidents obtain seats, they find that contests
that result in the turnover of top management have significantly higher
stock returns during the proxy contest and in the year following the proxy
contest than contests without management turnover. 14 They further show
that a turnover in top management and a restructuring of the company are
not independent events, supporting the generalization that successful
turnarounds require new management.142 Mulherin and Poulsen conclude
that much of the value created by proxy contests comes from either the
acquisition of the company or the turnover of top management.143 In sum,
these papers suggest that the market benefits of proxy contests may have
more to do with their role in company takeovers than their impact on
corporate governance.144

8. Proxy Contest or Tender Offer?
To view the issue from another angle, one could ask why someone
would try to use a proxy contest rather than a tender offer to gain control of
a company.145 Sridharan and Reinganum find that proxy contest targets tend
to be significantly more leveraged than tender-offer targets.146 They have
greater degrees of management control than tender-offer targets147 and tend

140. See id. at 299. For firms with an unsuccessful takeover bid, they find insignificant
abnormal returns from twenty days before the announcement up until the resolution and
significantly abnormal returns of -23.7% (z = -4.18) for the year after the resolution. Id. at
299, 299 tbl.7 (Panel A). For firms with successful takeover bids, they find positive
abnormal returns of 20.1% (z = 9.49) from twenty days before the announcement until the
resolution and positive abnormal returns of 12.4% (z = 1.83) in the year after the resolution.
Id.
141. Id. at 301 tbl.7, 302 (noting t-statistics of 2.46 and 1.09 respectively).
142. Id. at 305, 307, 307 tbl.10 (Panel A) (resulting in ap-value of 0.000).
143. Id. at 303-05.
144. See, e.g., DeAngelo & DeAngelo, supra note 63, at 51-52.
145. See Uma V. Sridharan & Marc R. Reinganum, Determinants of the Choice of the
Hostile Takeover Mechanism: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Tender Offers and Proxy Contests,
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57, 57-59 (1995).

146. Id. at 62, 66. They find that the mean leverage ratio is 0.31 for proxy contest targets
and 0.24 for tender offer targets, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. See id. at
62.
147. Id. Non-insiders hold larger blocks of shares greater than 5% in "tender offer targets
(17.1%) than for proxy contest targets (12.9%)." Id. "[T]he average fraction of shares held
by" outside directors is higher for "tender offers (5.32%) than for proxy contest targets
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to be less profitable than tender-offer targets.148 Interestingly, proxy
contests and tender offers target firms with a similar proportion of
staggered boards.14 9 Using a logistic regression, they find that the
dissident's decision to use a proxy contest is significantly positively related
to the ratio of inside directors and the level of leverage and negatively
related to the percentage of shares held in greater than 5% blocks.1 5 0 More
profitable firms are more likely to attract a tender offer. 151 These results,
however, must be viewed with caution because the authors limit their
sample of proxy contests to those linked to a takeover attempt. 152
9. Longer Term PerformanceEffects
Mulherin and Poulsen offer evidence that shows proxy contest targets
continue to underperform the stock market in the years after the contest,
especially where dissidents win control. 153 They report nearly significant
negative CARs in the year following the proxy contest. 154 By contrast,
Mukherjee finds that these firms outperform the market for six to eight
weeks after the contest.1 5 5 However, when he separates his sample between
contests where the dissidents succeed and those where they fail, he finds
that dissident failures significantly outperform the market for four weeks,
while dissident successes did not have a statistically distinguishable
(2.32%)." Id. Tender offer targets have fewer insiders sitting on the board (29.6%) than
proxy contest targets (37.27%). Id.
148. Id. They find an ROA of 2.58% for proxy contest targets and 5.76% for tender offer
targets, significantly different at the 1% level. Id. They find similar results with an
"economy-wide adjusted ROA." Id.
149. Id. They find that 28% of proxy contests have staggered boards compared to 26% of
tender offers. Id.
150. Id. at 63-65 (noting statistical significance at the 5%, 10%, and 5% levels
respectively). They are unable to find a relationship between staggered boards, changes in
leverage, or the fraction of shares held by outside directors. See id. at 62-63.
151. Id. at 65. They find that adjusted ROA positively correlates with using a tender
offer, significant at the 1% level. Id. Cumulative excess return is also positive but only
marginally significant. Id.
152. See id. at 59-60. They include proxy contests that don't seek a majority of board
seats because they still seek some degree of control and because eliminating them would
shrink their small sample. Id. at 59.
153. See, e.g., Mulherin & Poulsen, supra note 91, at 302-03.
154. Id. at 293. In the year after the proxy contest, they find CARs of -3.43% (z = -1.93),
falling just short of statistical significance at the 5% level. Id. at 292 tbl.4 (Panel A), 293.
However, there is a downward bias because they do not include firms that are acquired just
after the proxy contest. Id. at 294.
155. See Mukherjee, supra note 86, at 98 tbl.5, 99 tbl.6, 100 (noting statistical
significance at the 5% level with both the Sign Test and Wilcoxon Test).
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performance.156 In sum, at least in the short term, the market appears to
favor dissident failures when the proxy contest results are released. 157
Ikenberry and Lakonishok determine that firms have negative stock
returns in the twenty months after the resolution of the proxy contest. 158
When separated by outcome, they find that dissidents gaining some, or a
majority of, seats is associated with significantly negative abnormal
returns. 159 Where management keeps all of their seats, they observe only
insignificant negative returns.160 However, when they expand their analysis
to examine the period four and a half years after the contest, all statistically
significant results disappear.
This may indicate that dissidents run the
company poorly, at least in their first twenty months on the board.162 The
market may also be correcting for over-optimism during the dissidents'
initial victory.163

Ikenberry and Lakonishok further find that about a quarter of the
negative returns occur in the day before and after an earnings report,164
which indicates that information in the earnings report (and therefore, the
performance of the company) caused the disappointing stock returns. 16
Finally, Ikenberry and Lakonishok show that in contests where dissidents
gain at least one seat, companies without management turnover perform
substantially worse than companies with management turnover. 16 In
contrast, Borstadt and Zwirlein fail to find any abnormal returns in the three
years after the proxy contest, which might suggest that the proxy contest
has moved the company back on track. 1 Overall, in the short term,
dissident victories are associated with poorer stock performance, while in
the long run the two groups appear to be indistinguishable.16 8
156. See id. at 100.
157. Id. at 101.
158. See Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 62, at 420-21, 420 tbl.5 (noting
significance at the 5% level). They find a CAR of -17.24% for the period for five months to
two years after the contest. Id.
159. See id. (noting significance at the 1% level).
160. See id.
161. Id.
162. See id. at 421, 423.
163. Id. at 433.
164. See id. at 422.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 424 (finding an insignificant result of -20.3% between months five and
twenty-four for proxy contest with dissident victories and management turnover, compared
to the CAR of -40.1% for dissident victories without management turnover).
167. See Borstadt & Zwirlein, supra note 129, at 28-29.
168. See, e.g., Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supranote 62, at 421-23.

2017]

SHAREHOLDER VOTING IN PROXY CONTESTS

31

The target company's future operating performance reflects a similarly
bleak picture. 169 Ikenberry and Lakonishok demonstrate that firms with
dissident victories have significantly worse net sales, operating income
before depreciation, cash flow, and dividends compared to industry peers,
while firms with management victories are statistically indistinguishable
from their industry peers. 170
Mukherjee and Varela find that contest firms had worse performance in
the three years following the proxy contest, as measured by return on
equity, compared to an industry control group, particularly in the third year
where the difference was statistically different at the 5% level.171 When
they divide the groups between dissident successes and failures, they find
that the target firms with dissident successes had significantly lower rates of
return on equity compared to a control group in the year after the contest,
while dissident failures had lower rates of return on equity in years two and
three after the contest. 172
Austin observes that in his sample of proxy contests about a third of
targeted firms failed or were taken over within three years. 173 This occurred
twice as often after representation contests as contests for control. 174 He
suggests that the tensions of a divided board may be too great for a
company to withstand. 175 Of those that survived, about an equal number are
doing better as are doing worse.
The poor operating results of target firms where dissidents win a proxy
contest may indicate that shareholders fail to vote rationally in the proxy
contests.
The results may also be due to self-selection problems where

169. See id. at 427, 430.
170. See id. at 427, 428-29 tbl.9. For contests resulting in some dissident victory, they
find over the subsequent five years negative net sales (-31.6%, at a 5% significance),
operating income before depreciation (-79.2%, at a 5% significance), cash flow (-99.1%, at a
10% significance), and dividends (-72.5%, at a 1% significance). Id. at 428-29 tbl.9.
Interestingly, these results become less statistically significant when dissidents win a
majority of the board seats. Id. at 427.
171. Mukherjee & Varela, supra note 72, at 420-21. The authors defined return on equity
as income before extraordinary items divided by total equity. Id. at 419.
172. Id. at 421 (each significant at the 5% level).
173. See AUSTIN, supra note 74, at 54-55.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 55.
176. See id. at 59-61.
177. See Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 62, at 433-34.
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dissidents win at the worst performing firms that are simply beyond
-178

saving.

10. Management andDirectorEffects
Proxy contests facilitate the turnover in management, even where
dissidents fail to gain any seats.179 DeAngelo and DeAngelo find that less
than a fifth of the sample firms retain "the same incumbent management
team" three years after the proxy contest. 1o Even where the dissidents did
not win a majority of seats, about half of these firms experienced turnovers
in top management, with three-quarters of these turnovers linked directly to
the proxy contest."' They interpret this as support for the view that proxy
contests are mechanisms to discipline management of a company even
where they do not succeed. 18 2 Along those lines, Faleye finds that the
likelihood of a forced executive turnover increases from 9.18% before the
contest to 22.45% after the contest. 183
Borstadt and Zwirlein learn that two-thirds of firms have a change in at
least one top-level executive or board member in the three years after the
proxy contest. 184 Using very recent data, Fos and Tsoutsoura find that only
43% of directors retain their board seats three years after the contest.18 5
Their regression results show that 27% to 39% of directors will lose their
seats as a result of the proxy contest. 186
Ikenberry and Lakonishok show that top management turnover helps
curb the negative stock returns after the contest.1 8 7 In the year and a half
178.
179.

See id.
See, e.g., DeAngelo & DeAngelo, supra note 63, at 50-51.

180. Id.
181. Id. at 46. Of the thirty-nine firms that did not experience a change of control, twenty
experienced the resignation of a top manager within three years, of which fifteen
resignations can be linked to the proxy contest. Id. at 46, 49. DeAngelo and DeAngelo used
detailed case studies to establish a link. See id. at 46.
182. Id. at 50-52.
183. Olubunmi Faleye, Cash and Corporate Control, 59 J. FIN. 2041, 2056 (2004)
(noting significance at the 1% level).
184. See Borstadt & Zwirlein, supra note 129, at 27. "A complete change in control
occurred in 70 firms," while thirty-one firms saw an external replacement of at least one
"top-level executive or board position[]." Id.
185. Vyacheslav Fos & Margarita Tsoutsoura, ShareholderDemocracy in Play: Career
Consequences of Proxy Contests, 114 J. FIN. ECON. 316, 321 (2014).
186. Id. at 322 tbl.4 (Panel B), 323 (noting significance at the 1% level).
187. See Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 62, at 424-25, 427. They find management
turnover in 24% of the cases where dissidents gain no seats, and turnover in 58% of cases
where "dissidents gain at least one seat." Id. at 424.
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after a contest where dissidents gain at least one seat, they find significantly
negative stock returns where there is no management turnover, but
insignificant returns where there is a management turnover. 8 8 This is
consistent with the claim that proxy contests help corporate governance by
facilitating the turnover in top management. 189
Proxy contests also hurt a director's tenure at other companies.1 90 Using
data from recent proxy contests, Fos and Tsoutsoura find that directors of
target firms have on average 2.2 seats leading up to the contest, which
drops to 1.8 seats five years later.191 Using regression analysis, they claim
that directors are likely to lose seats after a proxy contest. 192 Their
regression predicts that a targeted director will lose in total 1.7
directorships, including those at the targeted company and other companies,
leading to lost income of $2.9 million over twelve years. 1 93 The authors
take advantage of the presence of staggered boards to show that these
results are caused by the proxy contest rather than the director's position at
a poorly performing firm. 194 Looking at companies with staggered boards,
they compare the future career paths of those directors that were standing
for election at the time of the proxy contest ("nominated") directors with
other directors on the board that were in board classes not being voted on
("non-nominated") directors. 195 Their analysis shows that nominated
directors lose significantly more seats at other firms than non-nominated
directors.

196

188. See id. at 424. Where dissidents win one seat but don't cause a management
turnover, they find a CAR of -40.1% (t = -2.74) for the five to twenty-four months after the
initiation of the contest. Id. Where dissidents gain at least one seat and cause a turnover in
management, they find a CAR of -20.3% (t = -1.54) for the same time period. Id.

189. See, e.g., id. at 424-25, 427.
190. See Fos & Tsoutsoura, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 333-35.
191. See id. at 324, 324 fig.2.
192. Id. at 325, 325 tbl.6 (noting significance at the 1% level).
193. Id. at 326. For being targeted with a proxy contest, a director can expect to lose 0.55
directorships at the targeted firm and 1.15 directorships at other firms. Id. They arrive at the
compensation figures by starting with the fact that an average "director has 12 years until
retirement ... and is paid $0.144 million per year." Id.
194. See id. at 327.

195. Id.
196. Id. at 328, 329 tbl.10 (noting significance at the 5% level). A regression shows that
"nominated directors are expected to lose 0.67 directorships" in other companies, while nonnominated directors should lose 0.44 directorships, leaving nominated directors with a 60%
higher career cost. Id. at 328.
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They next investigate whether media coverage or the fact of being voted
off the board attributes to the difference. 197 Both nominated and nonnominated directors have a higher chance of being covered by the media
after a proxy contest, 19 8 but "nominated directors receive more media
coverage than non-nominated directors." 1 99 They next check if nominated
directors who lose the proxy contest are more likely to lose seats on other
boards than nominated directors who keep their seats. 200 As expected, they
find that directors who lose their seats are more likely to lose seats on other
boards as well.201 Interestingly, independent directors appear to receive a
bigger hit to their reputation and can expect to lose more board seats than
inside directors.202 Overall, this evidence supports the view that proxy
contests impose significant career costs on incumbent directors. 203 These
career costs likely act as a major incentive for directors to run the company
properly and avoid proxy fights.
1]. Post-Success Earnings "Baths"
If dissidents win a proxy contest, they tend to take an earnings "bath"
after they take control in order to make the firm appear less profitable,
presumably because they know they can blame outgoing management and
position themselves to make the company appear more profitable later
on.204 DeAngelo finds that more than half of the target firms with dissident
victories reduced earnings through "discretionary non-cash writeoffs" in the
year after the contest.205 She detects insignificant unexpected earnings,
significantly negative unexpected accruals, and significantly positive
197. See id. at 329.
198. Id. at 330 (noting significance at the 1% level). They find that "[t]he probability of
being covered by the media increases from 28% before the proxy-contest announcement date
to 37% after the proxy-contest announcement date." Id.
199. Id. (noting significance at the 1% level). They find that a nominated director has a
40% probability of being covered in the news, while a non-nominated director has only a
31% probability of being covered in the news. Id.
200. See id. at 332.
201. Id. at 332, 332 tbl.13 (noting significance at the 10% level).
202. Id. at 333-34 (noting significance at the 1% level). Their regression suggests that an
independent director will lose 0.21 more seats than an inside director. Id.
203. See id. at 334.
204. See Daniel W. Collins & Linda DeAngelo, Accounting Information and Corporate
Governance: Market and Analyst Reactions to Earnings of Firms Engaged in Proxy
Contests, 13 J. ACCT. & EcoN. 213, 226 (1990).
205. DeAngelo, supra note 70, at 30. She finds that twelve of the twenty-two firms with
dissident victories had writeoffs in the year after the proxy contest, while two more had
writeoffs the following year. Id.
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unexpected cash flows.206 These results indicate that firms experiencing a

control change typically experience an immediate increase in firm
profitability but that this is not reflected in reported profitability, most
likely because new management manage their earnings by taking a
"bath."

207

Collins and DeAngelo find significantly negative unexpected accruals
for firms where dissidents gain control, which are significantly lower than
firms with unsuccessful contests and pre-contest unexpected accruals.208
They also report significantly lower analysts' earnings-forecast errors for
successful contests compared to unsuccessful contests. 209 They examine the
post-contest annual reports for the successful proxy contests and are able to
find unusual income items for 95% of the companies.210 Of these firms,
80% "report unusual items that are negative in the aggregate." 211 This
evidence suggests that new management takes an earnings "bath" to make
the firm appear more profitable in the future.212
12. Impact on Cash Holdings
213

Proxy contests may help to reduce excess cash within corporations.
Management has a self-interested tendency to maintain high levels of cash
within the corporation, even to the detriment of shareholders.2 14 Paying out
the excess liquidity as a dividend would reduce the resources under their
control, restrict their ability to pursue corporate growth, and force them to
215
raise funds to finance future projects. 2 As expected, Faleye finds that
targets of proxy contests have significantly higher cash-to-asset ratios
206. Id. at 32-33. She finds a mean unexpected accrual of -0.0477 and a mean
unexpected cash flow of 0.0241. Id. at 32 tbl.11.
207. See id. at 32-34.
208. See Collins & DeAngelo, supra note 204, at 226. For the successful contests, they
find mean unexpected accruals of -2.78% and median unexpected accruals of -3.29%, which
are different from zero at the 0.0265 and 0.0167 levels respectively and different from
unsuccessful contests at the 0.0169 and 0.0300 levels respectively. Id. at 226-27.
209. Id. at 227-28. They find significantly lower analysts' earnings forecast errors for
successful contests compared to unsuccessful contests, with the mean significantly different
at the 0.064 level and the median significantly different at the 0.0216 level. Id. at 228.
210. Id. at 228-29, 229 tbl.4.
211. Id. at 229. They find that "total unusual items comprise a negative 65.3% of
reported income," with a median of -96.2% "after a successful proxy contest." Id. at 230.
212. See id. at 230, 232.
213. See Faleye, supra note 183, at 2041.
214. Id. at 2042-43 (citing Michael C. Jensen, The Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow,
CorporateFinance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 323, 323-29 (1986)).

215. Id. at 2042.
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compared to a control sample.216 Also, contest targets have a mean and
median excess cash that is significantly different from zero, while the
control sample did not.217 Faleye confirms that excess cash positively
relates to being targeted in a proxy contest.218 Excess cash also positively
relates to abnormal stock price returns in the three-day period surrounding
the announcement of the proxy contest. 21 9 This correlation suggests that
investors view proxy contests as effective mechanisms to curb excess cash
problems.220
Faleye discovers that, in the year after the proxy contest, companies
experience a significant drop in their average cash ratio and average excess
cash.221 Money distributed to shareholders increases from $5.9 million on
average in the year before the contest to $55.4 million in the year after.222
Where dissidents campaigned on excess cash retention issues, targeted
223
firms were significantly more likely to make a special cash distribution.
Similarly, Hancock and Mougou6 find that a dissident victory is
negatively associated with the price-to-earnings ratio and dividend-payout
ratio.224 They also find that management success is significantly positively
225
correlated with the dividend-payout ratio.22 It appears that corporate
226
directors use dividends to appease shareholders after a proxy contest.

216. Id. at 2048. The cash-to-asset ratio of contest firms are a mean of 12.82% and a

median of 8.56%, compared to 10.39% and 5.79% respectively for control firms, significant
at the 10% and 1% levels. Id.
217. Id. at 2049 (showing a significant difference from zero at the 1% level). He finds a
0.0722 mean and 0.0367 median excess cash for target firms. Id.
218. See id. at 2049. The relationship is significant at the 5% level. Id. at 2050 tbl.2. The
regression also controls for management ownership, outside block ownership, and marketadjusted returns. Id.
219. Id. at 2052 (noting a significance less than the 1% level).

220. See id.
221. Id. The average cash ratio falls from 12.82% to 9.15% between the start and finish
of the contest, having a statistically significant difference at the 5% level. Id. The average
excess cash goes down from 0.0722 to 0.0351, significant at the 1% level. Id.
222. Id. at 2054 (showing a significant difference at the 5% level).
223. Id. at 2058. Dissidents mentioned cash issues at fourteen firms, while the remaining
eighty-four did not. Id. Where cash issues were raised in the campaign, 57.14% of firms
made special cash distributions, compared to 13.01% in the campaigns without cash issues,
significantly different at the 1% level. Id.
224. Hancock & Mougou6, supra note 111, at 548 tbl.4, 549 (showing significance at the
5% level).
225. Id. (showing significance at the 5% level).
226. Id. at 549.
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Overall, it appears that proxy contests help to control excess cash within a
company and prompt management to pay dividends to shareholders.227
13. CorporateGovernance Effects
In principle, the mere threat of a proxy contest may positively impact
corporate governance.228 To assess this theory, Fos examines the effect that
an increased probability of being targeted in a proxy contest has on
corporate governance.229 He does this by establishing a number of factors
that make a proxy contest likely and then, using those factors, predicting the
probability that a company will have a proxy contest in a given year.230 He
finds that companies that have an increased probability of a proxy contest
are likely to have higher leverage, lower R&D, and lower capital
expenditures.21 He concludes that the threat of a proxy contest is sufficient
232
to impact and assist corporate governance2.
He also repeats his analysis to
understand when these disciplinary effects take place.233 His results show
that targeted companies increase leverage, spend less on R&D, decrease
capital expenditures, and increase dividend payouts in anticipation of, or in

227. Faleye, supra note 183, at 2059.
228. See Fos, supra note 55, at 656. Fos's sample includes 1061 proxy contests that occur
between 1994 and 2012. Id. at 657.
229. See id. at 656.
230. See id. at 664. He constructs a probit regression with the occurrence of a proxy
contest as the dependent variable. Id. He finds that proxy contests are more likely to occur at
firms that have a low market valuation, poor stock performance, higher institutional
ownership, lower market capitalization, and higher liquidity. Id. Each of these factors had a
statistically significant relationship at the 1% level, except for institutional ownership, which
was statistically significant at the 5% level. Id. He constructs seven multiple regressions,
with the occurrence of a proxy contest as the dependent variable. See id. at 664-65. All seven
have variables for liquidity, market value, sales, institutional ownership, and book to market
ratio. See id. Additionally, each has a corporate policy: leverage, cash, and dividends. See id.
at 664-68. He then uses the equation produced by each respective regression to create a
probability of a proxy contest for a given company in a given year. Id. He uses the respective
probability as an independent variable in each of seven multiple regressions with each of the
corporate policies as dependent variables. See id.
231. Id. at 669 (showing significance at the 1% level). He did not find a statistically
significant relationship between the probability of receiving a proxy contest and cash
holdings. Id.
232. Id. He demonstrates that correlation is due to causation by proving the identification
assumption, which is that stock liquidity satisfies the exclusion restriction, and thus showing
that his results are not endogenous. Id. at 668-69.
233. Id.

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

38

[Vol. 70:9

234

trying to avoid, a proxy contest.23 He fails to find any correlation between
235
changes in policy and the post-contest years. 2 He concludes that the threat
of a proxy contest accounts for a significant part of its effect on corporate
governance.

236

14. Hedge FundActivism and Proxy Contests for Control or
Representation
Hedge funds have shaken up the U.S. corporate governance scene since
the early 2000s by pushing for changes at targeted companies such as sales,
restructurings, higher dividend payments, and changes to corporate
management. Hedge funds frequently take substantial positions in targeted
companies' stock, between 5% and 10%, and then begin lobbying for
change. 237 Their activism "is backed up--implicitly or explicitly-by the
threat of a proxy contest for corporate control." 238 Fos and Tsoutsoura find
that hedge fund activism has caused an increase in the number of proxy
contests.239
In another paper, Fos reports data on the number of control contests
versus short slate contests: during the period 1994-2012, there were 199
control contests, but 708 contests involved short-slate contests to some
extent.240 He notes that in the same years, hedge funds sponsored 602
contested proxy contests of all sorts (control contests, short-slate contests,
and issue contests), or approximately 57% of all such fights. 241 The hedge
funds' sponsorship of proxy contests greatly increased in the latter part of
this time period (2003-2012) so that they sponsored 70% of total proxy
fights during that interval.24 2 Fos suggests that hedge funds prefer noncontrol contests, such as running a short slate of candidates, because they
seek to change the management of a firm, not to manage the firm

234. Id. He finds that the dummy variable for having a proxy contest within a year
positively correlates with leverage (10% significance) and dividend payouts (5%
significance) and negatively correlates with R&D spending (5% significance), capital
expenditures (10% significance), and CEO compensation (5% significance). Id. at 668 tbl.8.

235. Id.
236. See id.
237. See Bray et al., supra note 32, at 1730-31.
238. Partnoy & Thomas, supranote 54, at 131.
239. Fos & Tsoutsoura, supra note 185, at 317.
240. Fos, supra note 55, at 660 tbl.2.
241. Id. at 660 tbl.3.
242. Id. The number of proxy contests sponsored by hedge funds increased by 170% in
the 2003 to 2012 period compared to the 1994 to 2002 period, a difference that is
statistically significant at the 1% level. See id.
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themselves. 243 Fos also finds that the market has a more positive reaction to
the announcement of a contest sponsored by hedge funds compared to other
types of sponsors.244 However, this difference in the firm's cumulative
abnormal returns disappears eight months after the announcement,
suggesting that hedge funds are no better at increasing a firm's value
through proxy contests than other sponsors.245
There has been relatively little other academic research on hedge funds'
use of proxy contests in elections of directors. We found one other study
where the researchers separately identified hedge fund director contests and
compared them with proxy contests brought by other types of activist
246
investors2.
However, the leading scholar in the area concludes that hedge
fund-sponsored director election proxy contests are largely for
247
representation or influence on the board of directors2.
He argues that 81%
of proxy contests are "non-control contests," so that "the current corporate
governance environment therefore resembles the 'market
for corporate
248
influence' and not the 'market for corporate control."'
15. Summary
Proxy contests appear to function as a productive corporate governance
mechanism, but a lot of questions and uncertainty still surround their utility.
They provide many benefits to the corporation, including facilitating a
change in management, reducing unnecessary liquidity, and prompting the
payout of dividends. 249 The threat of a proxy contest alone may be
sufficient to bring about these results. 250 The stock market appears to
confirm the advantages of proxy contests and can even price the benefits of
the contest before it begins. 251 The dissidents also have significant stakes in
the targeted company and commence the contest usually after failed

243. See id. at 660.

244. See id. at 662.
245. See id.

246. The closest thing we found related to hedge fund sponsorship of contested
shareholder proposals. Bonnie G. Buchanan et al., Shareholder Proposal Rules and
Practice: Evidence from a Comparison of the United States and United Kingdom, 49 AM.

Bus. L.J. 739, 779-80 tbl.10 (2012). They found that hedge funds and private equity firms
sponsored about 45% of U.S. contested proposals, held on average 8.9% of the targeted
firm's stock, and spent on average more than $400,000 on their solicitation costs. Id.
247. See Fos, supra note 55, at 660-64.
248. Id. at 660 & tbl.2.
249. See supra Sections II.A.10, II.A.12.
250. See supra Section II.A.13.
251. See supra Sections JJ.A.6, JJ.A.8.
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negotiations, characteristics not normally associated with raiders.2 52 The
companies targeted in the contest also tend to be underperforming the
253
market and generally in need of better management.25
Still other evidence raises doubts about the effectiveness of proxy
contests and newly elected dissidents to help poorly performing
corporations.254 The stock gains associated with proxy contests may result
from their impact on the likelihood of a corporate takeover.255 Companies
with dissident victories tend to have poor stock returns and weak operating
256
performance after the proxy contest.25 In these cases, it is possible that
these companies were beyond saving to begin with, or perhaps the newly
elected dissidents face a steep learning curve before they can move the
company back on track.257
Hedge fund activism has been understudied with little academic research
examining the differences between proxy contests brought by hedge funds
and those initiated by other activist investors. Hedge funds, however, do
appear to be the primary proponents of contested proxy solicitations and to
251
have brought more short slate contests than control contests.25
B. Determinants of Control Contests' Outcome
1. Do Incumbents Have Systemic Advantages?
Another line of inquiry asks whether proxy contests go far enough in
providing a fair opportunity for the challenging dissidents to gain control of
the corporation.259 Studies tend to show that incumbent directors have a
significant advantage in winning proxy contests, due to a number of factors
such as inefficiencies in the proxy system, the presence of blockholders,
trust issues for stockholders, the stock's liquidity, and the ability of
260
directors to manage earnings2.
On the surface, studies find that
challengers succeed in obtaining control of the firm in a quarter to a third of

252. See supraSection II.A.1.
253. See supraSections II.A.2-4.
254. See supraSection JJ.A.9.
255. See supranotes 135-144 and accompanying text.
256. See supraSection JJ.A.9.
257. See supra Section JJ.A.9.
258. Fos, supra note 55, at 660 tb1s. 2 & 3.
259. See, e.g., John Pound, Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight,
20 J. FIN. ECON. 237, 258-59 (1988).
260. See, e.g., id. at 258-60.
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261

proxy contests.
Such evidence suggests that incumbents have an
advantage in proxy contests, but it fails to take into account the quality of
262
the challenging candidates.
Researchers ask whether the proxy contest
presents a fair fight in control over a firm and what factors advantage one
side or the other.263
Director elections appear to favor the incumbent directors even where
264
the dissidents would be as good or better candidates to run the company.
Listokin developed a novel and rather clever way to show that incumbent
265
directors have a structural advantage in proxy contests. 2 He views a
shareholder vote as a mechanism of information aggregation analogous to
how the stock market aggregates information to determine value, but
266
through different processes and with different results2.
He runs a
regression to see how the stock market reacts to dissident and management
267
victories as the voting outcome gets closer and closer to a tied election.
Theoretically, a close vote implies that shareholders view the incumbents
261
and dissidents as equally capable of running the company.
If the stock
market assesses information in a similar manner, then it should have a
minimal reaction to a close vote since it would also value either outcome as
about equal.269 If it assesses information differently, however, then its
reaction to a close vote demonstrates a systematic bias in the shareholder
vote's ability to assess the two outcomes of a proxy contest.270 His

regression predicts that a management victory after a close vote reduces the
value of stock by 5.9% compared to a dissident victory. 271 This shows that

&

261. See, e.g., DeAngelo & DeAngelo, supra note 63, at 41 (showing success in 35% of
the contests); Dodd & Warner, supra note 57, at 409 (showing success in 25.4% of control
contests); Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 62, at 413 (showing success in 28.4% of the
contests).
262. See Yair Listokin, Corporate Voting Versus Market Price Setting, 11 AM. L.
ECON. REv. 608, 609-10 (2009). Listokin's sample includes ninety-seven proxy contests that
occurred between 2000 and 2006. See id. at 615-16.

263. See id. at 609-10.
264. See id. at 610.

265. See id. at 608-09.
266. See id. at 609.
267.

See id. at 610, 623.

268. See id. at 609.
269. See id. It helps that as the outcome of a proxy contest becomes even it becomes
harder to predict who will win. See id. This means that the stock market will not be able to
price in the value of either outcome vis-?i-vis their relative probabilities of occurring prior to
the outcome announcement. See id.
270. See id. at 609-10.
271. Id. at 623 (showing significance at the 10% level).
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when a shareholder vote views both outcomes as fairly equal, it is actually
overvaluing a management victory, demonstrating a systematic bias
towards management in the proxy contest process that hurts shareholder
value.272 Other studies demonstrate a number of factors that might cause
this disparity.273
Mechanical aspects of the proxy process give incumbent directors an
274
inherent advantage.
Proxies are costly and difficult to solicit for
dissidents.2 75 Shares are usually held in nominee or street name, which
means that votes have to be solicited through the nominee.276 The record
date occurs weeks before the vote, and so for companies with high share
turnover, a large portion of voting rights will be separated from shareholder
ownership.277 These dynamics give incumbents a significant advantage due
to their prior experience in dealing with these problems and their
preexisting relationship with shareholders. 278 This background leads Pound
to several testable hypotheses. 279 If it is more difficult for dissidents to

solicit votes, then more shareholders should relate to a greater chance of
management victory.280 It should also mean that a shorter contest time or
holding the vote at a special meeting also increases the chance of
management victory.21 As expected, Pound finds that more shareholders,
shorter times between the announcement and outcome, and holding the vote
at a special meeting rather than the usual meeting all indicate lower chances
282
of dissident success2.
He views this as evidence that structural aspects of
the proxy process bias the contest toward management victory.283

272. See id. at 631. To phrase the conclusion differently, if the process of voting is biased
towards management relative to the stock market's valuation then it will place a premium on
dissident victory when the biased voter is indifferent to the results, as it does in this study.
See id. However, this conclusion depends entirely on the assumption that the stock market
reflects the "true" value of each outcome. Id. at 623. If the shareholder vote is viewed as the
better valuation mechanism, then these results show a systematic bias in the stock market's
valuation of each outcome. Id.
273. See, e.g., Pound, supra note 259.
274. Id. at 258-59.
275. Id. at 239.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 239-40.
278. Id. at 240.
279. See id. at 241.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 258-59 (showing significance at the 1%, 10%, and 10% level respectively).
283. See id.
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In some studies, the presence of institutional investors and large
blockholders tend to favor the incumbent directors.284 Pound finds that
higher levels of institutional ownership relate to lower chances for dissident
285
victory.28 This correlation suggests that institutional investors have either
conflicts of interest towards management or strategic alliances with
286

management.
Schrager similarly finds that management is more likely to
win where institutional investors own more shares and where more shares
are held in blocks of 5% or more.287 This may be because management
exerts pressure on shareholders more effectively, which is a more important
factor when there are fewer shareholders, or that management may place
blocks of stock in friendly hand when they expect a proxy contest.288
Dissidents have a better chance of winning when they own a larger
percentage of the company or seek only to replace a minority of the
board.2 89 In this way, the dissidents are able to gain the trust of the other
shareholders.290 As expected, Pound finds that dissidents who have larger
holdings or make formal offers to buy the company have higher chances of
success. 29 Dissidents that seek only minority representation on the board
are also more successful than dissidents who want control of the board.292
Shareholders naturally fear that dissidents may seek control of the board for
the private benefits of control rather than to increase the profitability of the
293
Owning larger portions of the company or making a formal
company.
offer to buy the company dissipates shareholders' fears and helps dissidents
to gain more votes.294

284. Id. at 242.
285. Id. at 259 (showing significance at the 10% level in two regressions and at the 5%
level in the other three regressions).
286. Id. at 259-60 (showing dissident holdings are significant at the 1% level in three of
the five regressions, while making an offer is statistically significant at the 1% level in three
of the three regression).
287. RONALD D. SCHRAGER, CORPORATE CONFLICTS: PROXY FIGHTS IN THE 1980s, at 51
(1986) (showing t-statistics of 2.011 and 2.000 respectively).
288. Id.
289. Pound, supra note 259, at 260-61.
290. See id.
291. Id.; see also id. at 244-46 (explaining that, depending on the dissident's goals, a
formal tender offer may serve their interests better than a proxy contest).
292. Id. at 251 tbl.1, 261 (showing significance at the 1% level in all three regressions).
293. See id.
294. See id.; see also id. at 244-46 (explaining that, depending on the dissident's goals, a
formal tender offer may serve their interests better than a proxy contest).
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2. DissidentSpending Impact
As conventional electioneering strategy suggests, dissidents' spending
increases their chances of winning the proxy contest.295 Harris finds that
challengers who win board seats spend more on the elections than those that
296
lose2.
He confirms this with a logistic regression that shows that dissident
spending positively relates to their chances of success.29 7 Interestingly, he
does not find a statistically significant relationship between incumbent
spending and their chances of success, using either a difference of means
test or a logistic regression. 298 This may be because the directors have
access to the firm's resources and can spend as much as they feel necessary
to win the election. 299 The fact that dissident spending plays a large role in
determining proxy contests suggests that these contests may not be the most
accurate mechanism for determining the best people to run the company.300
3. Effect of Cumulative Voting
The presence of cumulative voting greatly helps shareholders to gain
some seats.301 Looking at representation contests, Duvall and Austin find
that straight voting significantly decreases the dissidents' chance of victory,
compared to contests with cumulative voting.3 02 Ikenberry and Lakonishok
also find that dissidents are more likely to gain a seat in elections with
cumulative voting than in elections with straight voting.303 Austin finds that
dissidents succeeded in approximately three-quarters of representation
contests that involved cumulative voting.3 04 Cumulative voting may not
help to give dissidents control of the board but it will help to give them
-305
representation.

295. Harris, supranote 69, at 1798.
296. Id. He finds that winners spend on average $730,912, while losers spend on average
$468,969 on their election efforts. Id. A difference of means t-test finds a statistically
significant difference at the 5% level. Id.
297. Id. at 1799-800 tbl.3 (showing significance at the 5% level).

298. Id.
299.

See id. at 1807.

300. See id. at 1809-10.
301. See, e.g., Duval & Austin, supra note 73, at 468-69.
302. Id. (showing significance at the 1% level). All of the contests in their sample where
dissidents succeeded in gaining representation used cumulative voting. Id. at 468.
303. Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 62, at 413. They find that dissidents gain at
least one seat in 46.3% of straight voting contests and at least one seat in 71.9% of
cumulative voting contests. Id.
304. See AUSTIN, supra note 74, at 44.
305. See, e.g., Duval & Austin, supra note 73, at 468-69.
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4. Voting Recommendations
An Institutional Shareholder Services ("ISS") recommendation has a
major impact on who wins the proxy contest.306 Alexander et al. find that a
dissident wins the contest 55.06% of the time after receiving an ISS
recommendation but only 41.28% after management receives a
recommendation.3 07 A multivariate probit regression predicts that an ISS
recommendation for the dissidents will increase their chances of winning by
14.1 percentage points.308 When they add in a series of controls known to
predict proxy contest outcomes, their model predicts that an ISS
recommendation for dissidents will increase their chances of winning by
29.5 percentage points.3 09 These results suggest that an ISS
310
recommendation is a good predictor of contest outcome.
Alexander et al. also examine how an ISS recommendation affects the
stock market's valuation of each side. 311 The stock market has a statistically
significant positive reaction to an ISS recommendation for a dissident but
312
no reaction to a recommendation for management.
An ISS
recommendation has a higher effect on the stock price of smaller
companies.

313

306. See Alexander et al., supra note 132, at 4420.
307. See id. at 4439. A chi-squared test shows an association between a recommendation
and winning significant at the 10% level. Id. These numbers are higher than the general
probability of a dissident winning a proxy contest probably because ISS issued a
recommendation in only 77.6% of proxy contests, presumably where the dissidents had a
significant chance of winning. See id. at 4434 tbl. 1.
308. Id. at 4444 (showing significance at the 6% level, heteroscedasticityrobust z-statistic = 1.89).
309. Id. (showing significance at the 1% level, heteroscedasticity-robust z-statistic =
2.75).

310. Id.
311. See id. at 4420.
312. Id. at 4422. For ISS recommendations for dissidents, they find positive abnormal
returns of 3.76%, significant at the 1% level. Id. They find insignificantly abnormal returns
of -0.56% for ISS management recommendation. Id. A t-test shows that the difference in
abnormal return recommendations for management and dissidents is statistically significant
at the 1% level. Id.
313. Id. at 4438. Repeating the analysis on companies with asset values below the
median, they find a CAR for endorsement of dissidents of 6.09% that is significantly greater
at the 1% level than the CAR for endorsement of an incumbent of -0.82%. Id.
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The enactment of Regulation Fair Disclosure ("Reg FD") in October
2000 weakened the effect of an ISS recommendation.3 14 Reg FD prohibits
incumbent management from making selective disclosures to ISS and so
decreases the information content of an ISS recommendation.3 15 Alexander
et al. suggest that part of the recommendation's effect on stock value occurs
through a shift in the probability of each outcome ("the prediction effect")
and part occurs through additional information about the value of each
outcome ("the certification effect").3 16 They control for the prediction effect
based on their earlier regression and reject the hypothesis of no certification
effect.3 17 Investors rely on ISS recommendations to determine the value of a
management or dissident victory, rather than just the probability of each
outcome.31 An ISS recommendation affects the stock market's valuation of
a dissident's victory but does not appear to affect the valuation of a
management victory.39 This difference may be due to the uncertainty
surrounding how dissidents would manage a company, since they do not
have an active track record. 320
5. EarningsManagement and Disclosure
During a proxy contest, incumbent managers will manage the earnings of
the company to make it appear more profitable. 321 Looking at earnings
reports released during the proxy campaign, DeAngelo finds significant
unexpected earnings and unexpected accruals but no unexpected cash
flows.

322

If the unexpected earnings and accruals were the result of real

increases in profitability, then one would also expect to see unexpected cash
314. See id. at 4439. When they divide the sample around that date, they only find a
statistically significant difference between a management and dissident recommendation in
the period before the regulation. Id.
315. Id.
316. See id. at 4420.
317. Id. at 4448 (showing significance at the 5% level). To do this, they use an OLS
regression equation. See id.
318. See id.
319. See id. at 4449. A dissident recommendation increases the value associated with
dissident victory by 8.4%, while a management recommendation decreases the value
associated with a dissident victory by about 5.6%. Id. These figures are statistically
significant using OLS standard errors at the 5% level but are not statistically significant
using GMM standard errors. See id.
320. See id. at 4451.
321. DeAngelo, supra note 70, at 20.
322. See id. at 20-22. Using the random-walk model, she finds mean unexpected earnings
of 0.01, significant at the 1% level, and mean unexpected accruals of 0.0195, significant at
the 5% level. Id. at 21 tbl.5.
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flow.323 To bolster her argument, she examines firms that do not release an

earnings report during the contest and does not find any statistically
significant unexpected earnings, unexpected accruals, or unexpected cash
flow.3 24 She concludes that when an earnings report is released during a

proxy contest, management takes the opportunity to manage earnings to
make the firm appear more profitable.3 25 Collins and DeAngelo similarly
find that managers' accounting choices during the proxy contest artificially
increase income. 2 6
Baginski et al. report that managers increase the rate of forward-looking
disclosures during the campaign.3 27 They find no difference between the
pre-contest and post-contest level of forward-looking disclosures.3 28 This
suggests that managers may be increasing disclosures during the proxy
contest to explain away poor performance or reduce undervaluation of the
company.329 To judge whether the disclosures are more positive during the
proxy contest, they examine how the stock market reacts to them.330 They
find significantly negative CARs in response to disclosures before the
campaign and statistically neutral reactions during the campaign.33 1 The
323. See id. at 22.
324. See id. at 22-23.
325. See id.
326. Collins & DeAngelo, supra note 204, at 218-20. Using a random-walk model, they
find mean unexpected accruals of 1.38% of total assets, which has ap-value of 0.0155 using
a standard t-test. Id. at 220. Using an alternative model, they find a mean unexpected accrual
of 1.82% of total assets, significant at the 0.0003 level. Id.
327. Stephen P. Baginski et al., Forward-Looking Voluntary Disclosure in Proxy
Contests, 31 CONTEMP. ACCT. REs. 1008, 1024-25 (2014). Baginski's sample includes
seventy proxy contests that occur between 1994 and 1999. See id. at 1019-22. They find
0.2197 disclosures per month before the proxy contest compared to 0.4327 during it,
significantly different at the 5% level. Id. at 1025 tbl.3. Using a smaller but more consistent
sample of fifty-five firms, they find 0.3802 disclosures per month compared to 0.0970 after
the contest, significantly different at the 1% level. Id. Using a multiple regression model,
they find a strong positive correlation between being a proxy contest relative to the precontest period and the frequency of disclosures, significant at the 1% level. Id. at 1028.
Similarly, they find a strong negative correlation between the post-contest period relative to
the contest period and the frequency of disclosures, significant at the 1% level. Id.
328. Id. at 1030.
329. Id. at 1008-09 (citing Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, Information Asymmetry,
Corporate Disclosure, and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure
Literatures, 31 J. ACCT. & ECON. 405 (2001)).
330. See id. at 1033-34.
331. See id. at 1033. For the two years leading up to the contest, they find a mean CAR
of -0.020, significant at the 1% level. Id. They find a mean CAR of 0.007 during the proxy
contest, significant at the 1% level. Id.
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disclosures may not have stock market reaction because investors
understand that releases will be biased during the campaign.332 A multiple
regression analysis confirms that disclosures are more positive during the
campaign than before or after it.333 Another regression shows that the rate
of positive forward-looking disclosures positively correlates the presence of
a proxy contest. 334 They next examine how the disclosures change when
management wins or loses the proxy contest. 335 They find that managers

who won the contest temporarily increased their disclosures while the
managers who lost did not.336 The authors suggest that the increased
disclosures may have helped the managers to win the contest. 337 Similarly,
they rerun the multiple regressions examining stock market reaction and
find that the disclosures were more positive for managers who won their
contests.338
6. Summary
Incumbent directors appear to have a systematic advantage in proxy
contests.339 Where the stock market would judge both sides as equal, the
incumbent directors have a significantly higher chance of winning. 340 Their
position as directors allows them to manage the earnings reports of the
company and release positive information to help themselves win.341 Other
systematic factors give them a considerable advantage, such as the process

332. Id.
333. Id. at 1034. A multiple regression model finds a negative correlation between a
disclosure released before rather than during a proxy contest and market reaction to the
disclosure, significant at the 1% level. Id. Another regression finds a significant negative
correlation between a disclosure released before rather than during a proxy contest and
market reaction to the disclosure. Id.
334. See id. at 1038-41. They find that rate of issuing positive disclosures positively
relates to being in a proxy contest, significant at the 5% level. Id.
335. Id. at 1038-41.
336. Id. at 1038. Using an interaction term between being in the contest and dissidents
winning and being in the post contest and dissidents winning, they find a negate coefficient
for the first variable and a positive coefficient for the second variable, both significant at the
5% level. Id.
337. Id. at 1041.
338. Id. Using interaction terms between the pre-proxy contest and dissidents winning
and the post-contest and dissidents winning, they find positive coefficients, significant at the
10% and 1% levels respectively. Id.
339. See supra Section II.B.1.
340. See supra Section II.B.1.
341. See supra Section II.B.5.
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of soliciting proxies and the presence of institutional investors.3 42 While
this may present a significant hurdle to dissidents, other factors can even
the playing field. 134
The previous section demonstrated that dissidents have higher chances of
winning at worse performing firms.3 44 Dissidents willing to spend their own
money to invest in the company or run a better campaign may be able to
ease the distrust of their fellow shareholders by demonstrating their
dedication to the company. 45 Cumulative voting can also help dissidents to
get representation on the board, even if it will not help them to gain
control.3 46 Finally, ISS can overcome collective action problems to
effectively distinguish between dissidents likely to better manage the
company from those who are not. 347 The system may not be perfectly fair,
but it presents each side with a very real chance of proving themselves and
gaining the opportunity to run the company.
III. UncontestedDirectorElections
The overwhelming majority of corporate elections are uncontested.
Incumbents need not worry about losing their seats in these circumstances
because state corporate law uses plurality voting, not majority voting, as the
default rule for director elections. The combination of an uncontested
election and a plurality voting system ensures that directors are almost
guaranteed to get reelected. 348 Under plurality voting rules in an
uncontested election, shareholders can choose between voting "for" the
candidate or "withholding" their vote.3 49 The director just needs a single
vote, which can even be their own, to get reelected.3 50 Indeed, most
directors get elected with more than 95% support from shareholders.3 51
These concerns are compounded by the fact that free-rider problems may
deter shareholders from taking the time and effort to seriously evaluate a
342. See supra notes 274-288 and accompanying text.
343. See supra Section JJ.A.5.
344. See supraSection JJ.A.5.
345. See supra Section II.B.2.
346. See supra Section II.B.3.
347. See supra Section II.B.4.
348. See Paul E. Fischer et al., Investor Perceptions of Board Performance: Evidence
from Uncontested DirectorElections, 48 J. ACCT. & ECON. 172, 172 (2009).
349. See Diane Del Guercio et al., Do Boards Pay Attention When InstitutionalInvestor
Activists "Just Vote No"?, 90 J. FiN. ECON. 84, 85 (2008).
350. See id.
351. See Fischer et al., supra note 348, at 175, 176 tbl.2. They find a mean of 96.4% of
support for directors and a median of 98% support. See id. at 176 tbl.2.
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director's performance.3 52 Also, shareholders may choose to sell their
shares when directors mismanage a company rather than "withhold" their
votes.3 53 Therefore, many commentators argue that uncontested director
elections are a sham and an ineffective tool of corporate governance.354
Others, however, contend that even minor drops in a director's support can
act as signal of shareholder disapproval and effectively discipline the
director.3

55

A. Determinants of UncontestedElection Outcomes
1. Vote No Campaigns
With this theory in mind, some shareholders have begun launching "just
vote no" campaigns. 3 56 Between 1990 and 2003, there were 112 such
campaigns, mostly driven by institutional investors.3 57 These campaigns
resulted in an average of 5.8% withheld votes, with 21.2% of campaigns
having a withheld vote of greater than 20%.3 Studies evaluate whether
director elections are a meaningful tool of corporate governance by
examining what factors determine their results and how their results impact
corporate governance.359 These studies show that shareholders vote based
on the actions of individual directors rather than the overall company
performance.360 While the evidence confirms that uncontested elections
pose little threat to a director's tenure on the board, they can have a
361
meaningful impact on other aspects of corporate governance.
Cai et al. suggest that the results of a director election only weakly
reflect the performance of the company.362 They show that the percentage
of "for" votes that a director receives in an uncontested election reflects the
363
company's prior performance but has limited economic significance.
Cai
et al. find that having a poor operating performance predicts there will be
352. See id. at 173 (citing ANTHONY DowNs, AN EcoNoMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY
(1957)).
353. See id. (citing Robert Parrino et al., Voting with Their Feet: InstitutionalOwnership
Changes Around Forced CEO Turnover, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2003)).
354. See id. at 172.
355. See id.
356. See Del Guercio et al., supra note 349, at 85.
357. See id.

358. Id. at 89.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., Jie
See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., id.
See id.

at 85.
Cai et al., Electing Directors, 64 J. FIN. 2389, 2416-17 (2009).
at 2417.
at 2399.
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fewer "for" votes, but a standard deviation decrease in the industry-adjusted
EBITDA-to-assets ratio only predicts a 0.37% decrease in support.3 64
Similarly, Del Guercio et al. find barely significant evidence that groups
start "just vote no" campaigns at companies with worse operating return on
assets compared to their industry peers.365
There is mixed evidence about the impact of stock returns on the results
of a director election.3 66 Cai et al. fail to find any significant relationship
between stock returns and voting outcome.367 Del Guercio et al., however,
find stronger evidence that companies targeted for "just vote no" campaigns
have negative market-adjusted stock returns over the previous year.368
Fischer et al. find that a lower percentage of "for" votes in a director
election predicts a more positive stock market reaction to a change in the
CEO. 369 This result suggests that shareholder votes in director elections are
an accurate reflection of the management's performance. While company
performance has some role in director elections, shareholders appear to be
looking at other factors in deciding whether to support a director or to
withhold their vote.370
2. Corporate Governance Effects
The governance characteristics of the company have a strong relationship
with the "for" votes cast for directors, albeit with small economic
significance.371 Cai et al. find that lower ratings on the governance index,
entrenchment index, and having both staggered board and poison pill
provisions all predict fewer "for" votes at a statistically significant but

364. See id. (showing significance at the 1% level).
365. See Del Guercio et al., supra note 349, at 93. In the third to second years before the
start of the campaign, they find a difference of means of the operating performance
significant at the 10% level but fail to find a significant difference of medians, compared to
industry peers. See id. at 92 tbl.3. However, they fail to find a significant difference for mean
or median in the year before the "just vote no" campaign. See id.
366. Compare Cai et al., supra note 360, at 2399, with Del Guercio et al., supranote 349,
at 87 tbl.1.
367. See Cai et al., supra note 360, at 2399 (using two- and three-year excess returns to
measure market performance).
368. See Del Guercio et al., supra note 349, at 87 tbl.1. They find that the mean and
median market adjusted stock returns for the previous years for targeted companies are
significantly different from zero at the 1%. See id. at 88.
369. See Fischer et al., supra note 348, at 177-79 (showing statistical significance at the
1% level).
370. See Cai et al., supra note 360, at 2416-17.
371. See id. at 2399.
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reveal

a

similar

relationship for the presence of a shareholder suit.3 73

Board characteristics also have an impact on director elections.3 74 Larger
boards, more outsiders on the boards, and higher ownership by directors
predict more "for" votes.3 75 These results suggest that the features of a
company's corporate governance system affect a shareholder's opinion of
directors.376

3. Bad DirectorPerformance
Evidence suggests that shareholders distinguish the actions of individual
directors and hold directors accountable in specific instances for failing to
perform their duties.3 77 Cai et al. find that the biggest determinant of a
direct election, outside of a negative ISS recommendation, is failing to
attend board meetings.3 78 In their study, directors that attended fewer than
75% of board meetings received 14% fewer "for" votes in an uncontested
election.3 79 Directors who abrogate their responsibilities will receive fewer
"for" votes.380 Shareholders appear to react less to overall performance of
the company and more to specific failures of the directors.381
4. Impact of Weak Internal Controls
Shareholders are more likely to "withhold" their votes for managing
directors when there is a material weakness in the internal controls of a
company.382 Starting in 2004, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires that
accelerated filers disclose the independent auditor's opinion on the
372. See id. at 2399, 2400 tbl.II (finding all significant at the 1% level). A standard
deviation increase in their governance and entrenchment index all predict a decreased "for"
votes of 0.43% and 0.4% respectively. Id.
373. See id. at 2399. The presence of a shareholder lawsuit predicts 1% fewer "for"
votes, statistically significant at the 10% level. Id.
374. See id.
375. See id. (showing significance at the 1% level).
376. See id.
377. See, e.g., id.
378. See id. at 2404.
379. See id. (finding statistical significance at the 1% level).
380. See id.
381. See id.
382. Zhongxia (Shelly) Ye et al., Shareholder Voting in Director Elections and Initial
SOX Section 404 Reports, 28 J. ACCT., AUDITING & FIN. 103, 104 (2013). Ye et al. collect a
sample of 370 companies that received an adverse or disclaimer opinion on the effectiveness
of internal control in the first year of the SOX section 404 auditor reports, and a
corresponding industry matched control firms. See id. at 110, 112.
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effectiveness of internal controls and in particular whether there was a
material weakness.383 Studies suggest that internal control problems have
negative consequences on the company including higher levels of debt, less
accurate earnings forecasts, and a higher likelihood of receiving a modified
audit opinion on financial statements.38 4 Management directors at firms
with a material weakness in their internal controls received fewer votes than
management directors in firms of the same industry.38 5
Directors on the audit committee, however, did not receive significantly
different voting results than their industry peers.386 Nonetheless, a
disclosure restatement predicted significantly fewer votes for an audit
committee director, but not fewer votes for a management director. 387
By contrast, Cai et al. fail to find a relationship between receiving an
accounting restatement and the votes of an audit committee director.3 88 Ye
et al. find that the more material weaknesses a company has predicts a
higher percentage of votes withheld in an uncontested director election.389
Disclosing a material weakness or deficiency, however, correlates with an
increase in votes for management directors. 390 These results suggest
shareholders express their dissatisfaction with corporate management by
withholding their vote.391
5. Executive Compensation'sRole
The ability of directors to ensure fair compensation of officers also
significantly affects director elections.392 Cai et al. find that excess CEO
compensation predicts fewer "for" votes in director elections.39 3 This is

383. Id. at 104.
384. See id. at 106.
385. See id. at 114. A difference of means t-test shows that the difference is statistically
significant at the 10% level. See id. at 114 tbl.3. A regression also shows that the presence of
a material weakness predicts fewer votes for management directors, significant at the 10%
level. Id. When the split material weakness into two variables, account balance-level
weakness and company-level weakness, they find that both predict lower votes for
management directors, significant at the 10% level. See id. at 118.
386. See id. at 114 tbl.3.
387. See id. at 115. A nontechnical restatement disclosure predicts fewer votes for an
audit committee director, statistically significant at the 1% level. See id.
388. See Cai et al., supra note 360, at 2407.
389. See Ye et al., supra note 382, at 119 (showing significance at the 1% level).
390. See id. (showing statistical significance at the 1% and 10% levels respectively).
391. See id.
392. See Cai et al., supra note 360, at 2399.
393. See id. (showing statistical significance at the 1% level).
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particularly true when the director sits on the compensation committee. 394
Also, CEOs who serve as directors and receive excess compensation
receive significantly fewer "for" votes than the other directors.395
Ertimur et al. take advantage of the backdating scandal in 2006 and 2007
to examine whether shareholders are more likely to cast "withhold" votes
for directors that fail to properly oversee executive compensation.3 96
Directors at firms caught up in the backdating scandal have more votes
withheld than directors at other firms.397 Because a decade passed between
when the backdating occurred and when the scandal became public, many
directors at the backdating firms had no connection to the controversy.398
While shareholders are more likely to withhold their votes for both the
backdating directors and the new directors, the shareholders withheld
significantly more of their votes for backdating directors. 399 These results
suggest that shareholders are able to distinguish between different degrees
of responsibility.40
Shareholders blamed directors on the compensation committee more
than directors on the auditing committee, and in turn, more than the other
directors.401 Again, shareholders blamed directors who were on the
compensation committee at the time of the backdating more than those who
402
were not.
This suggests that the directors who sat on the compensation
394. See id. at 2407 (showing statistical significance at the 10% level).

395. See id.
396. See Yonca Ertimur et al., Reputation Penaltiesfor Poor Monitor of Executive Pay:
Evidence from Option Backdating, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 118, 121 (2012). They collect a sample
of 178 firms involved in the scandal and a sample of control firms. See id. at 122.
397. See id. at 123. For directors caught in the backdating scandal, they found a mean
and median withheld votes of 9.8% and 4.9%, compared to 4.9% and 2.2% respectively for
directors at other companies, significantly different at the 1% level. Id. A multiple regression
confirms that shareholders are more likely to withhold their votes for directors at the
backdating firms, significant and positive around the 5% level. Id.

398. Id.
399. See id. Both groups see a positive correlation between being on the board and
receiving a "withhold" vote relative to directors on other boards, significant at the 1% level.
See id. at 125 tbl.2. However, the directors who were on the board during the backdating
received 3.77% higher "withhold" votes. Id. at 123.

400. Id.
401. Id. at 123-24. When they divided the director of the backdating firms between
compensation committee membership, auditing committee membership, and other directors,
they find coefficients of 8.41, 5.79, and 4.06 respectively, all significantly more likely to
receive a "withhold" vote at the 1% level. See id. at 125 tbl.2.
402. Id. at 123-24. Although all groups of the compensation committee had a statistically
significant correlation at the 1% level, those also on the compensation committee during the
backdating had a t-statistic of 7.41, compared to a t-statistic of 4.59 and 4.99 for those not on
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committee at the time of the backdating received the largest penalty in
"withhold" votes.403 It also suggests that shareholders view the backdating
as a failure of the compensation committee rather than the auditing
comnimittee. 4 0
Directors received more "withhold" votes at firms that had more severe
backdating.40 5 An ISS "withhold" recommendation based on the backdating
406
correlated with higher percentage of "withhold" votes by shareholders.
This result may raise concerns that shareholders follow ISS
recommendations too closely or mechanically.4 07 The directors at
backdating firms received more "withhold" votes at other firms where they
served as directors, but the results were largely statistically insignificant.4 08
Shareholders appear not to penalize directors for their failings at other
firms.409

B. Key Players in Uncontested Elections
1. Labor Union Voting Patterns
In his paper, Agrawal claims that labor unions may use their votes to
further their own interests, often at the expense of the company's
wellbeing. 410 Agrawal further examines the voting habits of the AFL-CIO
before and after part of the organization split off to become the Change to

the compensation committee or not on the board at all during the backdating. See id. at 125
tbl.2.
403. Id. at 127.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 128. They divide directors between firms with backdating worth more than
6.5% of assets and firms with less. Id. While both groups had significantly more "withhold"
votes, the top half had a t-statistic of 6.10 in the regression model compared to 4.08 for the
bottom half. See id. at 127 tbl.2.
406. See id. at 129. Of the firms involved in the backdating scandal, firms with an ISS
"withhold" recommendation based on the backdating had a t-statistic of 10.92, compared to
a coefficient of 4.99 at firms without a "withhold" recommendation by ISS. See id. at 127
tbl.2.
407. Id. at 129.
408. Id. at 136. The directors of backdating firms received mean and median "withhold"
votes at other firms of 5.8% and 2.6%, compared to 4.9% and 2.2% for directors who don't
serve at backdating firms. Id. However, the differences are economically small and don't
become statistically significant in multiple regressions. Id.
409. See id. at 139-41.
410. See Ashwini K. Agrawal, Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union
Shareholders: Evidencefrom Proxy Voting, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 187, 187 (2012).
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Win ("CTW") Coalition.411 He shows that the AFL-CIO varied its voting
patterns based on whether or not it represented the workers of that
company, thus leading to the inference that it is using its voting power as a
tool in their labor struggles.4 12 The firms with AFL-CIO unions have
similar characteristics as firms with CTW unions. 413 The AFL-CIO is more
likely to vote against directors at companies with AFL-CIO unions than
those with no union.414 The difference suggests that the AFL-CIO's votes
are in part guided by its labor relations with the companies. 415 The
organization became significantly less likely to vote against a firm's
416
directors after it went from being an AFL-CIO union to a CTW union.
By comparison, mutual funds are more likely to vote for the directors at
companies with unions and did not change their voting patterns after the
move from AFL-CIO to CTW representation.417 The mutual funds' voting

411. Id. at 188-89. Specifically, he examines the AFL-CIO votes before and after part of
the organization spun off in 2005 to form the Change to Win ("CTW") Coalition, as well as
the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America ("UBCJA") before and after
joining the CTW Coalition in 2005. See id. at 188-90. They collect 10,407 votes by the AFLCIO between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2006. Id. at 194-95. On average, the
organization supported 65% of director nominees. Id. at 195.
412. See id. at 190, 203.
413. See id. at 201-03. The notable difference is that the AFL-CIO firms have an average
market capitalization of $32 billion, while the CTW firms have an average market
capitalization of $23 billion. Id. at 201-02. Otherwise, the two groups have similar capital
intensity, number of employees, return on assets, and asset growth. Id. at 202.
414. Id. at 203. For these purposes, "AFL-CIO firms" are those that have a AFL-CIO
union both before and after the 2005 split off. See id. The AFL-CIO voted against 31% of
directors at nonunionized firms and 44% of AFL-CIO firms. Id. Agrawal confirms that these
differences are statistically significant. Id. A multiple regression confirms that the AFL-CIO
was 11% more likely to vote against directors of unionized firms, statistically significant at
the 1% level. Id. at 205 tbl.5, 206.
415. Id. at 203.
416. See id. When the CTW firms were represented by the AFL-CIO, the AFL-CIO
voted against their directors in 45% of elections. Id. After the firms moved to CTW unions,
the AFL-CIO voted against their directors in only 29% of elections. Id. A multiple
regression confirms that the AFL-CIO became 17.9% more supportive of firms' directors
after they moved to CTW unions, statistically significant at the 5% level. Id. at 205 tbl.5,
206. They find the same results when they repeat the regression with controls for governance
characteristics and stock performance. Id. at 206.
417. Id. at 207. Agrawal examines the voting pattern of the Fidelity Spartan Total Market
Index Fund, the Vanguard Institutional Total Stock Market Index Fund, and the TIAACREF Equity Index Fund. Id. Vanguard was more likely to vote for the director of a firm
with unionized works, statistically significant at the 5% level, while the other two funds had
no statistically different result. See id. at 208 tbl.6. None of the funds had a statistically
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tendencies suggest that unionization is not associated with lower director
quality, eliminating one alternative explanation of the AFL-CIO's voting
pattern.418 Similarly, CalPERS, "the world's largest public pension fund,"
was not more likely to vote for or against directors of unionized firms and
did not change their voting pattern in response to the change in union
representation.4 19
Agrawal suggests that the most reasonable explanation for AFL-CIO's
voting pattern is that the organization bases its decisions on the labor
relations with the companies that it represents.4 20 Similarly, the United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America ("UBCJA") became
more likely to vote against the directors of CTW firms after it joined the
CTW.421 Agrawal claims that basing voting decisions on a union's labor
relations may be a common practice to other union pension funds.422
The AFL-CIO is also more likely to vote against directors at firms
experiencing management-union conflicts as compared to the other firms it
represents.423 Agrawal argues that the AFL-CIO appears to use its
shareholder voting power to influence the directors of firms where there are
ongoing labor disagreements.424 Because the AFL-CIO pension fund
controls $100 billion in assets, its vote can significantly affect a director

different likelihood of voting against the director after changing from AFL-CIO
representation to CTW representation. See id.
418. See id. at 207.
419. See id. at 207, 208 tbl.6.
420. Id. at 187, 212.
421. Id. at 209. Specifically, the UBJCA became 21.7% more likely to vote against the
directors of CTW firms after they joined the CTW, statistically significant at the 10% level.
Id. at 208 tbl.6, 209.
422. Id. at 209.
423. Id. at 210-11. They use two proxies to assess the presence of labor strife: (1)
whether any unfair labor practice charges were raised by the firm for unlawful attempts at
strengthening union membership; and (2) whether any unfair labor practice charges were
filed by the labor union against the firm for refusing to bargain collectively. Id. at 210. A
multiple regression finds that the AFL-CIO is 17.7% more likely to vote against a director at
a firm with unionization conflict compared to other firms the organization represents,
statistically significant at the 1% level, and 13.9% more likely to vote against firms with
collective bargaining conflicts with the AFL-CIO. See id. at 211 tb.7, 212.
424. See id. at 210. An alternative explanation is that the AFL-CIO is simply trying to
remove directors who have created potentially value-decreasing labor conflicts. Id. To
eliminate this possibility, the authors examine how the AFL-CIO's voting pattern in
response to labor strife changes at firms that move from AFL-CIO representation to CTW
representation. See id. at 210, 211 tbl.7. They find that the pattern disappears and so
eliminate the alternative explanation. Id.
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election. 425 On its own, AFL-CIO opposition to a director predicts 2.57%
less support.426 The AFL-CIO's use of its voting power to assist labor
disputes appears to hurt shareholder value.427 When firms moved from
representation by AFL-CIO to representation by CTW, their stock value
increased. 428 The stock price increase is more pronounced at firms that
previously experienced AFL-CIO opposition to their directors compared to
where the AFL-CIO supported their directors.4 29
430
AFL-CIO appears to be an effective tool in benefiting labor unions.
Opposition to a firm's directors predicts a decrease in the number of unfair
labor practice findings, with a more pronounced effect when the AFL-CIO
opposed the entire slate of directors. 431 These results suggest that union
pension funds vote with an eye to help the laborers, rather than just increase
shareholder value, which appears to have a real benefit to the union at the
expense of other shareholders.4 32 More broadly, the results suggest that
directors respond to the votes of individual shareholders rather than just the
aggregate election outcomes.433

425. Id. at 215.
426. See id. at 215 tbl.8 (showing significance at the 1% level). They find that directors
supported by the AFL-CIO receive on average 96.06% support, while directors opposed by
the AFL-CIO receive on average 93.49% support. Id. at 214.
427. See id. at 216.
428. Id. The firms that move from AFL-CIO representation to CTW representation
experience an average one-day abnormal return of 0.50%, statistically significant at the 1%
level. See id. at 216, 217 tbl.9.
429. See id. at 216. Where the AFL-CIO previously opposed at least one director, the
firm experienced a one-day abnormal return of 0.49%, statistically significant at the 1%
level. See id. at 216, 217 tbl.9. Firms where the AFL-CIO did not oppose any directors do
not have statistically significant abnormal returns. See id. at 216-18. Similarly, firms that
experienced labor strife with the AFL-CIO had statistically significant abnormal returns,
while the firms without labor strife had no statistically significant abnormal returns. Id. at
218.
430. See id. at 218-19.
431. See id. at 219. The AFL-CIO opposition to at least one director predicted a 2.5%
decrease in unfair labor practice filings, significant at the 1% level. Id. at 219, 220 tbl.10.
AFL-CIO opposition to the entire slate of directors predicted a 11.5% reduction in union
conflicts. Id.
432. See id. at 219-20.
433. Id. at 220. Agrawal suggests that analogous results may be found with other entities
such as public pension funds, family shareholders, and government owners. Id. at 221.
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2. Mutual Fund Voting
Mutual funds are more likely to support management, perhaps also with
an eye to self-interest.434 In 2003, the SEC created a new rule that required
mutual funds to report their votes in shareholder elections, allowing
researchers to study their voting patterns.4 3- Matvos and Ostrovsky find that
some mutual funds have a greater propensity to vote for management than
others, irrespective of company and director characteristics.4 36 These
mutual funds may be "trying to build a reputation for management
friendliness." 437 Mutual funds are also more likely to vote for directors
when a higher percentage of other funds are voting for that director, which
the authors call the "peer effect."

438

Similarly, Cai et al., find that brokers are more likely to vote for the
directors than other shareholders. 439 This result is important because
brokers vote on average 13.1% of outstanding shares.4 40 In fact, eliminating
the broker's votes would reduce overall "for" votes by 2.5%, a significant
portion considering that directors normally receive only 5% "withhold"
votes.4 Their regressions predict that a swing of this magnitude in election
434. See Gregor Matvos & Michael Ostrovsky, Heterogeneity andPeer Effects in Mutual
Fund Proxy Voting, 98 J. FIN. EcoN. 90, 90 (2010).
435. Id. Matvos and Ostrovsky construct a comprehensive data set of 2,058,788 votes by
2774 mutual funds in 13,588 director elections of 1388 companies that occurred from July 1,
2003 to June 30, 2005. Id. at 94. An average of 152 funds vote for each director. Id.
Elections are made up of 16.7% of inside directors, 70.7% outside directors, and 12.6%
outside related directors. Id.
436. Id. at 96-97. They note that if the fund's voting decisions responded only to director
characteristics, there would not be systematic differences in voting patterns. Id. A multiple
regression shows that the percentage of "for" votes in a given year positively correlates with
a "for" vote in a given election in the subsequent year. Id. at 97. Matvos and Ostrovsky rerun
the regression while controlling for firm and director characteristics and see the same result.
Id. They rerun the regression again with separate fixed effects for each shareholder meeting
and fixed effects for each director election and find the same correlation. Id.
437. Id. at 97.
438. Id. Matvos and Ostrovsky avoid simply running a regression to see how the votes of
other mutual funds predicts a given mutual fund's vote because they don't think they can
control for every other factor that determines a fund's vote. Id. Instead, they use the other
mutual funds' propensity to support management as an instrument for the other funds' votes.
Id. They find a statistically significant relationship between the other funds' propensity to
support management and the mutual fund's vote with a linear probability model, statistically
significant at the 1% level. Id. at 97, 100. They confirm this result by adding in controls and
using alternative ways of instrumenting. See id. at 100.
439. See Cai et al., supra note 360, at 2415.
440. Id.
441. See id.
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results would reduce CEO compensation by $600,000, increase the odds of
CEO turnover by 1.07, and increase the odds of removing a poison pill by
1.08, as examined in more detail below.442
3. ISS Recommendation Effect
The single biggest factor impacting a director election appears to be a
recommendation from the ISS. 443 There is evidence that ISS issues a

"withhold" recommendation in 0.8% of director elections.44 4 Cai et al. find
that an ISS "withhold" recommendation predicts that the director will
receive 19% fewer "for" votes." 5 Choi et al. find that a "withhold"
recommendation by ISS predicts 10.7% fewer "for" votes by institutional
investors and thus an overall 6.4% fewer "for" votes." 6 The
recommendation of Glass Lewis, another proxy advisor firm, also has a
significant impact on the outcome of a director election, while the
recommendations of Proxy Governance and Egan Jones do not.447
Because proxy advisors, especially ISS, play such a large role in director
elections, it is important to understand what factors determine how they
vote." 8 Choi et al. identify fourteen factors that have a statistically
significant relationship with whether ISS issues a "for" or "withhold"
recommendation. 449 Eight of the ten board-related factors are statistically
442. See id. at 2415-16.
443. Stephen Choi et al., The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J.
869, 871 (2010).
444. Id. at 886.
445. See Cai et al., supra note 360, at 2404 (showing significance at the 1% level).
446. See Choi et al., supra note 443, at 903. They first use a multiple regression to show
that an ISS recommendation has a significant correlation with the outcome of a director
election. See id. at 894. They note that adding the variable for an ISS recommendation
increased the predictive power of their regression from an R2 of 0.109 to 0.185. Id. at 895.
Attempting to differentiate causation from correlation, they work off the assumption that ISS
influences the votes of institutional investors and not individuals. See id. at 894. They rerun
the multiple regression with two interaction variables: one multiplying the voting
recommendation by the fraction of shares held by institutional investors and the second
multiplying the voting recommendation by the fraction of shares not held by either directors
or institutional investors. See id. at 901. This essentially works off the assumption that,
absent the ISS recommendation, the institutional investors would vote the same way as
individuals, thus producing the predicted effect of an ISS recommendation. See id. at 90102.
447. Id. at 905.
448. See Stephen J. Choi et al., Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors, 82 S.
CAL. L. REv. 649, 651 (2008).
449. See id. at 671-72 tbl.3. The factors that make ISS significantly more likely to issue a
"withhold" recommendation are being a CEO, an SEC investigation within the past two
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significant, with some also having economic significance, such as failing to
act on a proxy issue proposal that received majority support, attending less
than three-quarters of board meetings, being an employee of the company,
and being an outside director linked to the company; each factor increases
the probability of a "withhold" recommendation from ISS. 450 Interestingly,

ISS was significantly less likely to issue a "withhold" recommendation for
451
directors who had golden parachutes. 4 In addition, being a CEO, serving
on the compensation committee, having a classified board, or having
cumulative voting each increased the probability of a "withhold"
452
recommendation.45 Finally, new directors were less likely to receive a
"withhold" recommendation. 453 Relative to other proxy advisor firms, ISS
paid less attention to compensation-related factors and no attention to auditor disclosure-related factors.454
C. The Effects of UncontestedElections
1. Effect of Weak ShareholderSupport
Evidence is mixed on whether low shareholder support will affect a
director's chances to remain in office.455 Cai et al. fail to find any
relationship between director elections and subsequent director turnover.456
They also fail to find a relationship between the election results and the
director tenure at other firms.457 This result tends to support the view of
director elections as meaningless charades of shareholder democracy.45 8
Aggarwal et al., however, find that low shareholder support in an
uncontested director election can have a meaningful impact on the

years, being on the compensation committee, having excess CEO compensation in the top
5% of the sample, attending less than 75% of board meetings, being on at least three other
major boards, being on the nominating committee, being an employee of the company, being
an outside director with affiliate link to the company, owning more than 20% of the
company, failing to implement a proxy issue proposal that received majority support, having
a classified board, and having cumulative voting. See id. Factors that make an ISS "for"
recommendation significantly more likely are being a new director, being an interlocking
director, being a chairman and not an employee, and having a golden parachute. See id.
450. See id. at 673.
451. See id. (demonstrating significance at the 1% level).
452. See id.
453. See id.
454. See id. at 675.
455. See Cai et al., supra note 360, at 2414.
456. See id.
457. See id.
458. See id.
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director's career.459 Directors that receive more "withhold" votes are more
likely to leave within the next year. 460 Naturally, directors at firms with
classified boards are less likely to leave within a year than directors at firms
without classified boards.461 This result is because directors on classified
462
boards only face election every three years4.
Additionally, a director that
receives a higher percentage of votes withheld is likely to lose director
positions at other firms.463 The authors next look at directors who stay on
464
the board despite receiving low support from shareholders.
A director
who receives low support but still stays on the board is more likely to lose a
465
committee position.46 Overall, their results suggest that "withhold" votes
still have a negative impact on directors, both at the at issue company and at
other companies. 466
2. CEO Turnover
The percentage of "withhold" votes at an uncontested director election
467
can also significantly impact the firm's corporate governance.
Fischer et
al. find that a lower percentage of "for" votes predicts a higher rate of CEO
turnover.468 Their results are also economically significant.469 A CEO at a

company with the lowest quintile of board approval is two and half times as
likely to suffer a forced turnover as a CEO at a company in the top
quintile.470

459. See Reena Aggarwal et al., The Power of Shareholder Votes: Evidence from

Uncontested Director Elections 3-4 (Georgetown McDonough Sch. of Bus. Research Paper
No. 2609532, 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2609532.The authors limit their sample to
outside directors. See id. at 12. They look at all director elections between 2003 and 2014.
See id. Their final sample includes 83,496 director elections. See id. at 18.
460. See id. at 23 (showing significance at the 1% level). Their regression also shows that
if ISS makes an "against" recommendation, then the director is more likely to leave within
the next year. See id. (showing significance at the 1% level).
461. See id. at 25-26.
462. See id.

463. See id. at 27, 48 tbl.7 (showing significance at the 1% level).
464. See id. at 28.
465. See id. at 29.
466. See id. at 33.

467. See, e.g., Fischer et al., supra note 348, at 173.
468. See id. at 180 (showing statistical significance at the 1% level).
469. See id.

470. See id. A CEO in the lowest quintile of board approval has a 1.9% chance of
suffering a forced turnover, compared to a 5.1% chance for a CEO at a company in the
lowest quintile of board approval. Id.
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By contrast, however, Cai et al. find a negative but insignificant
relationship between shareholder support for a director and the rate of
subsequent CEO turnover. 471 This suggests that shareholder approval may
472
be only a weak predictor of subsequent CEO turnover.
Interestingly,
when Cai et al. distinguish between inside and independent directors, they
find that the support for independent directors has a significant negative
correlation with subsequent CEO turnover, while inside directors do not
have a statistically significant relationship.473 In their model, a standard
deviation decrease in support for an independent director predicts a 20%
greater likelihood of a CEO turnover.474 These results suggest that inside
directors are less likely than independent directors to respond to shareholder
dissatisfaction and replace the company's CEO.4 75
Fischer et al. rerun their regressions for CEO turnover rate and market
reaction with variables for both the percentage of voter support out of
shares voted and for the percentage of shares voted out of all shares, a
476
proxy for shareholder apathy.
Shareholder support has similar results as
before, while the shareholder apathy has insignificant results.4 77 These
results suggest that the market reaction to a CEO turnover is driven by the
percentage of shareholders who vote for a director, not by the percentage of
shareholders who vote overall.4 78 When there is a forced CEO turnover, the
lower board approval predicts a higher likelihood that the CEO will be
replaced by someone outside of the company.4 79 Similarly, lower board

471. See Cai et al., supra note 360, at 2411.
472. See id. The different results may be explained by the different statistical procedures
used. See id. at 2410. Cai et al. use a two-stage approach to control for the endogeneity of
votes, such that they include firm performance to explain the director votes and use the
residual to explain CEO turnover in the second stage. See id. Fischer et al. more simply use a
multiple regression where they control for various measures of firm performance. See
Fischer et al., supra note 348, at 180.
473. See Cai et al., supra note 360, at 2410-11.
474. See id. at 2410.
475. See id. at 2411.
476. See Fischer et al., supra note 348, at 186-87.
477. See id. at 187. The percentage of shareholder support out of votes cast had a
significantly negative relationship with both CEO turnover rate and market reaction to the
turnover rate, just as before. See id. The variable for apathy, the percentage of shares voted
out of shares outstanding, did not have a significant correlation with the market reaction to
CEO turnover but did have a significantly negative relationship to the likelihood of CEO
turnover. See id.
478. See id.
479. See id. at 181-82.
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approval predicts an increased likelihood that there will be a director
480
turnover in the following year.
Del Guercio et al. similarly report that "just vote no" campaigns increase
the likelihood of CEO turnover. 481 They find that a "just vote no" campaign
resulted in a CEO turnover 31% of the time and a forced CEO turnover
25% of the time.482 These rates were significantly higher than similarly
performing control firms. 483 Del Guercio et al. find that these companies
have significantly negative abnormal returns in the 250 days leading up to
the forced CEO turnover and significantly positive returns in the two days
surrounding the announcement.4 84 Their results suggest that director
elections can have a meaningful impact on corporate elections, even if not
by directly replacing the directors.4 85
The CEO turnover resulting from poor election results tends to increase
the profitability of the company.486 Del Guercio et al. find that companies
targeted for "just vote no" campaigns tend to have higher operating returns
on assets in the three years following the campaign compared to industry
487
peers.
However, when they remove the firms with a forced CEO turnover
in the year following the campaign, the results become insignificant.488 In
contrast, Cai et al. fail to find a relationship between election results and
subsequent firm performance.489

480. See id. at 182 tbl.6 (showing significance at the 5% level).
481. See Del Guercio et al., supra note 349, at 97.
482. See id.
483. See id. at 97 tbl.5. They find that the target firms have higher rates of CEO turnover,
with a difference of means and medians significant at the 5% level. See id. They find that the
targeted firms have significantly higher rates of forced CEO turnover, with a difference of
means and medians significant at the 1% level. See id.
484. See id. at 101 tbl.7. For the 250 days leading up to the forced CEO turnover, they
find a mean negative abnormal return of -42.75% and a median of -40.28%, both significant
at the 1% level. See id. For the two days surrounding the announcement, they find mean
abnormal returns of 2.52%, significant at the 1% level, and a median of 2.88%, significant at
the 5% level. See id.
485. See, e.g., Fischer et al., supra note 348, at 180.
486. See Del Guercio et al., supra note 349, at 93.
487. See id. When they control for both industry and prior performance, they find a
difference of means significant at the 5% level and a difference of medians significant at the
1% level. See id. at 92 tbl.2. When they control for only industry, they find a difference of
means significant at the 10% level and no significant difference of medians. See id.
488. See id. at 101 tbl.7.
489. See Cai et al., supra note 360, at 2414.
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Overall, these results provide some evidence that poor elections results
increase the likelihood of CEO turnover, which in turn improves the
performance of the company.

490

3. Corporate Governance and Takeover Defenses
Director elections can help to bring the corporate governance practices of
the company into line with shareholders' expectationS 491 by, for example,
reigning in excess CEO compensation.4 92 Cai et al. find that director
elections impact the subsequent change in excess CEO compensation,
especially for directors on the compensation committee. 493 A 1% decrease
in the votes for a compensation committee member predicts a reduction in
unexplained CEO compensation of $143,000 in the following year.494 If the
director is the chair of the compensation committee, then a 1% decrease in
their votes predicts a decrease in excess CEO compensation of $220,000 in
the following year.495 By contrast, election results for directors not on the
compensation committee appear not to impact the subsequent CEO excess
compensation.4 96 Similarly, Fischer et al. find that higher shareholder
support for directors predicts higher subsequent excess CEO compensation,
although these results are statistically insignificant.4 97
The results of director elections can increase the likelihood of removing
a poison pill. 498 Cai et al. find weak evidence that lower director support
increases the likelihood of a company removing its poison pill. 499 Their

initial results indicate a significant negative relationship between election
results and removing the poison pill, but the relationship disappears when
controls are added for firm characteristics.so However, lower support for a

490. See Del Guercio et al., supra note 349, at 93.
491. See, e.g., Cai et al., supra note 360, at 2408.
492. See id.
493. See id.

494. Id. at 2410 (showing a coefficient statistically significant at the 1% level).
495. See id. (showing a coefficient significant at the 1% level).
496. See id.

497. See Fischer et al., supra note 348, at 183, 184 tbl.7. They fail to find a correlation
between board approval and CEO compensation, but they find a correlation between the
quintile rank of board approval and CEO compensation, statistically significant at the 1%
level, and a negative correlation between being in the lowest quintile and CEO excess
compensation, statistically significant at the 5% level. See id. at 184 tbl.7.
498. See Cai et al., supra note 360, at 2411.
499. See id.

500. See id.
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governance committee member significantly predicts a higher chance of
removing the poison pill. 01
Weak election results do not affect the odds of declassifying the board.502
Interestingly, however, an increase in the dispersion of election results
between the directors does significantly increase the likelihood of
declassifying the board.503
The level of shareholder approval of the directors also impacts
companies' acquisition activity.5 m Fischer et al. show that higher
shareholder support for directors predicts a worse market reaction to a
subsequent announcement that the company will be acquiring another
firm. 05 They also find a weak correlation between director support in an
election and subsequent acquisition activity.5 0 6 External financiers or board

members may be more likely to be careful in their analysis of proposed
acquisitions when they are perceived to be poorly managing the
company. 0 7 There is also a negative correlation between shareholder
approval of directors and the average subsequent divestiture market
return.so Lower support for directors also predicts more divestiture activity
in the following year.509 Fischer et al. suggest that firm assets are likely to
be underperforming at firms with low board approval, which increases
returns on divestitures and the probability of more divestitures since there
should be more valuable divestiture opportunities. 1 0 Overall, their results
suggest that uncontested director elections can play a meaningful role in
reflecting investors' perceptions of board performance.1 1
The board's structure also determines whether the shareholders' votes
will meaningfully impact corporate governance. Gal-Or et al. examine
elections for directors on the audit committee to determine whether

501. See id. (showing significance at the 5% level both with and without controls).
502. See id. at 2414.
503. See id. at 2414 tbl.7 (showing significance between 5% and 1% levels).
504. See Fischer et al., supra note 348, at 184.
505. See id. (showing significance at the 1% level).
506. See id. at 185. They fail to find a correlation between board approval and later
acquisition activity but find a correlation between the quintile of board approval and
subsequent acquisition activity, significant at the 5% level. See id.
507. See id. at 184.
508. See id. at 185 (showing significance at the 1% level).
509. See id. at 185-86. They find the correlation between board approval and the number
of divestitures is statistically significant at the 1% level, but using quintile measures is
significant at the 5% level. See id. at 186.
510. See id. at 185.
511. See id. at 187.
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staggered boards affect the impact of director elections. 5 12 They postulate
that directors on staggered boards are more insulated from the opinion of
shareholders because they are elected only once every three years and
513
therefore may be less responsive to shareholder concerns.
They find that accounting financial experts on the audit committee are
more likely to be turned over following low shareholder support, but only if
they sit on a non-staggered board.5 14 Furthermore, weak shareholder
approval increases the likelihood that the departing accounting financial
expert will be replaced with another accounting financial expert on nonstaggered boards, but is not significant for staggered boards. 15 Audit
committees on non-staggered boards are more likely to increase the number
of meetings following low support from shareholders, which the authors
use as a proxy for diligence. 16
Low shareholder support, however, does not lead to any change in
meeting frequency for audit committees of staggered boards. 17 The low
shareholder support also does not increase the number of board meetings or
compensation committee meetings at companies with either staggered or
non-staggered boards.s1 Low shareholder support in audit committee
elections also reduces money spent on tax non-audit services, but only for
non-staggered boards. 519 The non-staggered boards decreased discretionary
accruals following low support from shareholders, while staggered boards
remained insignificant.520

&

512. Ronen Gal-Or et al., The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting in Staggered and NonStaggered Boards: The Case of Audit Committee Elections, 35 AUDITING: J. PRAC.
THEORY 73 (2016). Their sample includes more than 18,296 director elections in more than
6786 firm year observations between 2004 and 2010. Id. at 74.
513. See id.
514. See id. at 87 (showing significance at the 5% level). The authors found no
relationship between the level of support for a director who is on the committee and is an
accounting financial expert and the likelihood of that director's turnover. See id. For these
directors on non-staggered boards, receiving low support increases the likelihood of turnover
by 5.2%. See id.
515. See id. (showing significance at the 5% level).
516. See id. (showing significance at the 5% level). The regression suggests that the
number of meetings increases by 3.7 meetings. See id.
517. See id.
518. See id. at 87-89.
519. See id. at 89 (showing significance at the 10% level). The authors acknowledge
however that the economic significance of the reduction is small, only about 2.9 for firms
with the highest spending. See id.
520. See id. at 91-92 (showing significance at the 5% level).
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As a whole, their study suggests non-staggered boards are more
responsive to shareholders than staggered boards. 521 The study also
suggests that researchers should be cognizant of whether they are looking at
staggered or non-staggered boards when studying the impact of uncontested
522
director elections.52
4. Shift to Majority Voting
Choi et al. argue that firms experienced a major shift from plurality
voting to majority voting between 2005 and 2015 and that this shift has
affected uncontested director elections. 52 3 If a director's election is
uncontested, then that director needs only a single vote to win reelection
under a plurality voting system.524 Under a majority voting system,
however, the director would still need support from a majority of
525
shareholders.5 Despite the increased accountability allegedly created by
majority voting, directors are much less likely to fail to receive a majority
of shareholder support in a majority voting system compared to a plurality
voting system.526
Choi et al. find that this difference largely results from the self-selection
of firms to move from plurality voting to majority voting.527 The motivation
for shifting from plurality to majority voting changed between the first half
of the period, from 2007 to 2009, and the latter half of the period, from
2010 to 2012.528 The early adopters self-selected, while the later adopters

521.
522.
523.

See id.
See id.
See Stephen J. Choi et al., Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?, 83
U. CHI. L. REv. 1120, 1120-24 (2016). Their data set includes 64,933 elections between 2007
and 2013. Id. at 1135. The number of firms with majority voting has grown from 16% of
S&P 500 companies in 2006 to almost 90% in 2014. See id. at 1127.
524. See id. at 1121.
525. See id.
526. See id. at 1122. Between 2007 and 2013, 0.03% of directors at majority firms failed
to receive majority support, compared to 0.6% at plurality firms. See id. at 1129 (showing a
significant difference at the 1% level).
527. See id. Firms that decided to switch from plurality to majority voting in 2011 were
less likely to have previously received a "withhold" recommendation or a significant number
of "withhold" votes from shareholders compared to firms who did not switch. See id. at
1140. The authors confirm this result using a Cox proportional hazard model. See id. at
1141. Additionally, firms with a poison pill were less likely to adopt majority voting. See id.
at 1142. Interestingly, companies with better stock performance were less likely to adopt
majority voting. See id. Shareholders apparently seek more accountability from firms that
are not performing as well. See id.
528. See id. at 1146.
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were responding to shareholder pressure.529 The adoption of majority voting
results in a decreased likelihood of receiving a "withhold" vote of more
than 30% by 2 to 3 percentage points.: When divided between early and
late adopters, the decreased likelihood has a much higher magnitude and
statistical significance for the late adopters compared to the early
adopters. 531 Directors are much less likely to miss more than 25% of board
meetings after the adoption of majority voting as compared to before.532
However, boards are no more likely to implement shareholder proposals
after adopting majority voting. 533 Given that a director has committed
certain "offensive" conduct, leading to them receiving a "withhold"
recommendation from ISS, the odds of a majority of shareholders casting a
"withhold" vote is higher at firms with plurality voting than at firms with
majority voting.534 These results suggest that directors engage in certain
electioneering practices, but it is unclear exactly which practices.5
Overall, majority voting adds a new dimension to director elections that
deserves further study.
5. Summary
Empirical studies paint a picture of director elections that are more
meaningful than the dearth of competition and uniformly high rate of "for"
536
votes would suggest.
Simultaneously, however, the elections act less as a
direct check on the directors' ability to maintain profits and more to ensure

529. See id. When the authors split the sample between firms that adopted majority
voting between 2007 and 2009 and those that adopted it between 2010 and 2012, the ISS
"withhold" recommendation and the presence of the poison pill remain significant only for
the early adopters, while abnormal returns remains significant only for the later adopters. See

id.
530. See id. at 1150 (showing significance at the 1% level).
531. See id. at 1151. Additionally, firms that adopt majority voting are less likely to
receive a high "withhold" vote relative to their industry matched peers. See id. at 1153
(showing significance at the 1% level). When split between early and later adopters, the
difference from industry match peers remains statistically significant only for late adopters.
See id. at 1156-57.
532. See id. at 1167, 1169 tbl.8 (showing significance at the 5% level).
533. See id. at 1164.
534. See id. at 1173. The other conduct that the authors considered to be "offensive" was
to miss more than 25% of board meetings. See id. When the authors split the sample between
early adopters and late adopters, they find evidence that early adopters are doing
electioneering, while late adopters are not. See id.
535. See id. at 1166.
536. See, e.g., Fischer et al., supra note 348, at 173.
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that they continue to perform their responsibilities. 537 Company
performance has only a limited impact on the outcome of a director
election, with results ranging from a statistically but not economically
significant relationship to no relationship at all.538
The ability of directors to perform their stated duties appears to have a
larger effect on their election results, somewhat irrespective of how it
impacts the company's bottom line.539 Directors receive fewer "for" votes

when they allow the CEO to receive excess compensation.54 0 Shareholder
can even distinguish between the failings of different directors. 54 1 When
there is a material weakness in the internal controls of the company,
shareholders are more likely to withhold their votes for management
542
directors but not directors on the audit committee.
One of the biggest
factors impacting election results is the director's neglect of responsibilities
and failure to attend three-quarters of the board meetings. 54 3
These results perhaps show that shareholders can distinguish between the
performance of the company and the performance of its directors. 5 " They
may also show that free-rider problems prevent shareholders from assessing
how the director's decisions affect the company's profitability and instead
rely on heuristic cues to make voting decisions, such as board meeting
attendance.545 The strong impact of ISS decisions, even when performance
is controlled for, points toward the latter interpretation.
Interestingly,
while the specific failures of directors hurt the election results, poor election
results have a greater impact on a company's management than specific
directors. 547
While some evidence suggests that low support for directors will lead to
their resignation, often directors will replace the company's management
and keep a tight hold on to their own seats. Thus, uncontested director
elections can be understood as keeping corporate governance on track
without passing judgment on the efficacy of corporate policies.

537.
538.
539.
540.
541.
542.
543.
544.
545.
546.
547.

See supraSection
See supra Section
See supra Section
See supra Section
See supra Section
See supra Section
See supra Section
See supra Section
See supra Section
See supra Section
See supra Section

III.A.1.
III.A.1.
III.A.2.
III.A.5.
III.A.3.
III.A.4.
III.A.3.
III.A.3.
III.A.3 and text accompanying note 352.
III.B.3.
III.C.1.
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IV Management Proposals
A. In General
Unlike director elections and proxy contests, management proposals
often have a binding effect and give shareholders a direct say on directors'
governance of the corporation. 548 These proposals also raise collective
action concerns.:
Most shareholders own too few shares to make a
meaningful impact on the vote tally and so may maintain a rational
ignorance of the corporation's affairs. 50 Some practical aspects of the
proxy process may give managers an inherent advantage in receiving votes
for their proposals. 5 1 Managers can bundle controversial proposals with
552
favorable ones.5 Managers can also hire proxy solicitors to help pass
proposals.55
At first glance, shareholders appear to rubber stamp management
proposals. 554 On average, about 80% of shareholders support the
management proposal. 55 Less than 2% of management proposals fail to
receive the necessary support from shareholders. 5 6
Management appears to have a significant structural advantage in
winning the necessary votes to pass their management proposals. 5 7 By
examining the continuity of the distribution of close votes, Listokin finds
significantly more management proposals that just barely pass than just
barely fail to pass, suggesting that management is able to influence close
votes to secure passage.5 5 8 He rejects the possible explanation that
548. Jennifer E. Bethel & Stuart L. Gillan, Corporate Voting and the Proxy Process:
Managerial Control Versus Shareholder Oversight 4-5 (paper presented at Tuck-JFE

Contemporary Corp. Governance Conference, 2000), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract id=236099.
549. Ernst Maug & Kristian Rydqvist, Do Shareholders Vote Strategically? Voting
Behavior, ProposalScreening, and Majority Rules, 13 REv. FIN. 47, 47-48 (2008).

550. See Bethel & Gillan, supra note 548, at 4-5.
551.
552.

See id. at 5.
See id. at 7.

&

553. Id. at 8.
554. See id. at 2-3.
555. See Maug & Rydqvist, supra note 549, at 63 (finding that management proposals
between 1994 and 2003 received 82.8% of shareholder support on average).
556. See id. (finding that management proposals pass 98.5% of the time); Bethel
Gillan, supranote 548, at 2-3.
557. See Yair Listokin, ManagementAlways Wins the Close Ones, 10 AM. L. & ECON.
REv. 159, 173-74 (2008).
558. See id. at 173. Listokin uses a "caliper test" to determine the probability that the
discontinuity surrounding the 50% mark is due to random chance. Id. (using the caliper test

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

72

[Vol. 70:9

management works to get to the 50% mark and then stops because the votes
follow simple majority rules where the total number of votes that will be
cast is itself uncertain.
As a comparison, he looks at the distribution of votes on shareholdersponsored resolutions, which are nonbinding, and finds that the distribution
can easily be attributed to chance.s6 He also finds that larger companies
have a higher likelihood of winning a close election, while the level of
institutional ownership and the score on the governance index has no
significant association.6 1 These numbers may reflect management's ability
to track the results of the vote as they come in (accurate within a single
percentage point) and intercede to shift the balance of close elections. 562
1. Bundling
Another form of potential abuse is that managers can bundle separate
issues together into a single management proposal in order to achieve the
result that they want.
In 1992, the SEC implemented "Unbundling Rules"
that prohibit companies from bundling together multiple voting items into a
single box on the ballot.
Cox et al. discover that some form of bundling
565
occurs in 28% of management proposals in their sample.:s Bundled
proposals include items that would increase shareholder rights in nearly
three times as many cases as items relating to restricting shareholder
566
rights.
However, many of the cases that would expand shareholder rights
relate to board declassification, where there is no intrinsic need for the
567
items to be bundled.

suggested by Alan Gerber & Neil Malhotra, Do Statistical Reporting Standards Affect What
Is Published?PublicationBias in Two Leading PoliticalScience Journals, 3 Q.J. POL. ScL.
313 (2008)). The test shows that the odds that the distribution is a result of random chance is
less than one in a billion. Id.
559. See id. at 173-74.
560. See id. at 174-75.
561. Id. at 175-76 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level).
562. See id. at 176-77.
563. James D. Cox et al., Quieting the Shareholders' Voice: Empirical Evidence of
Pervasive Bundling in Proxy Solicitations, 89 S. CAL. L. REv. 1175, 1175 (2016). They
collect a sample of 1349 management proposals between 2003 and 2012. Id. at 1220-21.
564. Id. at 1178.
565. Id. at 1220-21. More specifically, bundling with at least one material item occurs in
23% of cases. Id. at 1221. Finally, a bundling of two or more material issues occurs in 18%
of cases. Id. at 1222.
566. Id. at 1228.

567. Id.
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Proxy advisors, particularly ISS and Glass Lewis, make their voting
recommendations for bundled proposals "based on the perceived net effect
of the items in the bundle." 6 8 ISS recommended an "against" vote for less
than 10% of the items with some degree of bundling. 569 All of the proposals
with the "against" recommendation tended to restrict shareholder rights. 7 0
Additionally, ISS only notes the bundling issue in 13% of bundled
proposals.5 71 These results suggest that shareholders cannot rely on proxy
advisors to identify bundled proposals. 572
On average, only 4.2% of shareholders vote against the bundled
proposals. 573 The authors find similar results when looking at Glass Lewis's
recommendations and its impact on shareholder voting.574 Overall, it
appears that managers use bundling as a strategy to influence shareholder
votes, and this tool is an effective one.
2. Use of Proxy Solicitors
According to Bethel and Gillan, managers' use of proxy solicitors does
not appear to have a major impact on the voting results. 75 They find no
relationship between the amount of money spent on proxy solicitors and the
576
voter turnout.s? In fact, money spent on proxy solicitors was negatively
correlated with votes cast in favor of management.s7 The most likely
explanation for that result is that elections where the company spent more
on a proxy solicitor were probably also more controversial and faced
greater shareholder resistance.57 They may also be nonroutine proposals
where brokers are not able to vote uninstructed shares.57 9

568. Id.

at 1230.
569. See id. at 1233.
570. See id. The thirty-one proposals with an "against" recommendation represented 37%
of all the proposals that hurt shareholder rights. See id. The authors suggest that the reason
that only thirty-one of the eighty-four proposals that hurt shareholder rights received an
"against" recommendation is because those proposals also contained issues that would
expand shareholder rights. Id.
571. See id.
572. See id. at 1234.
573. Id. However, voter dissent rises to 25.7% when ISS gives a "vote against"
recommendation. Id. Only seven of the thirty-one proposals with an "against"
recommendation failed to receive support from a majority of shareholders. Id.
574. See id. at 1234-36.
575. Bethel & Gillan, supranote 548, at 21.
576. See id.
577. See id. at 21, 40 tbl.8 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level).
578. See id. at 22.
579. See id.
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Some other important results from their research include the finding that
managers were more likely to use a proxy solicitor and spend more money
on solicitors in votes on nonroutine management proposals than routine
management proposals.58 0 Higher insider and block ownership predicted
less spending on a proxy solicitor and a lower likelihood of using a
58
solicitors.

The presence of insiders and blockholders made the use of
582

proxy solicitors less necessary.
However, higher institutional ownership
predicted more money spent on proxy solicitors, suggesting that
management uses proxy solicitors to interact with institutional investors. 583
The authors, however, fail to find any relationship between the amount of
money spent on a proxy solicitor and the voting results, presumably
because management spends more money on measures that have more
shareholder resistance. 584
Other characteristics of the company also influence voting results on
management proposals. 8 5 Bethel and Gillan find that companies with
management proposals tend to have higher market-to-book ratios, marketadjusted returns, price earnings ratios, insider holdings, and less debt.ss A
negative recommendation from ISS leads to significantly fewer votes in
favor of the management proposal. 8 7 Higher levels of block ownership
predict higher shareholder support for management proposals.588
3. Mutual Fund Voting
Mutual funds are major shareholders in most public companies, so the
impact of their voting on management proposals is substantial, but studies
disagree on whether their business ties or conflicts of interest influence how
they vote. 589 By way of background, the equity assets owned by mutual
funds increased from $83 billion to $4.49 trillion between 1984 and

580. See id. at 22, 42 tbl.9 (demonstrating significance at the 10% and 1% levels
respectively).
581. See id. at 23, 42 tbl.9 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level).
582. See id. at 23.
583. See id. at 23, 42 tbl.9 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level).
584. See id. at 21-22.
585. See id. at 15.
586. Id. All results were different at the 1% level, except for the debt-to-asset ratio,
which was different at the 5% level. Id. at 30 tbl.1.
587. See id. at 21.
588. See id. at 23, 42 tbl.9 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level).
589. See Burton Rothberg & Steven Lilien, Mutual Funds and Proxy Voting: New
Evidence on CorporateGovernance, 1 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 157, 157-58 (2006).

2017]

SHAREHOLDER VOTING IN PROXY CONTESTS

75

2004.590 In 2004, mutual funds held about 24% of U.S. stock market
capitalization .591 To guide their voting on management proposals, the
largest mutual funds have adopted voting guidelines, although many
delegate the voting of their proxies to ISS in accordance with these
guidelines.592
Rothberg and Lilien find that all of the ten largest funds had policies in
2004 of voting against at least one antitakeover defense, including eight
against dual class stock, seven against supermajority voting and classified
boards, and five supporting restricting poison pills.593 They find that mutual
funds rarely supported social or political activists, with some funds saying
they would support management and others stating they would follow ISS
or even abstain.59 These authors interpret mutual funds' voting decisions as
evidence that they are willing to confront management to increase
shareholder value.595
Overall, mutual funds support management proposals about 80% of the
time.
For proposals on takeover defenses, they voted against
management 59% of the time, including 70% on poison pills.

597

They voted

"no" on 47% of stock option compensation proposals but only voted "no"
on 9% of bonus compensation proposals. 598 Funds within the same family
tended to vote the same way on the same proposals. 599 For example,
Fidelity's funds only voted differently from each other 0.8% of the time,
mostly where one voted against and another abstained, presumably as a
result of some sort of communications error.600 Rothberg and Lilien note
that the six funds that take long-term positions in companies were much
more likely to vote with management than the five largest funds.60 They
find similar voting patterns between the four "mostly mutual fund" families

590. Id. at 159.
591. Id. at 160.
592. See id. at 163.
593. Id. at 164.

594. Id. at 165.
595. Id. at 164.
596. Id. at 167 (finding that the top five funds voted against management 17% of the
time); cf Lilian Ng et al., Firm Performance and Mutual Fund Voting, 33 J. BANKING FIN.
2207, 2210 (2009) (finding that mutual funds supported management between 65% and 98%
of the time depending on the type of management proposal).
597. Rothberg & Lilien, supra note 589, at 167.

598. Id.
599. Id.
600. Id.
601. Id. at 169 (noting 95% versus 81% support of management).
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and the four mutual funds that mostly get their business from another
source.602 This result suggests that business ties are not a major factor in
mutual funds' observations. 603
However, Ng et al. find evidence that mutual funds' voting is partly
driven by conflicts of interest. 604 They compare mutual funds without
business ties to those with business ties, which they define as those with
banking, insurance, brokerage, or investment banking parents or large
605
401(k) business or large retirement accounts. o A difference of means test
finds statistically significant differences between the two groups for eleven
606
of the twenty proposal types0.
This result shows that mutual funds with
607
business ties vote differently than those without them.60 They also find that
strong company performance and an ISS recommendation increases the
601
odds that the mutual fund will support the management proposal.
4. Confidential Voting
Confidential voting does not appear to eliminate management's
advantage in voting on management proposals. Confidential voting
prevents management from knowing how any individual shareholder
voted. 609 Theory suggests that confidential voting would mitigate conflicts
of interest, since shareholders, particularly institutional investors, could
vote against management without losing their favor.6 Romano, however,
fails to find a relationship between having confidential voting and
shareholder support for management proposals.' These results undermine
the hypothesis that confidential voting will reduce the effects of conflicts of
602.
603.
604.

See id. at 170-71.
See id. at 171.
See Ng et al., supranote 596, at 2215-16.

605. Id.
606. Id. (demonstrating significance at the 5% level ten times and the 10% level once).
607. Id. at 2216.
608. See id. at 2212-14 (varying significance between the 10% and 5% level depending
on proposal type).
609. See Roberta Romano, Does Confidential Proxy Voting Matter?, 32 J. LEGAL STUD.
465, 466 (2003). She examines proxy proposal outcomes for firms that adopted confidential
voting between 1988 and 1997, leading to a sample of 129 firms with 920 management
proposals and 801 shareholder proposals. Id. at 472, 480. Of the 129 firms with confidential
voting, only fifty-two firms had shareholder votes on a proposal to adopt confidential voting.
Id. at 474. The proposals voted on before the adoption of confidential voting received an
average support of 39.2%. Id. at 475. Of these, seven received majority support, leading
management to adopt confidential voting in the following years. See id.
610. See id. at 466.
611. See id. at 493, 496.
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612

interest in institutional investors6.
It is, however, possible that managers
submit more favorable plans in anticipation of the decreased support
resulting from having confidential voting.613 Romano also fails to find
abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of plans to adopt
614
confidential voting.
She argues that the insignificant stock market
reaction suggests that confidential voting does not increase the value of the
615
company.
Shareholders may be able to vote strategically on management
616
proposals.
Maug and Rydqvist develop a model where each shareholder
617
has access to some private information and all the public information.
Shareholders do not know each other's private information but do know
611
how they intend to vote.
If each shareholder uses "sincere voting," then
they will vote based on their own private information but will disregard
others' voting intentions.619 Sincere voting creates a problem with
supermajority requirements, where more than half of shareholders have
620
information that the proposal will increase value but the vote still fails.
However, if voters engage in "strategic voting," then they will recognize
how others intend to vote and adjust their votes to reflect the collective
621
wisdom of the shareholders, allowing the supermajority proposal to pass.
Maug and Rydqvist find that shareholder support increases when a
proposal requires supermajority support, suggesting that shareholders vote
622
strategically.
The impact of strategic voting changes 77 of the 510
supermajority proposals from fail to pass.623 These results suggest that
shareholders are able to take into account the information of other
shareholders and overcome collective action problems.624
612. See id. at 496.
613. See id. at 496-97.
614. See id. at 502-04.
615. Id. at 504.
616. See Maug & Rydqvist, supra note 549, at 47.
617. Id. at 48.
618. See id. at 48-49.
619. See id. at 49.
620. See id.
621. See id.
622. See id. at 67.
623. Id.
624. See id. at 74. An alternative explanation may be that managers campaign harder
when their proposal requires supermajority approval. See id. at 73-74. However, Maug and
Rydqvist reject this explanation by looking at a matched sample of simple majority and
supermajority provisions that were voted on at the same meeting and still found a higher
approval for the supermajority provisions. See id. at 73.
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To better understand management proposals, we next examine the
evidence related to shareholder voting on four types of management
proposals: antitakeover amendments, mergers and acquisitions, auditor
ratification, and compensation proposals.
B. Antitakeover Amendments
Scholars disagree on whether antitakeover amendments will help to
increase the corporation's value.625 Some argue that antitakeover
amendments destroy shareholder value by exacerbating managerial agency
626
costs and decreasing the odds of a takeover.
Others claim, however, that
antitakeover amendments increase value by giving management negotiating
leverage with bidders and providing managers with short-term job
627
security.
1. Stock Price Effects
Older studies have shown that shareholders generally vote to approve
antitakeover amendments, 62 although this appears to no longer be the case.
Between 1985 and 1988, however, Young et al. find that antitakeover
amendments on average received the support of 80% of shareholders.629
Data from this time period shows that more than 95% of amendments on
630
average receive the needed majority support from shareholders to pass.
By the 1990s, however, things had changed. Institutional investors held
an ever-increasing percentage of most public companies' stock and began
to engage in shareholder activism.631 In particular, they began voting

against antitakeover defenses proposed by corporate management based on

625. See Erin E. Smith, The Value of Antitakeover Provisions in the Post-SOX Era 2
(last revised Mar. 16, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2303921.

626. Id.
627. See id.
628. See, e.g., James A. Brickley et al., Corporate Voting: Evidence from Charter
Amendment Proposals, 1 J. CoRP. FIN. 5, 8-9 (1994) [hereinafter Brickley et al., Corporate
Voting].
629. See Philip J. Young et al., Trading Volume, Management Solicitation, and
Shareholder Voting, 33 J. FIN. ECON. 57, 61 (1993).
630. See Brickley et al., Corporate Voting, supra note 628, at 8 (finding that about 5% of
antitakeover amendments failed to pass); Sanjai Bhagat & Richard H. Jefferis, Voting Power
in the Proxy Process: The Case of Antitakeover CharterAmendments, 30 J. FIN. ECON. 193,
223 (1991) (finding that only one antitakeover proposal failed to pass out of 187).
631. Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of InstitutionalInvestor
Voice, 39 UCLA L. REv. 811, 827-29 (1992).
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632

empirical studies such as the ones summarized below.
As a result, it
became impossible for corporate management to win shareholder approval
for charter amendments to insert classified boards and other antitakeover
defenses.
Agrawal and Mandelker examine the stock returns surrounding the
announcement of antitakeover amendments and find that the amendments
appear to hurt the corporations' value. 633 They find significantly negative
cumulative average abnormal returns ("CAARs") of -2.6% during the forty
days leading up to and including the announcement of the proposed
634
amendments6.
Interestingly, when they shorten the period to the ten days
leading up to the announcement, they find insignificant results, suggesting
that news of the proposed amendment has already been incorporated into
the stock market price.635
The authors find that the announcement of a proposal to add a
supermajority voting provision with a board-out clause636 resulted, on
average, in significantly negative CARs, while votes on supermajority and
authorized preferred stock provisions resulted, on average, in weakly
637
negative returns6.
The negative stock market reaction is probably due to
the combination of a supermajority provision with a board-out clause,
which gives enormous power to managers to prevent a takeover or to
631
discriminate against bidders.
Bhagat and Jefferis similarly report that firms that propose antitakeover
amendments have significantly worse returns around the announcement

&

632. See James A. Brickley et al., Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover
Amendments, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 267, 273-74 (1988) [hereinafter Brickley et al., Ownership
Structure].
633. See Anup Agrawal & Gershon N. Mandelker, Large Shareholders and the
Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments, 25 J. FIN.
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 143, 149-51 (1990).

634. See id. at 149 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level). Only 41.7% of their
sample had positive cumulative abnormal returns during this period. Id.
635. See id.
636. A supermajority voting provision with a board-out clause requires support from a
supermajority of shareholders, generally between 66% and 95%, in order for a merger to be
approved, but allows the board to waive this requirement. See id. at 144.
637. See id. at 156, 157 tbl.6. The presence of a supermajority with a board-out clause
predicts negative CARs, significant at the 1% level, for the forty- and twenty-day periods.
See id. at 157 tbl.6. The presence of a supermajority provision predicts negative CARs,
significant at the 5% level, for the twenty-day period. See id. The presence of an authorized
preferred stock provisions predicts a negative CAR, significant at the 10% level, for the
forty-day period. See id.
638. See id. at 156.
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date than industry-matched control firms. 63 9 The result holds for each group
of amendments: amendments that entrench the board, fair-price or
supermajority amendments, anti-greenmail amendments, and blank-check
preferred stock amendments. 640 They use weighted maximum likelihood
estimates to show that antitakeover amendments destroy about 1% of a
641
company's value.
Smith, however, examines the stock market's reaction to close votes and
claims that passing an antitakeover provision increases the value of the firm
642

by 4.66%.
However, this same study finds that close proposals to repeal
an antitakeover amendment did not have a statistically significant effect on
company value.643 The difference in results may be due to the different time
644
periods examined.
2. Impact of InstitutionalInvestor Holdings
Institutional investors and blockholders actively monitor the adoption of
antitakeover amendments and help to screen out those that would decrease
645
the corporation's value. 6 Brickley et al. (1988) find that institutional
investors are more likely to vote on, and more likely to vote against, the
646
antitakeover amendments6.
Their results show that institutional investors
647
are active in the affairs of the firm and do not rubber stamp management.
Agrawal and Mandelker conclude that corporations with higher levels of
institutional ownership had better stock returns leading up to the
announcement of the amendment.648 They argue that their results are
639. See Bhagat and Jefferis, supra note 630, at 203. They fail to find significant returns
for the antitakeover firms over the three-day announcement period. See id. However, the
control group had positive returns over the same period, significant at the 1% level for all
types of amendments, which were significantly different from the antitakeover firms at the
1% level. See id.
640. See id.
641. See id. at 215. The same results hold when they separate amendments that entrench
the board from those that require a fair price or supermajority support in a takeover. See id.
642. See Smith, supra note 625, at 26, 54 tbl.2 (demonstrating significance at the 1%
level).
643. See id.
644. Compare Bhagat & Jefferis, supra note 630, at 196 (using a sample period of 19841984) with Smith, supra note 625, at 1 (using a sample period of 2006-2010).
645. See Brickley et al., Ownership Structure, supra note 632, at 273-74.
646. Id. at 274 (finding both results statistically significant at the .01 level).
647. Id.
648. See Agrawal & Mandelker, supra note 633, at 151. They divide the firms into three
groups based on the percentage of institutional ownership. Id. at 150-51. They find that the
group with the lowest institutional ownership has significantly negative CAARs during the
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consistent with the active monitoring hypothesis-that more sophisticated
and well-informed shareholders, such as institutional investors, are more
likely to vote in their economic interests. 649 Their results may underestimate
the impact of institutional ownership because management knows about
institutional opposition before they propose the amendment.6 5 0 Similarly,
the more investments by institutions, the more likely that the announcement
of the amendment would receive a better stock market reaction.6 s The
concentration of institutional ownership in the five largest institutional
investors also positively relates to a better stock market reaction to the
652
amendment announcement.65
Agrawal and Mandelker also show that firms with higher levels of block
ownership are also more likely to receive better CARs leading up to the
653
amendment announcement.65 Using a multiple regression model, they find
a significant relationship between institutional ownership and CARs around
the announcement for fair-price provisions, supermajority provisions, and
supermajority with board-out provisions, while finding no relationship with
654
classified board provisions and authorized preferred stock.65
forty and twenty days leading up to the announcement, at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.
See id. at 151 & tbl.3. The other two groups had CAARs indistinguishable from zero. See id.
at 151. The CAARs of the groups with the largest and smallest institutional ownership
during the forty-day period were significantly different at the 1% level. See id.
649. See id. For a discussion of the active and passive monitoring hypotheses, see id. at
143-44.
650. See id. at 151-52.
651. See id. at 152. As before, they divide the firms into three groups based on the dollar
value of institutional ownership. See id. For the group with the smallest institutional
ownership, they find significantly negative CAARs of -5.4% for the forty-day period
(z-score = -3.09) and -3.09% (z-score = -1.89) for the twenty-day period. See id. The other
two groups had insignificant results. See id.
652. See id. at 153. They use Herfindahl Index to measure the concentration of
institutional investors. Id. After the dividing the firms between three groups based on the
Herfindahl Index, the group with the lowest concentration had significantly negative CAARs
of -3.8% over the forty-day period and -2.6% over the twenty-day period, significant at the
1% and 5% levels. See id. at 153, 154 tbl.4. The other two groups had insignificant returns.

Id.
653. See id. at 153-54. The third of firms with the lowest 5% or greater ownership had a
CAAR of -3.3% over the forty days leading up to the amendment announcement, significant
at the 10% level. See id. at 154. The other two-thirds had insignificant results. See id.
654. See id. at 156. They use interaction variables to test the relationship of institutional
ownership to CARs for specific types of antitakeover provisions. See id. For supermajority
with a board-out clause, higher institutional ownership predicts better CARs at the 5% and
1% levels for the forty-day and twenty-day periods. See id. at 157 tbl.6. For a supermajority
provision, higher institutional ownership predicted better CARs at the 10% and 5% levels for
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Bhagat and Jefferis, however, fail to find a correlation between the level
of institutional ownership and the likelihood of proposing an antitakeover
amendment, suggesting that institutions increase the value of antitakeover
amendments by some way other than deterring management from
proposing them. 5 5 The type of institutional investor can also impact
656
support for the antitakeover amendment. s Theory suggests that pressuresensitive institutions, such as insurance companies, banks, and trusts, tend
to be more susceptible to management coercion, while pressure-insensitive
institutions, such as corporate pension funds, brokerage houses, and
657
investment council firms, tend not to be susceptible to such pressure. s As
expected, Brickley et al. (1988) find that the pressure-sensitive institutions
correlated positively with the "voted for" while the pressure-resistant
institutions correlated negatively, and vice versa for the "voted against"
regression. 658
Brickley et al. (1994) also report that higher ownership by pressuresensitive institutions increases support for the proposal, while higher
ownership by pressure-insensitive institutions decreases support for the
proposal.659 Similarly, they find that high ownership by blockholders
increases the proportion of outstanding votes cast.660 These results suggest
that blockholders have greater incentive to overcome free-rider problems
associated with voting.'6' The presence of more institutional owners either
makes managers less likely to propose antitakeover amendments or
moderates their negative effects through better monitoring or greater voting

the forty-day and twenty-day periods. See id. For fair price provisions, institutional
ownership predicts better CARs at the 10% level in the forty-day and twenty-day periods.
See id.
655. See Bhagat & Jefferis, supra note 630, at 214. They note that their data does not
allow them to distinguish between institutional investors that might be biased towards
management from those who are independent. See id.
656. See Brickley et al., Ownership Structure, supra note 632, at 277, 278 tbl.2.
657. See id. at 277.
658. See id. at 278 tbl.2. The hypothesis that the pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant
variables are equal can be rejected at the .05 significance level. See id. at 279 n.13.
659. See Brickley et al., Corporate Voting, supra note 628, at 21 tbl.3, 22. Pressuresensitive institutions are those that are easily pressured by management, including insurance
companies, banks, and non-bank trusts, while pressure-insensitive institutions include public
pension funds, mutual funds, endowments, and foundations. Id. at 20 n. 11.
660. See id. at 18-19, 19 tbl.2 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level). Their model
predicts that every 1% increase in blockholder ownership will result in an increase of 0.1%
of votes cast. See id.
661. See id. at 19.
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662

power in the presence of a takeover bid6.
However, institutional investors
may just be better at identifying firms that are more likely to be
successfully taken over or have management that would not propose a
value-harming amendment.663
3. Management Stock Holdings
Studies find that managers who are also shareholders tend to vote in
favor of antitakeover proposals.66 4 Brickley et al. (1988) find that
managerial stock ownership is not significantly related to the percentage of
votes cast but is significantly related to the percentage of "for" votes,
possibly because management ownership reduces other shareholders'
665
incentives to vote.66
Bhagat and Jefferis find that the CEOs of the firms proposing the
amendments and all directors and officers as a group received higher
666
compensation as a percentage of firm value than the control firms.
The
CEO and the officers and directors at the amendment firms owned a lower
667
percentage of the voting rights compared to the control firms.
They find
no significant difference in earnings between the two groups.66 The
fraction of votes held by the CEOs, all officers and directors, or outside
directors negatively correlated with the probability of proposing an
antitakeover amendment.669 Having officers who are also 5% blockholders
decreases the likelihood of management proposing an antitakeover
amendment when other ownership characteristics are controlled for.67o The
662.

See Agrawal & Mandelker, supra note 633, at 156-57.

663. See id. at 158.
664. See Brickley et al., Ownership Structure, supra note 632, at 273-74.
665. Id. at 274.
666. See Bhagat & Jefferis, supra note 630, at 205. CEOs at the amendment firms receive
on average $0.6 million (0.20% of firm value) compared to $0.49 million (0.55% of firm
value) at the control group. See id. The entire group of officers and directors at amendment
firms receive $3.19 million (0.83% of firm value) compared to $2.29 million (1.26% of firm
value) at control firms. See id. These results are significantly different. See id. at 205 tbl.4.
667. See id. at 205. CEOs at the amendment firms own on average 2.54% of the
company, compared to 7.15% at the control firms. See id. The officers and directors as a
group own 8.03% of the company at the amendment firms, compared to 14.86% of the
control firms. See id. These results are significantly different. See id. at 205 tbl.4.

668. See id. at 208.
669. See id. at 213. Using a weighted probit analysis, they find t-statistics of 2.53 for
CEOs, 1.01 for all officers and directors, and 1.19 for outside directors. See id. at 211 tbl.6.
Using a LaGrange multiplier test, they find t-statistics of 3.47 for CEOs, 2.97 for all officers
and directors, and 1.89 for outside directors. See id. at 212 tbl.7.
670. See id. at 214.
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authors suggest that officers who are blockholders are usually part of the
founding family of the company and face a decreased risk of hostile
takeovers or management turnover.n
However, Brickley et al. (1994) find that management's ownership does
672
not correlate with the percentage of votes cast.
One would expect that
management votes their shares in favor of their own proposals, but this may
not be the case. 673 Requiring a supermajority of votes outstanding also
predicts higher shareholder support for the proposal.674 This result suggests
that management decides which amendments to propose with an eye toward
675
the likely level of shareholder approval.
Management also has a variety
676
of mechanisms to influence shareholder voting.
4. Proxy Solicitors'Effect
Young et al. find that increased money spent on proxy solicitation
677
predicts a higher proportion of votes cast by shareholders.
However, the
total number of days between the record date and the meeting date (which
measures the amount of time for a solicitation to occur) did not relate to the
678
More days between the record date and when
proportion of votes cast.
the proxy is received predicts fewer votes cast, while more days between
receiving the proxy and the meeting date predicts a higher proportion of
votes cast.679 These results suggest that a company can increase the
proportion of shares voted by mailing the proxy as soon as possible after
680
the record dates.
When the proposal requires a certain percentage of votes
outstanding for approval, there tend to be more days between when the
shareholders receive the proxy and when the meeting date occurs.
This
suggests that management is aware that the length of time between the
record date, the proxy mailing date, and the meeting date influences the

671. See id.
672. See Brickley et al., Corporate Voting, supra note 628, at 18-19, 18 tbl.2. When they
break up blockholders by type, they find that individual and corporate blockholders and
institutional investors increase the percentage of votes cast, significant at the 1% level, but
management does not. See id.
673. See id. at 19.
674. See id. at 24-25, 25 tbl.5 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level).
675. See id. at 24.
676. See Young et al., supra note 629, at 66-67 tbl.4.
677. See id. at 66-67 tbl.4, 69 (demonstrating significance at the 5% level).
678. See id.
679. See id. (finding both significant at the 1% level).

680. Id. at 69-70.
681.

See id. at 68 tbl.4, 70 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level).
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number of votes cast, so management uses this phenomenon to their
advantage to secure passage of their proposals.68 2
Individuals, possibly due to collective action problems, appear more
likely to support management than institutional shareholders. 68 3 Brickley et
al. (1988) find that the size of the firm positively relates to support for
management, which suggests that individual shareholders are more likely to
vote with management.684 Brickley et al. (1994) find that larger firms tend
685
to receive more shareholder support for their antitakeover amendments. s
Because larger firms tend to have more shareholders, the results suggest
that management can more effectively control shareholders when there are
686
more of them and each one owns a lower percentage of the company.
Interestingly, positive performance of the company, based on either stock
performance or return on assets, does not significantly correlate with
shareholder voting support for the proposed amendments.6 8 7
5. Impact of Counter Solicitations
Counter-solicitation proxy fights help demonstrate the value-decreasing
nature of antitakeover amendments.688 Counter-solicitation campaigns are
relatively rare compared to antitakeover amendment proposals, with only
twenty campaigns occurring between 1979 and 1987 out of more than 600
charter provisions proposed and ratified in the same period.689 Pound finds
that the counter-solicitation campaign succeeded in preventing the
690
amendment in 25% of cases.
Management has significant advantages in passing antitakeover
amendments because they can give as little as ten days' notice of a
shareholders meeting and decide who is allowed to vote by judiciously
682. See id.
683. See Brickley et al., Ownership Structure, supra note 632, at 274.
684. Id. (finding statistically significant results for one regression at the .02 level and
another at the .01 level). The relationship between firm size and percent of stock voted was
not statistically significant, which would seem to cut against the free-rider hypothesis. See
id.
685. See Brickley et al., Corporate Voting, supra note 628, at 21 tbl.3, 23 (demonstrating
significance at the 1% level).
686. See id. at 23.
687. See id. at 21 tbl.3, 22.
688. John Pound, Shareholder Activism and Share Values: The Causes and
Consequences of CountersolicitationsAgainst Management Antitakeover Proposals, 32 J.L.

&EcoN. 357, 358 (1989).
689. See id. at 360-61. Of these, sixteen had sufficient information to be included in the
study. See id. at 361.

690. See id. at 362.
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setting the record date. 691 These advantages prevent dissidents from having
the necessary time to buy additional shares.6 92 Where the antitakeover
amendments were ultimately approved, the firms experienced significant
negative returns when the vote outcome became public.693 Where the
antitakeover amendment was defeated, the firms experienced significant
positive returns.694 These results are economically significant and suggest
that antitakeover amendments hurt shareholder value.695 When Pound
examines the entire period of the counter-solicitation campaign, he finds
similar results.696 Looking at news articles, he finds that almost all of the
dissident groups expressed intent to control the firm and had a record of
control-oriented investment activity.697 As a result, the shifts in shareholder

value probably result from the changing probability of a successful
takeover.698
6. Summary
Despite the negative stock market reactions, shareholders have
historically tended to overwhelmingly approve antitakeover amendments.699
Today this is no longer the case, and corporate management is reluctant to
propose such charter amendments as they are almost certain to fail. In fact,
in recent years, shareholders have often succeeded in persuading corporate
management to propose the removal of classified boards and then voted
overwhelmingly to get rid of them.70

691.

See id.

692. See id. at 363.
693. See id. at 366. Pound finds an average net-of-market stock return of -7.24%,
statistically significant at the 1% level. See id. at 367 tbl.1.
694. See id. at 366. For the four firms where the antitakeover amendment was defeated,
Pound finds an average net-of-market stock return of 4.60%, statistically significant at the
1% level. See id. at 367 tbl.1.

695. See id. at 366.
696. See id. For companies where the antitakeover amendment ultimately succeeded, he
finds an average net-of-market return of -8.99%, significant at the 5% level. See id. at 367
tbl.1. For companies where the antitakeover amendment ultimately succeeded, he finds an
average net-of-market increase of 8.11%, significant at the 5% level. See id.
697. See id. at 369. He finds that fourteen of the sixteen dissident groups expressed intent
to control the firm. Id. Similarly, fifteen of the sixteen dissidents were individuals or firms
with a record of control-oriented investment activity. Id.

698. See id.
699. See supra Section IV.A.1.
700. 102 Companies Declassified, HARV. L. SCH.: SHAREHOLDER RTs. PROJECT,
http://www.srp.law.harvard.edu/declassifications.shtml (last visited June 12, 2017).
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Although it is not entirely clear why shareholders once offered such high
levels of support, the historical evidence does help to illuminate the
different roles that each group of shareholders play. Management holdings
are not as directly related to the likelihood of proposing or adopting
shareholder amendments as would be expected, possibly because larger
holdings act as a takeover defense in themselves and remove the need to
adopt other defenses.701 Institutional investors with large stock ownership
can effectively overcome collective action problems if they are organized to
702
block value-decreasing antitakeover amendments7.
Individuals, however,
do not own enough shares to escape rational ignorance and therefore tend to
support management in higher numbers. 703 As a result, institutional
shareholders need to overcome collective action problems to stop
antitakeover amendments.
C. Voting on Mergers and Acquisitions
1. Approval of Acquisitions
Matvos and Ostrovsky demonstrate that shareholders consistently
approve acquisitions despite their value-decreasing effect on the
company.70 4 From the perspective of management, the acquisitions can be
explained by the overconfidence of managers, the pursuit of empire
building, and the pressure effects on acquirers' stock prices around
mergers.7 05 However, little explanation exists for why shareholders would
approve any merger, given their predominantly value-decreasing nature.70 6
Acquisitions generally receive the support of around 95% of votes cast
and 70% of outstanding voting rights.7 07 Examining the acquisition votes
between 1990 and 2000, Burch et al. do not find a single instance of the
701. See supra Section IV.A.3.
702. See supra Section IV.A.2.
703. See supra text accompanying notes 683-684.
704. Gergor Matvos & Michael Ostrovsky, Cross-Ownership, Returns, and Voting in
Mergers, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 391, 391 (2008).
705. See id.
706. See id.
707. See, e.g., Jennifer E. Bethel et al., The Market for Shareholder Voting Rights
Around Mergers and Acquisitions: Evidence from InstitutionalDaily Trading and Voting, 15
J. CORP. FIN. 129, 135 (2009) (finding an average approval of 95% of votes cast and 70% of
votes outstanding for 350 mergers and acquisitions between 1999 and 2005); Timothy R.
Burch et al., Is Acquiring-Firm Shareholder Approval in Stock-for-Stock Mergers
Perfunctory?, FIN. MGMT., Winter 2004, at 45, 45-46 (finding an average approval rate of
98% of votes cast and 73% of votes outstanding for 209 acquisition votes between 1990 and

2000).
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acquirer's shareholders failing to approve a merger.708 Unsurprisingly,
shareholders are much more likely to support a merger when ISS issues an
"approve" recommendation.709
The rise of merger arbitrage provides new importance in shareholder
voting on mergers.7 10 In merger arbitrage, or more technically "activist risk
arbitrage," "a shareholder attempts to change the course of an announced
,,711
[merger and acquisition ("M&A")] deal through public campaigns.
Voting against a deal and persuading other investors to do the same
712
However,
provides leverage to the activists to negotiate better terms7.
these activists are cognizant of the fact that they will only profit if some
deal is eventually completed. 713 This type of activism has been an
increasingly common aspect of the M&A landscape, with activism in 0.6%
of deals in 2000 up to 13% and 6.5% of all deals in 2013 and 2014.714 In
total, Jiang et al. observe 343 instances of M&A activism between 2000 and
2014.715 Even where activists intervene, the merger tends to receive a high
level of support from the target's shareholders, with an average of 65%
716
voting in favor of the deal.
These numbers, however, are much lower
than in standard mergers and suggest a more controversial vote. Activists
708. See Burch et al., supranote 707, at 46.
709. See Laura Sophie Henning, Shareholder Voting and Merger Returns, 29 FIN. MKTS.
& PORTFOLIO MGMT. 337, 348 (2015). The author's sample includes 141 firm votes that
occur in target firms and 243 votes that occur in acquiring firms between 2003 and 2011, for
a total of 384 votes over 367 transactions. See id. at 342. The reason for the low overlap is
that private firms are not required to hold shareholder meetings or publicly release the
results, and shareholder approval is required for acquirer firms only when more than 20% of
outstanding shares will be issued. See id. at 342-43. An ISS recommendation was negatively
related to dissent at the target firm at the 5% level and negatively related to acquirer
recommendation at the 1% level. See id. at 349, 349 tbl.2. Henning also noted that the "free
float" of the company, meaning the percentage of shares in the hands of ordinary investors,
is positively associated with voter dissent for acquirers, and no statistically significant
relationship for target shareholders exists. See id. at 348, 349 tbl.2 (demonstrating
significance at the 1% level). Thus, ordinary investors at acquiring firms are more likely to
dissent to the acquisition. See id. at 348.
710. See Wei Jiang et al., Influencing Control: Jawboning in Risk Arbitrage 3 (Columbia
Bus. Sch. Research Paper Series, Paper 15-41, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2587925.
The author's sample covers 4278 deals between 2000 and 2014. Id. at 3.
711. Id. at 1.
712. See id. at 18-19.
713. See id. at 22.
714. Id. at 3.
715. See id. at 3-4. Because of incomplete data, they narrow down their final sample of
M&A activism in targets to 255 instances. See id. at 9.
716. See id. at 11.
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will use several techniques to influence other shareholders' votes, such as
public criticism of the deal and proxy solicitation to veto the deal.
By far
the most influential method is support from ISS, where dissidents gained
support in 69% of the eighty-four ISS recommendations disclosed.
Overall, the activists attained better terms in 31% of deals, but failed to
reach a completed deal in 21% of cases.719 Of the deals withdrawn from the
initial buyer, a failed shareholder vote was the cause in 25% of cases,
including 7.89% where the activist's vote was pivotal and 5.26% where the
negative vote followed a negative ISS recommendation.720 By contrast, the
authors find shareholders vote down the deal in 1.07% of all deals not
involving shareholder activists.721 These results suggest that shareholder
voting on mergers provides activists with a meaningful tool to attain better
terms for all of the company's shareholders. The rise in merger activism
gives the merger vote a more meaningful role in corporate governance.
2. Impact of Stock Returns
Even if they do not vote down the acquisition, shareholders pay attention
to the acquisition's value when casting their votes. Burch et al. find that the
acquirer's stock returns around the announcement of the merger and around
722
the shareholder vote both predict a higher rate of shareholder support.
The acquirer's change in return on the assets before and after the
acquisition correlates with acquirer shareholder support for the
acquisition. 723 The ratio of cash to assets predicts a worse reception of the
merger by shareholders.72 4 Shareholders may understand that acquisitions
by cash-rich firms tend to destroy more value because they represent a way
to waste cash.725 Neither the acquirer's return on assets nor their stock

717. See id.
718. See id. These numbers suggest that ISS issued a recommendation in favor of the
dissidents in 31% of cases. Id. at 12.
719. See id.
720. See id. at 52 tbl.5 (Panel C). Some of these deals were complete with other buyers,
where the activist's efforts led to better terms for the shareholders. See id. For all deals,
shareholders voted down the deal in 6.88% of cases. See id. However, it is not clear how
many of these deals made it to a shareholder vote. See id.
721. See id. However, it is not clear how many of these deals came to a shareholder vote.
See id.
722. See Burch et al., supra note 707, at 57 tbl.3, 58 (finding both significant at the 5%
level).
723. See id. at 57 tbl.3, 59 (demonstrating significance at the 5% level).
724. See id. (demonstrating significance at the 5% level).
725. See id. at 58-59.
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returns over the previous year significantly relate to the level of shareholder
726
This result suggests that shareholders are voting to approve the
support.
transaction based on the quality of the target and not based on their
company's performance over the previous year.727
The relationship between stock market returns and shareholder approval
presents a more complicated picture.728 Hsieh and Wang find that requiring
the shareholders of the acquiring company to vote on and approve the
acquisition predicts higher gains to both the acquirer and the target.729 On
the other hand, Kamar fails to find a relationship between requiring
shareholder approval and the stock market returns surrounding the
announcement. 730 The lack of a correlation suggests that the shareholder
voting requirement does not prevent harmful acquisitions or even
discourage management from putting a harmful acquisition to a shareholder
vote.73 1 Shareholder approval is also unrelated to the premium over the
stock price paid for the target company, although this is admittedly a crude
proxy for acquisition value.732
However, Henning finds that abnormal announcement returns relate
negatively to voting dissent by both target and acquirer firm
shareholders.73 3 This result suggests that shareholders take market reaction
into account when deciding how to vote.734 The relationship, however, is
stronger for target shareholders than for acquirer shareholders.735 Henning
interprets this result to mean that the merger is more pivotal for the target

726. See id. at 57 tbl.3, 58.
727. See id. at 58.
728. See Jim Hsieh & Qinghai Wang, Shareholder Voting Rights in Mergers and
Acquisitions 26 (Mar. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://wwwl.american.edu/
academic.depts/ksb/finance realestate/rhauswald/seminar/vote American.pdf.
729. See id. at 26, 49 tbl.6 (demonstrating significance at the 5% level). Gains are
measured over the five-day event window as both a percentage increase in market equity of
the acquirer and target and as dollar value of the increase in market equity. See id. at 24.
Having voting rights for the acquirer's shareholders predicts an additional increase in market
value of 1.1%. See id. at 26.
730. Ehud Kamar, Does Shareholder Voting on Acquisitions Matter? 14 (Mar. 2011)
(unpublished manuscript),
http://www7.tau.ac.il/blogs/law/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/
March-201 1.pdf.
731. See id. at 13-14.
732. See id. at 16-17.
733. See Henning, supra note 709, at 348.
734. Id.
735. See id. Abnormal returns are negatively related to target shareholder votes at the 1%
level. See id. at 349 tbl.2. Abnormal returns are also negatively related to acquirer dissent
but only marginally significant at the 10% level. See id.
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company and, as a result, the target shareholders invest more energy in
monitoring the transaction.
Henning analyzes the effect of voting dissent on abnormal returns
following the shareholder meeting. 73 7 Voting dissent has a strong positive
relationship with the cumulative abnormal returns following the meeting for
both target and acquiring firms. 738 Thus, meetings with higher voting
dissent are followed by a more positive stock market reaction. 73 9 This
counterintuitive result reflects the fact that the shareholder vote resolves
part of the uncertainty around the completion of the deal. 740 Henning claims
that the level of voting dissent reflects the uncertainty of deal completion,
even if the deal as a whole increases shareholder value. 741 Thus, once the
shareholders approve the deal, despite the high dissent, the company's share
742
value increases7.
Henning also looks at the relationship between voting
dissent and long-run abnormal returns. 743 As expected, voting dissent is
negatively related to long-run abnormal performance over the following
two years. 7 " Voting dissent, however, is only marginally significant when
correlated with performance over a five-year period.745 The amount of
shareholder dissent predicts a large portion of subsequent performance of
746
the merged company.

736. See id. at 348.
737.
738.

See id. at 355.
See id. (finding both significant at the 1% level).

739. See id. at 355-56.
740.

See id. at 356-57.

741. See id.
742. See id. at 355-56. To confirm this interpretation, Henning uses the length of the
negotiations as a proxy for deal uncertainty and divides the deals into two groups with above
and below median negotiation length. See id. at 357. As expected, for deals with shorter
negotiation periods, there was no significant correlation between voting dissent and
subsequent abnormal returns. See id. For deals with longer negotiation periods, higher voting
dissent predicted higher abnormal returns. See id. (demonstrating significance at the 1%
level for acquirers and the 5% level for target firms). Thus, the correlation between voting
dissent and abnormal returns reflects the increased certainty in resolving the deal going
forward. See id.
743. See id. She excludes firms that are not acquirers and creates separate samples for
firms with at least two years of subsequent data (194 firm observations) and five years of
subsequent data (79 firm observations). Id.
744. Id. (demonstrating significance at the 5% level).

745. See id.
746. See id. at 361.
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3. Advisor Opinions
Becher et al. find that the acquirer's shareholders appear to pay more
attention to the fairness opinion of the target's advisors than the acquirer's
advisors.747 They show that the presence of a target advisor's opinion
increases shareholder support more than the presence of an acquirer
advisor's opinion.7 4

'

Receiving a positive equity valuation ("EV") ratio7 4 9

from a target advisor also increases shareholder support, while one from an
acquisition advisor does not.7 5 0 Ouyang finds similar results. 75 1 A target

advisor's opinion of target equity value leads to better support from
acquirer shareholders than the acquirer advisor's opinion.752 In fact, the
747. David Becher et al., Do Shareholders Listen? M&A Advisor Opinions and
Shareholder Voting 4 (July 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.rhsmith.umd.
edu/files/Documents/Departments/Finance/Session6BecherDoShareholdersListen.pdf.
748. See id. at 15-16. A target advisor increases shareholder support by 8.38 percentage
points (significant at the 1% level), while an acquirer advisor increases shareholder support
by 6.25 percentage points (significant at the 3% level). See id. at 34 tbl.2. More dramatically,
a multiple regression finds that a target advisor's opinion significantly increases shareholder
support for the acquisition, significant at the 5% level, while the presence of an acquirer
advisor opinion has no significant effect. See id. at 16, 36 tbl.3.
749. The EV ratio is the difference between the average target equity valuation and the
offer price divided by the offer price. Id. at 12. A positive EV ratio indicates that the target
firm value is higher than the offer price, so that the offer is a good deal for the acquirer,
while a negative EV ratio indicates that the acquisition is a bad deal. Id.
750. See id. at 15-16. An opinion with a positive EV ratio from the target's advisor
increases the mean shareholder support by 6.92% (p-value = 0.11), with a median of 6.82%
(p-value = 0.08), while the opinion from the acquirer's advisor had no statistically
significant effect. See id. at 34 tbl.2. A multiple regression similarly finds that a positive
opinion from a target's advisor significantly increases shareholder support, significant at the
10% level, while the acquirer's advisor had no impact. See id. at 36 tbl.3. Part of the reason
for the lower statistical significant was because of the smaller sample size. See id. at 34 tbl.2,
35-36 tbl.3.
751. See Wenjing Ouyang, The Effect of M&A Advisors' Opinions on Acquirer
Shareholder Voting, 57 Q. REv. ECON. & FIN. 175, 175-76 (2015). The author collects a
sample of 136 friendly negotiated deals announced between 2000 and 2006. Id. at 178. The
paper focuses on acquirer shareholders rather than target shareholders because target firms
usually do not report voting results. Id. at 176 n.2. She limits the acquirer shareholder vote to
outside shareholder approval to limit the impact of insiders. See id. at 178. Using this
definition, she finds an average shareholder approval rate of 68.5%. See id. All of the
mergers she studies are approved by the acquirer shareholders. See id.
752. See id. at 181. "[W]hen a target advisor provides an estimation of the target equity
value, the average and median increases in acquirer shareholder support are 5.63% and
8.17% . . . respectively." Id. (demonstrating significance at the 2% and 1% levels
respectively). A Probit model "shows that when the target advisor provides an estimation of
target value, acquirer shareholder support significantly increases [by] 4.46%," significant at
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acquirer advisor's estimated EV ratio does not appear to have any
significant effect on shareholder voting. 753 As acquirer advisor opinions
tend to be more optimistic, these results suggest that shareholders can see
through the bias of acquirer advisors and focus on the less-biased opinions
of target advisors. 754
Becher et al. determine that shareholder support increases when the
target advisor provides an earnings forecast, particularly when the forecast
indicates that the merger is non-dilutive, and that an earnings forecast by
the acquirer's advisor has no impact on shareholder approval, even where
the opinion indicates that the merger is non-dilutive.7 5 Ouyang also finds
that the shareholder approval rate increases by an average of 6.34% when
the target advisor provides forecasts of the deal's impact on the acquirer's
earnings. 5 6 By contrast, when the acquirer advisors provide an earnings
forecast, the voting results do not change significantly. 75 If target advisors
forecast non-dilutive earnings, then the shareholder support increases by

the 7% level. Id. When an acquirer advisor provides the same estimation, however, it has no
impact on shareholder voting. Id. When the offer price is less than the midpoint of the target
advisor's valuation range, "the mean and median acquirer shareholder approval rates
increase by 8.01% and 8.52%, respectively." Id. (demonstrating significance at the 5%
level). Additionally, acquirer shareholders have significantly higher support for the deal
"when target advisors issue higher target equity evaluations." Id. (demonstrating significance
at the 5% level). A Probit model similarly shows that a one standard deviation increase in
the target advisor's equity valuation estimate increases the acquirer shareholders' approval
rate by 2.53%. Id.
753. See id. A Probit model similarly shows no significant relationship. See id.
754. Id.
755. See Becher et al., supra note 747, at 17-18. Univariate results indicate that the
presence of an earnings opinion from the target's advisor increases shareholder support by
6.5%, significant at the 1% level, while a non-dilutive forecast increases shareholder support
by 5.05%, significant at the 4% level. See id. at 37 tbl.4. Having an earnings forecast, even a
non-dilutive forecast, from the acquirer's advisor did not relate to shareholder voting. See id.
A multiple regression similarly finds that the presence of an earnings forecast from the
target's advisor increases shareholder support, while one from the acquirer's advisor does
not. See id. at 39 tb.5. Interestingly, having a non-dilutive earnings forecast has a similar
impact from the acquirer's and target's advisor, each significant at the 10% level. See id.
756. Ouyang, supra note 751, at 182 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level). The
median increase is 9.22%, significant at the 1% level. Id. A Probit model similarly "shows
that the approval rate increases by 5.60% when the target advisors provide earnings
forecasts." Id.
757. See id. A Probit model similarly fails to find a statistically significant relationship.
See id.
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4.53%.7" Again, the shareholder approval rate does not significantly
change when the acquirer advisors issue a similar opinion.75 9
The recommendation of an analyst who works for the same investment
bank as an advisor to the target or acquirer may have an impact on
shareholder voting. 760 Becher et al. find that shareholder support increased
by 11% when the analyst affiliate of a target advisor provides a
recommendation, and shareholder support increases even more when that
analyst's recommendation provides a positive recommendation.7 6 ' By
contrast, the recommendation of an analyst affiliated with the acquirer
762
advisor had no impact.
But shareholder support decreased by 14% when
the acquirer advisor had prior business with the acquirer firm.763 This

suggests that shareholders respond negatively to potential conflicts of
interest in their firm's advisor.764
Interestingly, the level of support from the acquirer's shareholders for the
acquisition accurately predicts whether the acquirer will use the same
765
advisor in a future acquisition.
This result suggests that managers believe
that the choice of advisor significantly impacts shareholder support, even
though the data suggests that their advisor's recommendation has little
766
impact on the deal.
The acquirer's shareholders appear to recognize their
firm's advisor faces an inherent conflict of interest and so look to the
767
target's advisor.
Overall, Burch et al. interpret these results to suggest that shareholders
pay attention to the value of the acquisition when casting their vote, even if
they do not overall reject the acquisition.76 Although these approval rates
suggest that shareholder voting does not directly block management's
-

758. Id. (demonstrating significance at the 4% level). Similarly, a Probit model shows
that a non-dilutive forecast leads to increased shareholder support by 4.36%. Id.
759. See id. A Probit model also finds that a non-dilutive forecast by acquirer advisors
does not impact shareholder support. See id.
760. See Becher et al., supra note 747, at 18.
761. See id. at 20, 42 tbl.7. The relationship between issuing an opinion and shareholder
support was significant at the 4.2% level, while the relationship between issuing a positive
opinion and shareholder support was significant at the 7% level. See id.
762. See id. at 20.
763. Id. at 20, 42 tbl.7 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level).
764. See id. at 20.
765. See id. at 22 (demonstrating significance at the 2% level). A standard deviation
increase in shareholder support increases the odds that the same advisor will be used in a
future deal by 13%. Id.
766. See id.
767. Id. at 24.
768. See Burch et al., supranote 707, at 46-47.
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decisions on mergers, the shareholder vote may offer an indirect check.769
The threat of shareholder rejection may prevent acquirer management from
pursuing a bad merger long before a shareholder vote occurs. 770 Burch et al.
postulate that disapproving shareholders may also prefer to sell their shares
rather than vote down the acquisition, or may simply view voting against
the acquisition as futile.
4. Deal Structure
If management fears that shareholders will vote down the deal, they may
structure the deal to avoid the shareholder approval requirement.772 Hsieh
and Wang find that slightly more than half of acquirers proposed
transactions that required shareholder approval. 773 They find that deals are
less likely to be successful where the acquirer's shareholders have to vote
on the deal.774 Kamar, however, finds no correlation between the
shareholder vote requirement and the odds of completing the stock
acquisition once the registration statement was filed.775 He interprets this
lack of correlation to suggest that shareholder approval does not filter
776
value-harming acquisitions,
although the advent of merger arbitrage
(discussed in Jiang above) suggests that this may have changed today.
A shareholder approval requirement makes the acquisition of a private
company take longer to complete. 77' A shareholder approval requirement is
less likely when the deal uses unregistered stock for a private company,

769. Id. at 46.
770. Id.
771. See id. at 51-52.
772. See Hsieh & Wang, supra note 728, at 3-4. Shareholder approval is required when
"the acquirer issues new shares exceeding 20% of outstanding shares." Id. at 8-9. However,
cash deals do not require approval of the acquirer's shareholders. Id. at 10.
773. See id. (finding that 53% of acquirers had shareholder approval).
774. See id. at 18, 46 tbl.4 (demonstrating significance at the 5% level). Their model
predicts a 24.06% decrease in the probability of deal success if the acquirer's shareholders
need to approve the deal. Id. at 18.
775. See Kamar, supra note 730, at 21. The author limits his sample to mergers that
involve stock consideration because prior literature finds that mergers without stock
consideration are treated differently by the markets and rarely require shareholder approval.
Id. at 8.
776. See id. at 21.
777. See supra notes 710-718 and accompanying text.
778. See Kamar, supra note 730, at 25, 44 tbl.6 (demonstrating significance at the 1%
level). A multiple regression predicted that a shareholder-approved acquisition of a private
company would take ninety-five days longer than an acquisition without shareholder
approval, which would take fifty days. See id.
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suggesting that the acquirer will avoid a shareholder vote to save time.
However, shareholder approval does not increase the duration of an
780
acquisition of a public company.
Hsieh and Wang find that larger acquirers are less likely to seek
shareholder approval of the acquisition.7
Acquirers with more cash
holdings were more likely to face shareholder approval, while acquirers
with higher market-to-book ratios, more institutional investors, or worse
stock performance were less likely to face shareholder votes.782 On the
other hand, shareholder votes were more common for the acquirer when the
target had higher institutional holdings. 783 Kamar finds no relationship
between the level of ownership by insiders and blockholders and having a
shareholder voting requirement, suggesting that managers do not avoid the
voting requirement for fear of shareholder resistance.784 These results
provide some support for the theory that voting rights serve as a screening
method to prevent bad deals from going through.7 5
5. Effect of InstitutionalInvestors
Institutional investors may be facilitating approval of the acquisitions.
Matvos and Ostrovsky find that, on average, institutional investors owned
43% of acquiring companies and 30% of target companies.
Consistent
with previous research, institutional investors who hold acquirer stock
receive negative returns from the acquisition.
However, when the
institutional investor's holdings in both the acquirer and the target are
accounted for, their returns become statistically indistinguishable from
zero.789

While an acquisition may hurt the acquirer's value, institutional investors
still increase the value of their investments by investing in both the acquirer

779. See id. at 30, 47 tbl.9 (finding both significant at the 1% level).
780. Id. at 26.
781. Hsieh & Wang, supra note 728, at 16. They find that the logarithm of the book
value of assets correlates negatively with having shareholder approval, significant at the 1%
level. See id. at 16-17, 45 tbl.3.
782. Id. (demonstrating significance at the 1% level).
783. Id. at 16, 45 tbl.3 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level).
784. See Kamar, supra note 730, at 30.
785. See Hsieh & Wang, supra note 728, at 19.
786. See Matvos & Ostrovsky, supra note 704, at 393-94.
787. Id. at 393.
788. Id. at 394 (finding significantly different from 0 at the 1% level). However, the raw
returns are not significantly different from zero. See id.

789. Id.
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and the target. 790 Matvos and Ostrovsky find that institutional investors that
only owned shares in the acquirer were more than twice as likely to
disapprove of the merger as institutional investors that owned shares in both
the acquirer and the target.791 Interestingly, they report several instances of
an institutional investor approving the merger on one side of the deal while
rejecting it on the other.792 When they limit the sample to acquisitions that
received a positive stock market reaction, the difference in voting habits
disappears.7 93
Institutional investors appear to buy additional shares leading up to the
record date, the date that determines who can vote on the acquisition.794
Bethel et al. show that institutions trade and buy more actively before and
on the record dates for mergers than afterward, suggesting that they do so
for the voting rights.795 However, they find no statistically significant
relationship between cross-ownership of the target and acquirer and
institutional buying behavior.796 These results provide some explanation for
why shareholders approve acquisitions but fall short of completely solving
the puzzle.
6. Summary
Although shareholder voting may not prevent every bad acquisition,
shareholders' decision-making process appears consistent with the goal of
maximizing company value.797 The shareholder vote closely follows the
stock market's assessment of the acquisition and reflects how the
acquisition will impact the company's operating performance.798
Shareholders can even screen out conflicted and unreliable sources of
790. See id.
791. See id. at 399. They find that on average 0.82% of cross-over firms voted against the
merger, while 2.17% of acquirer-only firms voted against it. See id. They use linear
probability, logit, and conditional logit models to confirm that cross-over funds are more
likely to vote for a merger than acquirer-only funds, significantly different at the 1% level.
Id.
792. Id. at 398.
793. See id. at 400. They are unable to find a statistically significant difference in voting
patterns between cross-over and acquirer-only firms during good mergers with linear, logit,
and conditional logit probability models. Id.
794. See Bethel et al., supra note 707, at 135.
795. Id. They eliminate the explanation of merger arbitrage by constructing a multiple
regression between trading around the record date and trading around the merger
announcement and find no statistically significant correlation. See id. at 139.
796. Id. at 143.
797. See supra Sections JV.B.1-4.
798. See supra Section IV.B.2.
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information when making their decision. 799 A binding shareholder vote,
however, loses its bite when management can structure the transaction to
avoid the requirement. 00 Still, the evidence suggests that the shareholder
vote has some screening impact without resorting to an outright rejection,
even if only as a soft deterrent or an implicit threat.so0 Other dynamics, such
as cross-ownership in the target company, may create shareholder approval
of an otherwise bad acquisition.8 02
D. Auditor Ratification
Auditor ratification allows shareholders, in a nonbinding vote, to
approve or reject the company's outside auditor.803 The goal is to keep the
auditor independent so he or she can effectively check the company's
books.'" Despite the lack of a legal requirement of shareholder approval,
around two-thirds of public companies hold a vote on auditor ratification. 0 5
In auditor ratification votes, auditors receive on average between 98% and
99% support from shareholders, as close to unanimous support as possible
in any election.

06

In studies examining data going back to 1976, there has been only one
instance of shareholders failing to ratify the board-approved auditor. 0 7 In
799.

See supra Section IV.B.3.

800. See supra Section IV.B.4.
801. See supra Section IV.B.4.
802. See supra Section IV.B.5.
803. See Mai Dao et al., Shareholder Voting on Auditor Selection, Audit Fees, and Audit
Quality, 87 ACCT. REv. 149, 149-50 (2012) [hereinafter Dao et al., ShareholderVoting].

&

804. See id. at 150.
805. See id. at 156 (finding that 67% of firms had auditor ratification); Jagan Krishnan

Zhongxia (Shelly) Ye, Why Some Companies Seek Shareholder Ratification on Auditor
Selection, 19 ACCT. HORIZONs 237, 238 (2005) (finding that 68% of public companies put

their auditor up for ratification); K. Raghunandan & Dasaratha V. Rama, Audit Committee
Composition and Shareholder Actions: Evidence from Voting on Auditor Ratification, 22
J. PRAc. & THEORY 253, 258 (2003) (finding that 64% of companies held auditor

AUDITING:

ratification votes).
806. See G. William Glezen & James A. Millar, An Empirical Investigation of
Stockholder Reaction to DisclosuresRequired by ASR No. 250, 23 J. ACCT. REs. 859, 863

tbl.1 (1985) (finding an average of 99% shareholder support from 1976 to 1981); Barbara J.
Sainty et al., Investor DissatisfactionToward Auditors, 17 J. ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 111,
119 (2002) (finding an average of 1.177% disapproval, with a maximum of 21%
disapproval). Both studies counted abstaining votes as voting against auditor ratification,
although they are technically two different categories.
&

807. See Suchismita Mishra et al., Do Investors' Perceptions Vary with Types of
Nonaudit Fees? Evidence from Auditor Ratification Voting, 24 AUDITING: J. PRAC.
THEORY 9, 10 (2005).
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2002, the shareholders of Hershey Foods voted against ratifying Arthur
Andersen LLP, a month after the accounting firm was indicted for its
involvement in the Enron collapse as the company's outside auditors.os
Critics naturally question whether these votes have any impact on the
auditor's independence and effectiveness.809 Despite the high levels of
shareholder support, auditor ratification votes help to keep auditors
independent and provide insight into what shareholders view as a threat to
auditor independence and effectiveness. 1 0
1. Non-Audit Fees
Theory suggests that the primary threat to auditor independence is the
fees paid to auditors for non-auditing services." Auditors may fear
exposing problems with the company's books and risking management's
wrath where they receive substantial business from the company in addition
to their usual auditing fee.812
The evolution of the required disclosure of fees paid to auditors has
allowed researchers to understand whether shareholders hold a similar
concern. Between 1978 and 1982, ASR No. 250 "required public
companies to disclose . . . the percentage of fees for nonaudit services in
relation to the audit fee."8 13 Glezen and Millar find no statistically
significant difference in the percentage of "for" votes before and after the
disclosure requirements. 8 14 Also, they did not find a correlation between
auditor approval rating and the percentage of fees paid for non-auditing
services.s1s This finding suggests that shareholders are not concerned that
non-auditing services will undermine auditor independence. 816

808. Id. (noting that 81% of shareholders rejected ratification).
809. See id.
810. K. Raghunandan, Nonaudit Services and Shareholder Ratification of Auditors, 22
AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 155, 155-56, 162 (2003).
811. See id. at 156-57.
812. See id.
813. Glezen & Millar, supra note 806, at 859. The requirement "was withdrawn because
[the SEC] found few companies reporting 'sensitive' nonaudit services" and because the
SEC Practice Section of the AICPA Division of Firms later required the release of similar
information. Id.
814. See id. at 864. Separating the data by industry and firm size also failed to yield a
statistically significant difference. See id. at 865.
815. See id.
816. See id. at 864.
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In 2001, the SEC again began requiring the disclosure of audit and nonaudit fees paid to the outside auditor. 1 7 The SEC's research suggests that
the average non-audit fee ratio for Fortune 1000 companies is 269%.1
Raghunandan finds that the non-audit ratio positively predicted the
proportion of shareholders who vote against shareholder ratification. 819 The
non-audit fee ratio also predicted a decrease in shareholder support for
auditor ratification compared to before the new disclosure requirement.820
The difference in ratification support suggests that the disclosure
requirement has facilitated shareholders' ability to monitor their company's
auditor.8 21 Similarly, Raghunandan and Rama find that a higher non-audit
fee to audit fee ratio predicted significantly more votes against auditor
ratification.8 22

In 2003, the SEC updated the auditor disclosure rules by adding two new
categories, "audit-related fees" and "tax fees," to the fee types.823 Mishra et
al. find that the audit-related fee ratio predicted increased support for
auditor ratification.824 The tax fee ratio and the "other" non-audit fee ratio
predicted more shareholders voting against ratification.8 25 These results
suggest that shareholders do not view audit-related fees as creating a
conflict for the auditor's independence.826 However, tax fees are still
perceived negatively as undermining the auditor's independence. 827

817. Raghunandan, supra note 810, at 155, 157. Companies were required to start
disclosing fees paid to the auditor after February 5, 2001. Id. at 159. "[T]otal nonaudit fees
are defined as the sum of the 'Financial Information Systems Design and Implementation
Fees' and 'Other Fees."' Id. The non-audit fee ratio "is the ratio of total nonaudit fees to
audit fees." Id.
818. Id. at 157.
819. See id. at 161. He finds a relationship between the non-audit fee ratio and both the
percentage of shareholders voting against and the percentage of shareholders either voting
against or abstaining, significant at the 1% level. See id. at 160 tbl.2 (Panel A).
820. See id. at 161 tbl.2, 162 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level).
821. See id. at 161-62.
822. See Raghunandan & Rama, supra note 805, at 259-60, 260 tbl.2 (demonstrating
significance at the 5% level).
823. Mishra et al., supra note 807, at 10. The other available fee type is "other fees." Id.
The SEC removed the financial information systems design and implementation fees
because they were prohibited by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Id. The SEC has argued that auditrelated fees and tax fees are viewed more favorably by shareholders and do not undermine
an auditor's independence. Id.
824. See id. at 19, 21 tbl.5 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level).
825. See id. (finding each significant at the 1% level).
826. See id. at 20.
827. See id. at 21.
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Although non-audit fees may reduce shareholder support for auditor
ratification, shareholders' votes on auditor ratification do not appear to
affect the level of non-audit fees. Neither Raghunandan nor Krishnan and
Ye find any statistically significant relationship between allowing
shareholders to vote on auditor ratification and the ratio of non-audit to
audit fees.8 28

Overall, these results suggest that shareholders have viewed non-audit
fees as a threat to auditor independence since 2001, but they did not view it
as a threat in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The change in shareholder
sentiment may be due to an increased willingness of shareholders to
question the board's decision. It may also be due to a greater recognition of
the need to have outside auditing after the scandals that took down Enron
and WorldCom.
2. Auditor Tenure
The relationship between an auditor's tenure and its effectiveness
presents another ongoing debate. 829 Some argue that longer tenure between
an auditor and a client undermines the independence (and thereby, the
quality) of the auditor.830 Others argue that having a mandatory rotation of
auditors would undermine their effectiveness "because of high audit startup costs and increased risk of audit failures." 831
Dao et al. show that longer tenure of an auditor predicts higher
opposition to ratification from shareholders. 832 This result suggests that
shareholders view auditors as less independent and less effective the longer
that they have audited the company. 833 Sainty et al. find a more conflicted
relationship between tenure and approval rates.834 Univariate results suggest
that longer experience with a client decreases ratification opposition. 835
However, multivariate results provide weak evidence that shareholders are
more likely to oppose auditor ratification the longer the auditor has worked
828. See Krishnan & Ye, supra note 805, at 246; Raghunandan, supra note 810, at 159.
829. See Mai Dao et al., Auditor Tenure and ShareholderRatification of the Auditor, 22
ACCT. HORIZONs 297, 297 (2008) [hereinafter Dao et al., Auditor Tenure].

830. Id.
831. Id.
832. Id. at 305 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level). The relationship holds true
for both Big Four and non-Big Four auditing firms, when the data is split up. Id. at 307.

833. See id. at 309.
834. See Sainty et al., supranote 806, at 122, 129.
835. See id. at 122. They divide the sample between clients who have had their auditor
for more (1.042% opposition) and less (1.338% opposition) than five years and find the
result significantly different at the 5% level. Id. at 121 tbl.3 (Panel C).
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with the company.83 6 These results suggest that shareholders may be
concerned that auditors who work for the company for a longer period of
time will become too cozy with management and lose their
independence. 837
3. Negative Reports
When the outside auditor issues a negative report, the shareholders
appear to respond with level-minded judgment by weighing the costs of the
negative report against the severity of the problem.838 The issuance of a
going-concern audit opinion presents an opportunity for shareholders to
judge the effectiveness of their company's auditor.83 9 One might think that
issuing such an opinion would increase the confidence of shareholders in
the auditor, since it would provide evidence that the auditor is performing
his or her monitoring function and is not beholden to management. 840
However, going-concern audit reports can also lead to a variety of negative
consequences for the company, including "negative publicity, violation of
debt covenants, higher costs of capital, [and] negative market reactions." 841
They can sometimes even be a "self-fulfilling prophecy," eliminating the
company's chances of recovery.842
Sainty et al. find that issuing a going-concern audit opinion increases
disapproval by shareholders. 843 Interestingly, a going-concern audit report
receives more shareholder opposition when the company is showing fewer
signs of financial distress.8 4 4 The initial going-concern opinion increases
836. See id. at 128 tbl.5 & 129. An ordinary least-squared regression finds no correlation
between audit tenure and voting results. See id. However, a logistic regression finds that
longer tenure makes shareholders more likely to oppose auditor ratification, significant at the
5% level. See id.
837. See Dao et al., Auditor Tenure, supra note 829, at 309.
838. See Sainty et al., supra note 806, at 121 tbl.3 (Panel D).
839. See id. at 115.
840. See id.
841. Id.
842. Id.
843. Id. at 121 tbl.3, 122. Auditors that issued a going-concern audit report received on
average 3.367% opposition, while auditors who did not received 1.007% opposition, which
were significantly different at the 1% level. Id. A multiple regression confirms that issuing a
going-concern audit report leads to more audit opposition. See id. at 128 tbl.5, 129.
844. See id. They rerun their multiple regression with an interaction variable between the
issuing of a going-concern audit report and a composite measure of the inverse likelihood of
financial distress. See id. at 126. The interaction variable is positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that fewer signs of financial distress lead to more
blame by shareholders on the auditor. See id. at 128 tbl.5, 129.
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shareholder dissatisfaction with the auditor, while a reversal of the goingconcern opinion decreases dissatisfaction back to normal levels.8 45 These
results suggest that shareholders can develop a nuanced understanding of
the situation, punishing auditors more when they prematurely issue a goingconcern opinion and returning to normal levels of support when the
situation is resolved. 846
4. Restatement's Impact
Similarly, restatement disclosures also lead to lower support for auditor
ratification.8 47 In theory, restatements evidence failure on the auditor's
part.8 48 Having a restatement disclosure predicts a decrease in shareholder
support for auditor ratification.8 49 This suggests that a restatement
announcement decreases the shareholders' perceptions of their auditor. 850 It
also supports the idea that shareholders' perception of audit quality will
influence their votes on audit ratification. 5 1
5. Adverse Internal Control Reports
Shareholders do not blame the auditors for issuing an adverse internal
control opinion unless the opinion involves a non-company-level material
weakness. 8 52 Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires companies to
disclose whether the auditor believes there are any material weaknesses in
the company's internal controls, which is known as an adverse internal

845. See id. at 130 & tbl.6. They expand out their data from 1994 to 1998. Id. at 130. The
initial going-concern leads to an average jump of shareholder opposition of 1.63%,
significant at the 5% level. Id. at 130 & tbl.6. Reversing the going-concern opinion reduced
opposition by 1.244%, significantly different from the year before at the 1% level. Id.
846. See id. at 130-31.
847. See Li-Lin Liu et al., FinancialRestatements and ShareholderRatifications of the
Auditor, 28 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 225, 234-35 (2009).
848. Id. at 226.
849. See id. at 233 tbl.4, 234 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level). Liu et al. find
that, on average, 2.75% of shareholders, with a median of 1.59%, vote against auditor
ratification for a restatement, compared to 1.45% average and 0.93% median for the control
group. Id. at 233 & tbl.3.
850. See id. at 234-35. To ensure that the restatement firms did not simply always have
lower auditor ratification rates, the authors compare the voting results before and after the
restatement and find the differences to be statistically significant at the 1% level. Id. at 234
& tbl.5.
851. See id. at 237.
852. See Dana R. Hermanson et al., Adverse Section 404 Opinions and Shareholder
DissatisfactionToward Auditors, 23 ACCT. HORIZONs 391, 391, 393 (2009).
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control opinion.8 53 The disclosure of an internal weakness can have
negative effects such as higher debt costs, decreased stock price, and even a
self-fulfilling prophesy of company failure.8 54 The auditor may be partly
responsible for any internal control problems, since the outside auditor
often helps the company develop its internal controls. 55
Hermanson et al. find no significant difference between the percentage of
shareholders that vote against auditor ratification in companies with and
without an adverse internal control opinion. 5 6 However, shareholders are
more likely to vote against auditor ratification when the auditor issues an
adverse opinion on an internal control that does not involve a companylevel material weakness. 57 This result suggests that shareholders are
punishing the auditor for being too conservative in issuing an adverse
opinion against a company that has not experienced any significant
misstatements.85 8 An adverse opinion for a company-level material
weakness only results in decreased shareholder support for the auditor when
the company had a restatement. 859 These results suggest that shareholders
blame auditors for not identifying and correcting material weaknesses in the
past and thus providing low-quality auditing services.s8o It also suggests
that, where an auditor issues a company-level adverse opinion before a
restatement has been issued, shareholders reward or at least do not penalize
853. See id. at 392.
854. Id. at 395.
855. See id.
856. See id. at 400, 401 tbl.2. Companies with an adverse internal control opinion saw on
average of 2.419% of shareholders voting against or abstaining from voting for auditor
ratification, with a median of 0.968%, compared to an average of 1.828% and a median of
1.118% for the control sample. Id. at 401 tbl.2. These results were not statistically different.
See id.
857. See id. at 403 tbl.4, 404. In the overall sample, they find a mildly significant
relationship between a non-company level material weakness adverse opinion and increased
votes against auditor ratification, significant at the 10% level. See id. at 403 tbl.4. When they
split the sample between companies that disclosed restatements and those that did not and
removed the interaction variables between restatements and adverse opinions, both samples
resulted in a positive correlation between issuing a non-company level adverse opinion and
increased votes against auditor ratification, significant at the 5% level. See id.
858. See id. at 404.
859. See id. at 403 tbl.4, 404. When the sample is limited to companies with a
restatement, an adverse opinion for a company-level material weakness predicts decreased
support for auditor ratification, significant at the 1% level. See id. at 403 tbl.4. The full
sample and the sample of companies without a restatement does not result in a significant
correlation between an adverse opinion for a company-level material weakness and
shareholder voting on audit ratification. See id.
860. See id. at 404.
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the auditor, because they believe that the auditor has identified an important
problem that needs to be corrected. 61
6. Auditor Characteristics
Auditor characteristics impact how shareholders vote on auditor
ratification.8 62 Theoretical literature suggests shareholders can determine
the quality of an auditor through proxies such as reputation, name brand
recognition, client base, and accumulated capital wealth since the auditor is
seen as a possible indemnifier if the investment goes bad.8 63 Sainty et al.
find that bigger auditing firms are likely to get more shareholder support.864
However, they find no difference in shareholder support when the auditor is
an industry leader for the specific industry. s6
7. Insider Ownership and Audit Committee Effects
Characteristics of the company and the audit committee can also impact
shareholder voting on auditor ratification. Raghunandan and Rama find that
higher share ownership by officers and directors and by blockholders
predicted fewer votes against auditor ratification, while having the CEO as
the chairman of the board predicted more votes against auditor
ratification. 6 6 Similarly, Raghunandan finds that the percentage of insider
ownership inversely predicts the proportion of shareholders voting against
auditor ratification.

Some evidence suggests that the composition of the audit committee also
affects the auditor ratification results. 86 When Raghunandan and Rama
861. See id. at 406.
862. See Sainty et al., supra note 806, at 119-20.
863. See id. at 114.
864. See id. at 120. The then-Big Six firms received on average 0.519% opposition, while
national firms received 0.876% opposition and local firms received 1.142% opposition. Id. at
121 tbl.3. The difference between these categories was significant at the 1% level. See id. at
120. A multiple regression confirms that the Big Six audit firms receive less opposition than
the other firms, significant at the 1% level. See id. at 127, 128 tbl.5.
865. See id. at 120, 121 tbl.3. They define industry leadership as having clients with
market share exceeding 20% in the specific industry. See id. at 120. Similarly, a multiple
regression fails to find any relationship between market share and voting results. See id. at
128 tbl.5, 129.
866. See Raghunandan & Rama, supra note 805, at 259, 260 tbl.2. Blockholder
ownership was significant at the 5% level, while officer and director ownership and CEO as
chairman were significant at the 1% level. Id. at 260 tbl.2.
867. See Raghunandan, supra note 810, at 159, 160 tbl.2 (demonstrating significance at
the 1% level).
868. See Raghunandan & Rama, supra note 805, at 260.
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divide the sample in two based on the audit fee ratio, they find that the
presence of a non-expert or non-independent audit committee predicted
significantly higher "against" votes in the half of the sample with a higher
non-audit fee ratio.8 69 These results suggest that the composition of the
audit committee affects shareholder perception of the audit when the nonaudit fee ratio is high. 870
8. Effect of Seeking Auditor Ratification
An examination of which companies allow their shareholders to vote on
auditor ratification suggests that auditor ratification is associated with better
-871
accounting practices. 1 Companies with auditor ratification tend to pay
more in auditor ratification fees. 872 Krishnan and Ye found that higher total
auditing fees predicted a higher chance that the company would seek
auditor ratification. 873 This result suggests that auditors seek ratification
when the auditor's interest in the engagement is high. 874 Dao et al. also find
that having shareholders vote on auditor ratification predicted higher audit
ratification fees.875 Their regression model predicts that having shareholders
vote on auditor ratification is associated with 9% higher auditor fees. 876
Krishnan and Ye report that auditing committees with greater financial
expertise were more likely to seek auditor ratification.
Dao,
Raghunandan, and Rama also find that companies with auditor ratification
were less likely to receive a restatement for fiscal year 2006.878 Their
regression analysis predicts that having auditor ratification predicts a 32%

869. See id. (demonstrating significance at the 5% level). Interestingly, the dummy
variable was not significant for the bottom half of the sample. See id.

870. Id.
871. See Krishnan & Ye, supra note 805, at 238.
872. See id. at 247-49.
873. See id. at 247, 248 tbl.3 (demonstrating significance at the 10% level).
874. See id. at 247, 250.
875. See Dao et al., Shareholder Voting, supra note 803, at 156, 159 tbl.2 (demonstrating
significance at the 1% level). They limit their sample to firms that added or removed auditor
ratification and again find a significant positive correlation between having auditor
ratification and having higher auditor fees, significant at the 10% level. See id. at 160, 161
tbl.3. Their regression suggests that a firm that added auditor selection would have 8%
higher fees than a firm that removed auditor selection. See id.

876. See id. at 156-58.
877. See Krishnan & Ye, supra note 805, at 248 tbl.3, 250 (demonstrating significance at
the 10% level).
878. See Dao et al., Shareholder Voting, supra note 803, at 162 tbl.4, 165 (demonstrating
significance at the 10% level).
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reduction in the likelihood of having a restatement. 879 Companies with
auditor ratification also have significantly lower abnormal current
accruals.880 The decreased likelihood of a restatement and the lower
abnormal current accruals suggest that having shareholders vote on auditor
ratification increases the quality of the auditor's work.88' Raghunandan
finds no statistical difference in company size between companies that do
and do not submit their auditor for shareholder ratification.882 Krishnan and
Ye, however, find that larger companies are more likely to seek auditor
ratification. 883
Companies with better returns and where directors receive higher levels
of shareholder support are also more likely to seek shareholder ratification
of their auditor. 884 These results suggest that better performing companies
tend to allow shareholder ratification of the auditor.8 8 5 Beyond the
difference in companies that do and do not have auditor ratification, there is
little evidence of the impact of shareholder voting. Sainty et al., however,
find that greater opposition to auditor ratification increases the chances that
the firm will change auditors in the next two years.
9. Summary
While shareholders give auditor ratification almost universally high
support, the small variations in shareholder support appear to accurately
reflect the auditor's ability to maintain independence and effectively
perform the job. Shareholders understand the threat that non-audit fees, tax
fees, and a longer relationship pose to an auditor's independence and
Shareholders also appear to
respond by withholding their support.
understand the importance of going-concern opinions, restatements, and
adverse internal control opinions and only blame the auditor for the

879. Id. at 165.
880. See id. at 166, 167 tbl.5 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level).
881.

See id. at 168.

882. Raghunandan, supra note 810, at 159.
883. See Krishnan & Ye, supra note 805, at 248 tbl.3, 250 (demonstrating significance at
the 5% level).
884. See id. (each demonstrating significance at the 10% level).
885. See id.
886. See Sainty et al., supra note 806, at 132, 133 tbl.7. A firm that changed auditors
received average ratification opposition of 2.67%, while firms that did not change auditors
received ratification opposition of 1.01%, significantly different at the 1% level. Id. A
multiple regression confirms that higher opposition to auditor ratification predicts a greater
chance that the firm will be fired in the next two years, significant at the 1% level. See id.
887. See supra Sections IV.D.1-2.
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associated problems when the auditor has gone too far prematurely."'
Allowing shareholders to ratify the outside auditor is associated with an
audit committee possessing greater financial expertise, lower abnormal
current accruals, and a lower chance of having a restatement.88 9 Although it
is still unclear whether auditor ratification leads to a more effective and
independent auditor, auditor ratification votes are at least associated with
such results.8 90
E. Compensation Proposalsand Say on Pay
Depending on how compensation is structured, it can increase
shareholder value by properly incentivizing executives or it can dilute
shareholder interest in the corporation.89 1 When managers are compensated
according to firm performance, they will work harder and take appropriate
risks.8 92 However, managers can make the plans overly beneficial to
themselves and thereby undermine shareholder value.8 93 As a result, a
shareholder vote on compensation can theoretically represent an important
check against management abuse.8 94
1. Voting Supportfor CompensationProposals
Compensation proposals receive, on average, support from 80% of
shareholders.8 95 Shareholders almost always approve compensation
proposals.8 96 Thomas and Martin found only five proposals, less than 1% of

888. See supra Sections IV.D.3-5.
889. See supra Section IV.D.8.
890. See supra Section IV.D.8.
-

891. See Angela G. Morgan & Annette B. Poulsen, Linking Pay to Performance
Compensation Proposalsin the S&P 500, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 489,490-91 (2001).

892. Id. at 491.
893. Id. at 490.
894. Id.
895. See, e.g., Angela Morgan et al., The Evolution of ShareholderVoting for Executive

Compensation Schemes, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 715, 723-24 (2006) (finding average shareholder
support for compensation proposals of 85% to 80.9% between 1992 and 2003); Randall S.
Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Determinants of Shareholder Voting on Stock Option

Plans, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 31, 58-59 (2000) (finding that stock option proposals in
1998 received on average only 18.6% opposition).
896. See, e.g., Christopher S. Armstrong et al., The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting:
Evidence from Equity Compensation Plans, 51 J. ACCT. REs. 909, 910-11 (2003) (finding

that shareholders failed to approve 2% of equity compensation proposals between 2001 and
2010); Thomas & Martin, supra note 895, at 58 (finding less than 1% of stock proposals fail
to receive shareholder support in 1998).
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their sample, which failed to receive the necessary shareholder support.8 97
From case studies of the defeats, they concluded that high levels of
shareholder dilution caused the rejection, ranging from 20% to 44%.898
At least before 2003, management had some latitude to structure
executive compensation to avoid the shareholder approval requirement,
which they had been increasingly avoiding despite the expanding
regulations requiring shareholder approval.8 99 Between 1978 and 1997,
companies adopted only 9% of plans without shareholder approval. 900 By
contrast, between 1997 and 2002, companies adopted 27% of plans without
shareholder approval. 901
2. Effect of Company Performance
Managers appear more likely to submit compensation to a shareholder
vote when the company is doing well, although shareholders seem
unconcerned with company performance. 902 Balachandran et al. find that
firms with better corporate governance tend to put their compensation plans
up for a vote. 903 Firms with a lower return on assets ("ROA") are less likely
to put their compensation plans up for a vote. 904 Similarly, Morgan and
897. Thomas & Martin, supra note 895, at 58.
898. Id. at 57.
899. Sudhakar V. Balachandran et al., Do Voting Rights Matter: Evidence from the
Adoption of Equity-Based Compensation Plans 1 (May 2004) (unpublished manuscript),
https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/mygsb/faculty/research/pubfiles/1083/1083.pdf.
SEC rule
16b-3 has long required that compensation awarded to executives be subject to the short
swing sale prohibition unless the plan was approved by shareholders. Id. at 9. In 1996, the
SEC amended the rule by expanding the exemption to approval by directors or a board
committee. Id. at 10. Also, in 1998, the NYSE created an exemption for requiring
shareholder approval of plans where 20% of companies were eligible to participate, half of
which must not be either officers nor directors. Id. They ended the exemption in 2002. Id. In
2003, NYSE and NASDAQ began requiring firms to obtain shareholder approval for equitybased compensation plans. Id. at 1.
900. Id. at 3-4.
901. Id. at 4. The increase in unapproved plans may be the result of regulatory changes.
See id. at 9-10.
902. Id. at 22-23.
903. Id. at 23. They use the proportion of directors that are insiders, whether the CEO is
also the chair of the board and whether the firm has a beneficial owner, defined as owning
more than 10% of the company's stock. See id. at 36 tbl.4. A CEO chairman and a higher
proportion of inside directors make the firm less likely to submit the compensation plan to
shareholders, both significant at the 5% level. See id. Having a beneficial owner made it
more likely that the company would submit compensation for shareholder approval,
significant at the 10% level. See id.
904. Id. at 22-23 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level).
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Poulsen find that managers are more likely to submit compensation
proposals after high stock-price performance, although sales did not make a
difference. 905

Executives may see periods of strong stock performance as opportune
times to have their compensation tied to company performance. 906 The
performance of the company, however, does not appear to affect
shareholders' support for compensation plans. 907 Morgan et al. find that
neither the prior one-year stock performance nor the book-to-market ratio
had a statistically significant relationship to proposal support. 908 Cremers
and Romano also find that company performance did not relate to support
for equity compensation proposals. 909
Poor company performance may also increase support for incentivebased executive compensation. 91 0 Thomas and Martin find that shareholders
offer greater support for future stock option plans when the company has
been performing poorly. 911 Perhaps shareholders are willing to create
stronger incentives to attract better managers when their company performs
poorly and needs top-notch management expertise.
However, while examining the first round of say-on-pay votes in 2011,
Ertimur et al. find that poorly performing firms, based on abnormal returns
and ROA, received less shareholder support. 912 Cotter et al. also find better
stock performance over the previous two years resulted in more support on
the say-on-pay proposals. 913 Ignoring the recent say-on-pay votes, managers

905. Morgan & Poulsen, supra note 891, at 512. The stock result was significant at the
5% level. See id. at 509 tbl.7.

906. Id. at 512.
907. See Morgan et al., supra note 895, at 726, 728.
908. Id. at 726, 727 tbl.5.
909. See K. J. Martijn Cremers & Roberta Romano, Institutional Investors and Proxy
Voting on Compensation Plans: The Impact of the 2003 Mutual Fund Voting Disclosure
Rule, 13 AM. L. EcoN. REv. 220, 238 tbl.3, 242 (2011).
910. Thomas & Martin, supra note 895, at 61-62.
911. Id. They divide the sample in half based on the prior one-year, three-year, and fiveyear market returns. Id. at 61. They find no significant difference in shareholder opposition
based on one-year returns. Id. However, lower three-year returns and five-year returns had
significantly lower shareholder opposition. Id. at 61-62. These results are confirmed with a
multiple regression, finding a significantly positive relationship between one-, three-, and
five-year returns and shareholder opposition. Id. at 71-72.
912. Yonca Ertimur et al., ShareholderVotes and Proxy Advisors: Evidence from Say on
Pay, 51 J. ACCT. REs. 951, 973, 975 tbl.6A (2013) (both measures significant at the 1%
level).
913. James F. Cotter et al., The First Year of Say-on-Pay Under Dodd-Frank: An
EmpiricalAnalysis and Look Forward, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 967, 985 (2013). They group
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appear to incorrectly believe that shareholders vote on compensation
proposals based on the company's recent performance. 914
Allowing shareholders to approve compensation plans may also improve
company performance. 915 In the year after the compensation proposal,
Morgan and Poulsen find that companies had significantly higher stock
performance, earnings divided by assets, and sales divided by assets than a
control group. 916 Balachandran et al. similarly find that having shareholder
approval of compensation plans predicts better ROA and better operating
returns in the year after initiating the plan. 917 It may be that the
compensation proposals lead to better company performance or that
executives propose compensation proposals when they expect strong
performance.918
Plans approved by shareholders tended to be larger and have a higher
exercise price. 91 9 Plans covering directors were likely to be approved by
shareholders, while plans covering officers were less likely to pass. 920 Also,
Morgan and Poulsen find that firms with higher institutional holdings were
more likely to let shareholders vote on the compensation plan, while insider
ownership had an insignificant impact. 921 These results suggest that insiders
are not able to propose these plans without support from institutional
investors. 922 Overall, these papers indicate that firms with good corporate

companies into five groups based on total stock returns over the twenty-four months leading
to Fiscal Year End 2010. Id. The group with the best stock returns received on average
68.9% support, while the group with the lowest support received on average 62.8% support;
these were significantly different at the 1% level. Id. A multiple regression confirms that
higher stock returns led to higher support, significant at the 1% level. See id. at 990, 991
tbl.6.
914. See id.
915. See Morgan & Poulsen, supranote 891, at 519-20.
916. Id. The CARs are significantly different at the 5% level, while earnings/assets and
sales/assets are significantly different at the 10% level. See id. at 519.
917. Balachandran et al., supra note 899, at 25 (both significant at the 5% level).
918. See Morgan & Poulsen, supranote 891, at 520.
919. Balachandran et al., supra note 899, at 16. Plans approved by shareholders included
an average of 5502 shares and an average exercise price of $12.13. Id. at 31 tbl.1. Plans not
approved by shareholders included an average of 3142 shares and an average exercise price
of $10.47. Id. A multiple regression finds that smaller plans were less likely to be put to a
vote, significant at the 1% level. Id. at 23.
920. Id. (both demonstrating significance at the 5% level).
921. Morgan & Poulsen, supra note 891, at 510 (demonstrating significance at the 5%
level).
922. See id.
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governance and strong performance allow shareholders to approve their
compensation plans. 923

3. Effect of Dilution
The primary driver of shareholder support for compensation proposals
appears to be their effect on the level of shareholder dilution. 924 Morgan
and Poulsen find that the average dilution of the plans was 3.21%, with a
median dilution of 2.35%, while 23% of the plans had a dilution effect
greater than 5%.925 Plans that resulted in less dilution of the company's
stock saw a better stock market response than plans with more dilution. 926
Shareholders gave lower support to plans with higher dilution levels. 927
Similarly, Thomas and Martin find that the dilution of all plans proposed
predicted significantly less shareholder support. 928 The total dilution of all
the stock option proposals in the proxy statement had a greater impact on
shareholder voting than the dilution of each individual proposal. 929
Morgan et al. report that more dilutive plans received less shareholder
support. 930 Armstrong et al. find that the dilution of the compensation plan
predicted less support from shareholders. 931
923. See id.
924. See id. at 499.
925. Id.
926. See id. at 514. Plans with dilution of less than or equal to 5% had average CARs of
0.46% (t = 2.70), while plans with returns greater than 5% returns received CARs of 0.17%
(t = 0.75). Id. at 515. When the sample was limited to plans that affected executives, plans
less than 5% received CARs of 0.62% (t = 3.04), while plans with greater dilution saw
CARs of 0.15% (t = 0.64). Id.
927. See id. at 514-15.
928. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 895, at 69 (demonstrating significance at the 1%
level). The result holds when they divide the sample between plans with more and less than
10% dilution. See id. at 69-70.
929. Id. at 60. They run a chi-squared analysis of total dilution of the proposals within a
stock option proposal greater or less than 10% and the dilution of individual proposals of
greater or less than 5%. Id. Naturally, shareholder disapproval is highest when the total of
dilution is greater than 10% and the individual dilution is greater than 5%, receiving
shareholder disapproval of 24.8% on average. Id. This disapproval rate is significantly
different from when total dilution is high and individual dilution is low. Id. However, there
is no significant difference between high and low individual dilution when total dilution is
low. Id.
930. Morgan et al., supra note 895, at 726, 727 tbl.5 (demonstrating significance at the
1% level).
931. See Armstrong et al., supra note 896, at 929-30. The number of shares created by
the plan as a proportion of shares outstanding, the number of stock options and restricted
stock not yet granted as a proportion of shares outstanding, and the proportion of the CEO's
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CEO compensation affects how shareholders vote on compensation
proposals. 932 Armstrong et al. find that the shareholders' support for the
equity compensation proposal correlates negatively with the CEO's option
compensation, total compensation, proportion of equity compensation, and
options granted. 933 Morgan et al. find that a higher ratio of CEO
compensation to total assets predicted lower support for the compensation
proposal. 934 These results indicate that higher CEO compensation led to less
shareholder support. 935 Conyon also finds that higher levels of CEO pay are
associated with higher levels of shareholder opposition to the firm's say-onpay proposal. 936 Furthermore, firms with better economic performance see
lower levels of shareholder dissent on the proposals. 937 Finally, the
composition of the board also has a significant impact on the say-on-pay
proposals. 938 Shareholders appear to pay attention to the dilution of the
compensation plan and the current pay of the CEO when they vote on
compensation proposals.
4. ShareholderComposition and CorporateGovernance Impact
The company's shareholder profile affects support for compensation
proposals. 939 Morgan et al. find that larger institutional holdings lead to less

compensation in equity all predict less shareholder support for the equity compensation plan,
each statistically significant at the 1% level. Id. at 929 tbl.2.

932. Id. at 935.
933. Id. at 931 tbl.3, 935 (each significant at the 1% level, except for total compensation
significant at the 10% level).
934. See Morgan et al., supra note 895, at 729, 730 tbl.7.
935. See Armstrong et al., supra note 896, at 935.
936. Martin J. Conyon, Shareholder Dissent on Say-on-Pay and CEO Compensation 17
(Mar. 16, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2748645. Their sample
includes 3205 firm-year observations from 2010 to 2012 that includes 1264 unique firms. Id.
at 10. Each of cash pay, total pay, realized pay (which includes ex post gains from the sales
of options and restricted stock), and excess compensation predict higher levels of
shareholder dissent, each significant at the 1% level. See id. at 29 tbl.6.
937. Id. at 18. Higher market performance and accounting performance result in higher
levels of shareholder support for the say-on-pay proposals, significant at the 1% level. See
id. at 29 tbl.6.
938. See id. at 18. A larger board leads to lower levels of support for say-on-pay
proposals, at a marginal level of significance. See id. at 18, 29 tbl.6. Interestingly, Conyon
finds no relationship between the percentage of independent directors and shareholder
support for the say-on-pay proposals. Id. Shareholders are more likely to oppose the say-onpay proposal when the CEO is also the chairman of the board. See id. at 18, 29 tbl.6
(demonstrating significance at the 1% level).
939. See Morgan et al., supra note 895, at 726.
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support for the compensation proposals. 940 This result suggests that
institutional shareholders are more critical of executive compensation plans
than are individual shareholders. 941
Morgan and Poulsen find that higher managerial holdings led to higher
support for compensation proposals. 942 Similarly, being a larger firm
predicts high shareholder support for a compensation proposal. 943 Cremers
states that high stock turnover led to less support for the equity
compensation proposals. 944 The presence of a poison pill is also correlated
with significantly less support for the equity compensation proposals. 945
5. Type of Compensation PlansMatters
Shareholders seem more inclined to support different types of plans. 946
Thomas and Martin find that stock option plans for all employees
experience significantly higher opposition than plans for just executives or
outside directors. 947 Evergreen plans face significantly more opposition
than stock option plans generally. 948 Plans with discount options receive
more opposition than fair market options. 949 Plans that allow for repricing
underwater options receive significantly more opposition than plans without
the option. 950 Plans with omnibus awards receive significantly more
940. Id. at 726, 727 tbl.5 (demonstrating significance at the 5% level).
941. See id.
942. Morgan & Poulsen, supranote 891, at 517.
943. Id. (demonstrating significance at the 5% level).
944. Cremers & Romano, supra note 909, at 238 tbl.3, 242 (demonstrating significance
at the 5% level).
945. Id. (demonstrating significance at the 5% level).
946. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 895, at 62.
947. Id. at 61. They find that stock option plans for all employees have opposition of
22.1%, plans for executives of 18.1%, and plans for outside directors of 11.9%. Id. A chisquared analysis shows that these differences are statistically significant. See id.
948. See id. at 62. On average, plans with evergreen or quasi-evergreen provisions
receive 28.2%, which is higher than the opposition rate to plans without the provisions,
significant at the 1% level. Id. at 62, 76 tbl.2. A multiple regression finds that evergreen
plans are weakly correlated with shareholder opposition, significant at the 10% level. See id.
at 71.
949. See id. at 63. Plans with discount options receive 24.2% opposition on average,
which is higher than plans with the market options, significant at the 1% level. Id. A
multiple regression shows that discount options are weakly correlated with shareholder
opposition, significant at the 10% level. See id. at 71.
950. See id. at 65. An underwater repricing option allows the board to lower the exercise
price of the option when the stock price has fallen below the original exercise price. Id. at
63. They find that plans that allow for repricing underwater options received on average
25.1% opposition, while options that did not have a repricing option received on average
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opposition than plans without the feature. 951 Time-lapse restricted stock
records greater opposition than other plans. 952 Thomas and Martin did not
find a significant difference in opposition to reload options compared to
other plans. 953 Plans with change in control provisions receive greater
opposition than plans without the provisions. 954 Plans accompanied by
preferential loans to executives to pay for the stock receive significantly
more opposition than other plans. 955 They did not find a significant
difference between plans with pyramiding of stock options compared to
other plans. 956 Plans with acceleration provisions receive significantly more

16.1% opposition, significant at the 1% level. Id. at 65. These results are confirmed with a
multiple regression. See id. at 71.
951. See id. at 65. Plans with an omnibus feature receive on average opposition of 21.1%
while plans without the feature receive opposition of 17.1%, which is significantly different
at the 1% level. Id. However, a multiple regression fails to find a significant correlation
between an omnibus provision and shareholder opposition. See id. at 71.
952. See id. at 66. Time-lapsing restricted stock occurs where "company stock . . . is
cannot be sold during a fixed period of time,"
given or sold, at a deep discount, [but] ...
which made up 44% of their sample. Id. at 66. The time-lapsing restricted stock received
20.8% opposition compared to other plans that received 16.9% opposition, significantly
different at the 1% level. Id. These results are confirmed with multiple regression analysis.
See id. at 71.
953. Id. at 67. Reload options allow the executive to lock in gains on their existing stock
options "without giving up the opportunity to realize further gains if the company's stock
price should continue to increase." Id. at 66-67. They made up 10% of the sample. Id. at 67.
The reload options received 20.4% opposition and other proposals received 18.4%
opposition, which were not significantly different. Id. However, a multiple regression fails to
find any significant relationship between a reload option and shareholder opposition. See id.
at 71.
954. Id. Change in control provisions allow executives to exercise their options "upon a
change in control of the company." Id. They received opposition of 19.7%, while other plans
received opposition of 14.9%, significantly different at the 1% level. Id. However, a multiple
regression fails to find a significant relationship between a change in control provision and
shareholder opposition. See id. at 71.
955. See id. at 68. Proposals that included "the possibility of using loans to pay the
exercise price" made up 27% of the sample and received opposition of 24.8%, while other
plans received opposition of 16.4%, which was significantly different at the 1% level. Id.
These results are confirmed with a multiple regression. See id. at 71.
956. Id. at 68.
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opposition than other plans. 957 Proposals that add shares to existing plans
face significantly higher opposition than proposals that create new plans. 958
Morgan and Poulsen find that proposing a new compensation plan
predicted higher shareholder approval, while replacement plans and adding
additional plans did not. 959 These results suggest that shareholder voting
reflects the negative and positives aspects of a compensation plan, even if
shareholders do not actually reject any of them. 960
6. Impact on CEO Compensation
Studies have found conflicting evidence on whether shareholder support
affects a CEO's future compensation. Martin and Thomas find that
shareholder support for a proposal correlated with changes in salary and
total pay for the CEO in the following year. 961 Shareholder support,
however, did not have a statistically significant relationship to salary plus
bonus or to option pay. 962 These results suggest that CEO compensation is
responsive to shareholder voting on compensation proposals. 963
In contrast, Armstrong et al. fail to find a correlation between the
shareholder vote and different measures of CEO compensation in the first
and second year after the vote. 964 They also examine whether there was a
relationship between approval of the equity compensation plan and the
CEO's compensation in the next year. 965 They find no correlation between a
failed vote on equity compensation and future compensation. 966 This is
surprising because equity proposals are generally binding, so it suggests
that boards are seeking additional shares for the CEO in the later years.

967

957. See id. Plans with acceleration provisions received 21.2% opposition while other
plans received opposition of 15.7%, significantly different at the 1% level. Id. However, a
multiple regression fails to find any significant relationship between an acceleration
provision and shareholder opposition. See id. at 71.
958. See id. (using a multiple regression, significant at the 1% level).
959. See Morgan & Poulsen, supra note 891, at 505 tbl.5, 506 (demonstrating
significance at the 5% level).

960. See id. at 514, 515 tbl.9.
961. See Kenneth J. Martin & Randall S. Thomas, When Is Enough, Enough? Market
Reaction to Highly Dilutive Stock Option Plans and the Subsequent Impact on CEO
Compensation, 11 J. CORP. FIN. 61, 78 tbl.8 (2005) (demonstrating significance at the 10%
level).

962. Id. at 78 tbl.8, 79.
963. Id. at 80.
964.

See Armstrong et al., supra note 896, at 932-33 tbl.3, 935.

965. See id. at 943.
966.

See id.

967. Id.
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Conyon finds that firms with higher levels of dissent are less likely to
increase their CEO's pay, but only at marginal levels of significance. 968
This result suggests that the say-on-pay votes provide some check on CEO
compensation.

969

7. Impact of SEC 2003 Rules
In 2003, the SEC adopted new rules that require shareholder approval for
new equity compensation plans or material alterations to an existing equity
compensation plan. 970 Ng et al. find that the percentage of firms with
management-sponsored equity compensation proposals increased from
47.6% before the 2003 regulation to 53.4% after the regulation. 971
However, the increase in the percentage of firms with compensation
proposals resulted mainly from firms that already had compensation
approved
by shareholders. 972 Interestingly,
ISS
gave
positive
recommendations to 80% of the equity compensation proposals in the two
years leading up to the new rule compared to 90% in the two years after the
new rule, suggesting that equity compensation proposals increased in
quality. 973

After, but not before the new rule, total compensation and equity
compensation of the top five executives predicted significantly less support
for the compensation proposals.974 More entrenched directors and more
institutional holdings also predicted significantly less support after, but not
before, the new rule. 975 These results suggest that the new rule increased the
quality of shareholder voting. 976 The new mandatory nature of equity
proposals may have empowered shareholders to more critically examine the
compensation proposals on which they vote. 977

968. Conyon, supra note 936, at 19, 30 tbl.7.
969. See id. at 19-20.
970. Lilian Ng et al., Does ShareholderApproval Requirement of Equity Compensation
Plans Matter?, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 1510, 1511 (2011). Prior to the new rule, about half of S&P
500 firms had equity-based compensation plans that weren't approved by shareholders. Id.
Equity compensation proposals fall into three categories: stock options, restricted stock, and
omnibus awards. Id. at 1515.
971. Id. at 1516. They find that 47.6% of firms have compensation proposals between
2001 and 2003 compared to 53.4% between 2003 and 2005. Id.
972. Id. at 1517.
973. Id. at 1520.
974. Id. at 1523, 1524 tbl.7 (both showing significance at the 5% level).
975. See id. (both significant at the 10% level).
976. Id. at 1523.
977. Id.
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The average composition of executive compensation dropped from 60%
equity and 40% cash to 50% equity and 50% cash after the new rule. 978 As
expected, it appears that the 2003 rule motivated management to receive
their compensation in cash instead of equity. 979
8. Mutual Fund Voting After 2003
Another part of the 2003 SEC reforms require that mutual funds disclose
how they vote on proxy proposals. 98 0 The SEC hoped that such disclosure
would reduce mutual fund support for management by making them more
accountable to their investors. 98 1 Cremers and Romano find that mutual
fund support for management did not decline after the disclosure rules. 98 2 In
fact, mutual funds may have increased their support for management after
the disclosure rules. 983 The added transparency may make mutual funds
more vulnerable to management backlash, but this interpretation is unlikely
since management would already have known how the mutual funds
voted. 98 4 Management would not have already known about the mutual
funds' votes if the corporation had confidential voting, but that
characteristic did not correlate with proposal support. 98 5 Perhaps mutual
funds may believe that their investors prefer them to vote with management
and are now responding to that pressure. 986
9. Dodd-Frank'sSay-on-Pay Vote
In 2011, the Dodd-Frank Act created a new mandatory, but non-binding,
vote on executive compensation known as say on pay. 987 On average, 9.6%
978. Id. at 1525. The differences between the two periods are statistically significant at
the 5% level. See id. at 1525 tbl.8.
979. See id.
980. Cremers & Romano, supra note 909, at 221.
981. Id. The SEC hoped that investors would pressure mutual funds into reducing their
support for management. See id. at 226.
982. Id. at 239. Their results suggest that mutual fund holdings, both before and after,
lead to decreased support for the EEIC proposals, significant at the 5% levels. Id. at 238
tbl.3. However, the correlation disappears as they add in additional control variables. See id.
The interaction variable between mutual fund holdings and the "after" dummy correlates
positively with EEIC support, significant at the 10% level, suggesting that mutual funds may
have increased their support for management after the disclosure. See id. at 238 tbl.3, 239.
983. See id. at 238 tbl.3 (demonstrating significance at the 10% level).
984. Id. at 242.
985. Id. at 242-43.
986. See id. at 243.
987. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 951, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n-1 (2012); Ertimur et al., supra note 912, at 951-52. They focus on the

2017]

SHAREHOLDER VOTING IN PROXY CONTESTS

119

of shareholders (median 4.6%) vote against the say-on-pay proposal. 988
Shareholders paid attention to the CEO's current compensation in voting on
the say-on-pay proposals. 98 9 Cotter et al. find that higher excess CEO
compensation predicted significantly less support for the say-on-pay
proposal. 990 The growth in CEO pay, however, did not have a major effect
on the say-on-pay vote. 991 Similarly, Ertimur et al. find that a higher level
of and higher growth of CEO pay predicts less shareholder support for the
say-on-pay proposal. 992

10. Proxy Advisor Impact on Say-on-Pay Vote
The recommendation of a proxy advisor had the greatest impact on
shareholder voting on say-on-pay proposals. 993 ISS recommended "against"
for 13% of the compensation packages in their sample. 994 Similarly, Glass
Lewis recommended "against" for 21% of the compensation packages in
their sample. 995 The two firms offer the same recommendation in

recommendations given by ISS and Glass Lewis in 2011 on say-on-pay votes, which are
mandatory but nonbinding. Id. Both proxy advisors, ISS and Glass Lewis, provide a
quantitative and qualitative analysis of the executive pay plan, assign a rating, and issue a
final vote recommendation. Id. at 953. ISS issued an "against" recommendation for 11.3% of
firms, while Glass Lewis issued an "against" recommendation for 21.7% of firms. Id.
988. Ertimur et al., supra note 912, at 973.
989. See Cotter et al., supra note 913, at 987-92.
990. Id. at 990, 991 tbl.6 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level). Excess CEO
compensation is defined as CEO compensation minus the expected CEO compensation
based on company performance and industry standards. See id. at 988-89 n.96.
991. See id. at 987-88. After dividing companies into five groups based on growth in
CEO compensation, they find statistically significant differences between the groups when
ISS issues a positive recommendation, significant at the 5% level, but not when it issues a
negative recommendation. Id. A multiple regression also fails to find a significant
relationship between the growth in CEO compensation and shareholder support. Id. at 990,
991 tbl.6.
992. See Ertimur et al., supra note 912, at 973, 975 tbl.6A (demonstrating significance at
the 1% and 5% levels respectively).
993. See Cotter et al., supra note 913, at 990.
994. See David F. Larcker et al., Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory
Firms, 58 J.L. & ECON. 173, 180 (2015). Their sample is based on 2008 firms from the
Russell 3000 index that were required to have a say-on-pay vote in 2011 under the DoddFrank Act. See id. at 176.
995. Id. at 181. Glass Lewis does not publicly release their recommendations. As a result,
the authors extrapolate Glass Lewis recommendations from the voting of four firms that
follow Glass Lewis policies. The firms disagreed in only six instances, suggesting that this
methodology has a high level of accuracy. See id. at 180.
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approximately 79% of cases. 996 No firm that received a positive ISS
recommendation failed to receive majority support, while one firm that
received a positive recommendation from Glass Lewis failed to receive
majority support. 997

Cotter et al. find that an ISS recommendation in favor of the say-on-pay
proposal resulted in significantly more shareholder support.998 Out of all of
the variables they studied, an ISS recommendation appeared to have the
largest effect. 999 Ertimur et al. also find that a negative recommendation
from ISS or Glass Lewis predicted significantly less shareholder support for
the proposal.1000 The ISS recommendation also had a significantly larger
effect on shareholder votes compared to the Glass Lewis
recommendation. o These results confirm that ISS and Glass Lewis have a
major impact on shareholder voting, with ISS playing the larger role. 1002
Ertimur et al. further report that a negative ISS recommendation had a
greater effect on non-blockholders than blockholders. 1003 This result
suggests that institutional investors deviate more from the ISS
recommendation when they own a greater share of the company, perhaps
because a greater ownership share incentives them to overcome collective
action problems.1004

996. Id. at 181. However, where one of the firms
recommendation, the firms agree only in 23% of cases. See id.

offers

a

"vote against"

997. See id.
998. See Cotter et al., supra note 913, at 982. Say-on-pay proposals with a positive ISS
recommendation received on average 28.2% more shareholder support than say-on-pay
proposals with a negative ISS recommendation. See id. A multiple regression confirmed that
companies with a positive ISS recommendation received more support, significant at the 1%

level. See id. at 990, 991 tbl.6.
999. Id. at 990.
1000. Ertimur et al., supra note 912, at 976 tbl.6B, 978 (both demonstrating significance at
the 1% level). The R2 is 43.8% in the model with Glass Lewis, 65.7% in the model with ISS,
and 82.3% in the model with both, compared to 20.9% in the model with neither, suggesting
that their recommendations explain a larger part of the variation in shareholder voting. See

id.
1001. See id. at 978.
1002. See id.
1003. See id. at 979. Their results indicate that a negative recommendation from ISS
results in 34.4% of nonblockholders voting no and 24.5% of blockholders voting no, while a
negative recommendation from Glass Lewis resulted in 17.6% and 13.7% respectively. Id. at

979-80.
1004. See id.
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Larcker et al. find that the recommendations of proxy advisors are more
likely to shift votes at firms with more passive investors. 1005 This result
reflects a free-rider problem among passive investors, who are happy to
defer to the recommendations of a proxy advisor.1006 An ISS "against"
recommendation that results from multiple parts of the compensation plan
being of high concern leads to more shareholders voting against the plan
then when only a single part created high concern. 1007 This result suggests
that some shareholders pay attention to the rational for the negative
recommendation and do not blindly follow the proxy advisor. 100

11. ISS Effect on Board Behavior
Of the firms that received a negative ISS recommendation, 55% claimed
to change their compensation the following year in response to the say-onpay vote. 1009 The claim occurred in 72% of firms that received 30-35%
dissent from shareholders, compared to 32% in firms that received 25-30%
dissent from shareholders.oo These results suggest that firms will change
their compensation policy in response to an ISS recommendation and
shareholder votes. 1011 However, Ertimur et al. find no market reaction to
these changes.1012 Ertimur et al. interpret their results as showing that proxy
advisors process significant amounts of information for institutional
investors but fall short of identifying or promoting best practices in
compensation proposals. 1013
12. Effect of Additional Disclosureson Say-on-Pay Vote
Mukhopadhyay and Shivakumar use the say-on-pay vote to understand
how disclosures affect shareholder voting. 1014 A higher number of
1005. See Larcker et al., supra note 994, at 184. They define passive investors as firms
that are "quasi indexers" and "transient institutions." See id. at 183. An interaction term of
ISS "against" and percentage of passive investors, as well as Glass Lewis "against" and
percentage passive, is statistically significant at the 1% level. Id. at 184, 185 tbl.2.
1006. Id. at 201-02.
1007. See Ertimur et al., supranote 912, at 980-81.
1008. See id. at 981.
1009. Id. at 984. Dodd-Frank requires firms to disclose how they reacted to the previous
say-on-pay vote. See id.

1010. Id. at 986.
1011. Id.
1012. See id. at 987.
1013. See id.
1014. See Tathagat Mukhopadhyay & Lakshmanan Shivakumr, Do Compensation
Disclosures Matter for SoP Voting? 1 (Nov. 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2718438. To examine the disclosures, the authors compute a score
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performance-related disclosures decreases the likelihood of getting less than
70% support on a say-on-pay vote.1015 A firm in the top decile of
disclosures has about a 5% chance of missing the 70% threshold, compared
to a 6.1% chance for a firm in the bottom decile. 1016 Thus, while not
determinative of the vote, the increased disclosure has a significant impact
relative to not disclosing. 1017 Additionally, firms become more forthcoming
in their disclosures after receiving a low level of support for the say-on-pay
vote. 1018 The low support prompts management to do more to justify its
compensation.1 01 9 These increased disclosures also decrease the likelihood
of receiving a low level of support on the next say-on-pay vote.1020
Finally, the authors look at whether the introduction of the say-on-pay
voting requirement changed firms' behavior. 1021 As expected, firms that
award their CEOs higher compensation also provide more disclosure,
presumably in order to justify the higher compensation. 1022 This
relationship, however, is significantly stronger in the post-say-on-pay
period. 1023 This result suggests that boards view disclosure as a useful tool
to gain approval of the say-on-pay vote.1024 Additionally, the result shows
that managers are responsive to investors' demands for compensationrelated disclosures. 1025
of textual disclosures of managerial performance. See id. at 2. Their sample includes 7973
say-on-pay votes that occurred between January 2011 and September 2014. See id. at 25.
1015. See id. at 27, 55 tbl.4 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level). The authors
focus on the 70% support level because receiving less support begins to affect firm behavior
and makes it more likely that ISS will issue a negative recommendation on subsequent sayon-pay votes. Id. at 20. The authors find similar results when they use a continuous variable
of the resulting disapproval of the say-on-pay vote. Id. at 28.
1016. Id.
1017. See id.
1018. Id. at 30, 60 tbl.6 (demonstrating significance at the 5% level).

1019. See id. at 31.
1020. See id. at 32, 62 tbl.7 (demonstrating significance at the 10% level). However, the
variable loses its significance when a control variable for ISS recommendation is added to
the regression. See id. at 32. This result may be because an ISS recommendation already
reflects the increases in textual disclosure. See id. at 32-33.
1021. Id. at 33. The authors look specifically at how the relationship between peeradjusted executive pay and textual disclosures of performance changes around the
introduction of mandatory say-on-pay voting. See id. The authors use peer-adjusted
executive pay as a proxy for shareholder demand for compensation-related disclosure. See

id.
1022. See id. at 35, 63 tbl.8 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level).

1023. Id. at 35.
1024. Id.
1025. Id. at 35-36.
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13. Frequency of Say-on-Pay Vote
The say-on-pay provisions also created a vote on how often shareholders
would vote on say on pay, with the ability to chose between every one, two,
or three years, known as "say when on pay." 1026 The say-when-on-pay vote
created a unique situation where proxy advisors consistently recommended
choosing every year, but managers' recommendations varied between one
and three years.1027

Ferri and Oesch find that a management recommendation for the
triennial option significantly increased shareholder votes for that result. 1028
Their results suggest that a management recommendation increased
shareholder support for the triennial option by 26%. 1029 Using four proxies
of management credibility, they find that shareholders give less support to
the triennial option in firms where management recommended the triennial
option but had less credibility.1030 In almost all cases, the board adopts the
frequency voted highest by shareholders. 10 31 In 2012, firms were requested
to disclose if and how they took into account the 2011 say-on-pay vote.1032
Significantly, of those companies that received negative ISS
recommendations on the say-on-pay vote, companies that adopted an
annual say-on-pay vote were significantly more likely to change their
compensation practices in 2012 because of the 2011 say-on-pay vote,
compared to the companies that adopted the triennial vote. 1033 This result
1026. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 951, 15 U.S.C.
§78n-1(a)(3)(B) (2012); Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, ManagementInfluence on Investors:
Evidence from Shareholder Votes on the Frequency of Say on Pay, at 3-4 (Columbia Bus.
Sch. Research Paper No. 13-17, Oct. 25, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2238999.
1027. Ferri & Oesch, supra note 1026, at 3. Management recommended an annual vote in
61.6% of cases. Id. On average, 75.5% of shareholders supported the annual option,
compared to 1.7% for biennial and 21.3% for triennial. Id. at 8. The annual option received
the most support in 90.8% of votes. Id.
1028. See id. at 11, 39 tbl.1 (demonstrating significance at the 1% level).
1029. See id. at 11. Including the management recommendation increased R2 from 35.2%
to 74.4%, suggesting that the management recommendation had significant explanatory
power. See id.
1030. See id. at 17-18, 43 tbl.3. In firms where management recommended the triennial
option, high votes against say on pay, high votes withheld from directors, average high votes
against management proposals, and management forecast error all predicted less support for
the triennial option, significant at the 5% level. Id.
1031. See id. at 19 (only twelve companies adopt a different frequency than recommended
by shareholders).
1032. See id.
1033. Id. at 20 (demonstrating significant differences at the 1% level). For the companies
with annual votes and negative ISS recommendations, 67.5% made changes to their
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suggests that a less frequent say-on-pay vote makes management less
responsive to shareholders' concerns on compensation.1034
14. Summary
Although the changing regulatory landscape for compensation proposals
makes direct comparisons difficult, some lessons can be drawn from the
evidence. The use of compensation proposals is clearly associated with
stronger company performance. 105 When they have a choice, managers are
more likely to submit their compensation to shareholder approval when the
company is doing well, but shareholders appear largely unconcerned with
the
company's
performance
when
it comes
to determining
103 6
compensation.
Thus, managers at less successful firms should be willing
to submit their compensation to shareholder approval without fear of
retribution. Also, submitting a proposal to a shareholder vote is associated
with better company performance in the future, but this may only be
because better performing firms submit compensation to shareholder
approval. 1037
The primary factor affecting shareholder support appears to be the level
of dilution created by the plan.1038 The 2003 reforms appear to result in
higher quality compensation plans but appear to not affect mutual fund
voting behavior.1 03 9 The new say-on-pay rules appear to give proxy
advisors a more important role in executive compensation and appear to
-1040
prompt many companies to reform their compensation practices.
V. Conclusions
A tremendous amount of empirical work has been done to document the
different aspects of shareholder voting in proxy contests for corporate
control, uncontested director elections, and management proposals. Proxy
contests for corporate control, or even the threat of such a proxy contest, act
as a productive corporate governance mechanism by providing several
benefits, including facilitating a change in management, reducing
compensation plans in response to the 2011 vote, while only 14.3% of companies with
triennial votes and negative ISS recommendation made such changes. Id.
1034. Id. at 23.
1035. See supra Section IV.E.2.
1036. See supra notes 902-905 and accompanying text.
1037. See supra Section IV.E.2.
1038. See supra Section IV.E.3.
1039. See supra Section IV.E.8.
1040. See supra Sections JV.E.12-13.
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unnecessary liquidity, and prompting the payout of dividends. The stock
market's reaction to their announcement appears to price the benefits of the
contest before it begins. Dissident shareholders take significant stakes in the
targeted company and target underperforming companies in need of better
management.
However, some evidence raises doubts about the effectiveness of proxy
contests and newly elected dissidents to help poorly performing
corporations. The stock gains, apparently associated with proxy contests,
may actually occur because of the market's revised perspective on the
likelihood of a corporate takeover. Dissident victories are associated with
poor future stock returns and weak subsequent operating performance.
Hedge fund activism has been understudied with little academic research
examining the differences between proxy contests brought by hedge funds
and those initiated by other activist investors. Hedge funds do, however,
appear to be the primary proponents of contested proxy solicitations and to
have brought more short-slate contests than control contests. The most
pressing area for future research from a policy perspective relates to hedge
fund activists' use of short-slate contests.
Uncontested director elections act less as a direct check on directors'
ability to maintain profits and more to ensure directors continue to perform
their responsibilities. Company performance appears to only slightly affect
voting results. Directors' ability to perform their duties, however, has a
larger effect on their election results. For example, directors receive fewer
"for" votes when shareholders perceive that they have granted the company
CEO excess compensation.
Shareholders distinguish between different directors in their voting.
Thus, when there is a material weakness in the internal controls of the
company, shareholders are more likely to withhold their votes for
management directors than they are for directors on the audit committee.
Similarly, if a director neglects his or her responsibilities and fails to attend
board meetings, shareholders are more likely to vote against him or her in
the next election. While some evidence suggests that low support for a
director will lead to their resignation, directors will often replace the
company's management and keep a tight hold on to their own seats. In sum,
uncontested director elections can be understood as keeping directors
focused on performing their individual jobs without passing judgment on
the efficacy of corporate policies.
Management proposals no longer receive a free pass from shareholders:
antitakeover charter amendments are suspect, and other proposals are
scrutinized by ISS and its institutional investor clients. Institutional
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investors with large stock ownership can effectively overcome collective
action problems if they are organized to block value-decreasing
antitakeover amendments.
For mergers and acquisitions, shareholder voting will not block all bad
acquisitions, although increasingly shareholders' voting behavior focuses
on maximizing company value. Shareholder votes track the stock market's
assessment of the acquisition and how it will impact the company's
performance. However, a binding shareholder vote loses its bite when
management can structure the transaction to avoid the requirement.
Furthermore, institutional cross-ownership in the target company and the
acquiring firm may lead to shareholder approval of an otherwise bad
acquisition.
Auditor ratification votes almost universally show high shareholder
support with small variations reflecting the auditor's ability to maintain its
independence and perform its work. Shareholders' votes reflect their
understanding of the potential conflicts of interest posed for audit firms if
they are receiving non-audit fees for performing other work (such as tax
advisory services) and have a long-standing relationship with the firm.
Shareholder ratification of the outside auditor is also associated with an
audit committee with greater financial expertise, lower abnormal current
accruals, and a lower chance of having a restatement.
For management compensation proposals, the dramatic changes in
government regulations makes direct comparisons difficult. Shareholders
appear largely unconcerned with the company's performance when it
comes to determining compensation. The primary factor affecting
shareholder support appears to be the level of dilution created by the plan.
The new say-on-pay rules appear to have given proxy advisors a more
important role in executive compensation and appear to have prompted
many companies to reform their compensation practices. They have also led
to greater shareholder management dialogue when management's proposals
receive lower levels of shareholder support.
As evidenced by these conclusions, the power of the proxy contest can
have dramatic impacts on corporate governance. This tremendous amount
of empirical work offers terrific insight into the effects of proxy contests for
corporate control, uncontested director elections, and management
proposals.

